Anwaarul Haq Pannun J. The State, through The Prosecutor General, Punjab, has filed instant appeal under Section 25 (4) of the Anti-T errorism Act, 1997 (Act No.XXVII of 1997) as amended by way of Act, XIII and XX of 2013, (hereinafter to be called as "the Act"), while calling in question the vires of judgment dated 30.03.2018, whereby , learned Judge Anti-T errorism Court, Rawalpindi Division, Rawalpindi (hereinafter to be called as the trial court ) on the conclusion of trial held in case FIR No.17 dated 17.05.2017, under Section 4 & 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, Sections 11-I, 11-K, 11-N, 21-C of the Act, Section 13(2)(c) of Pakistan Arms Ordinance and Article 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order , 1979, registered at P.S. CTD, Rawalpindi has acquitted respondents No.1 to 7, namely , Muhammad Ehsan, Ghulam Yasin, Muhammad Adeel Akram, Muhammad Fayyaz, Khawaja Ashar Fayyaz, Aslam Khan and Moeez Ahmad Khan respectively of the charge.
2. At the very outset, learned counsel for the respondents-acquitted accused questioned the maintainability of instant appeal by submitting that impugn ed judgment of acquittal was pronounce d on 30.03.2018, the appeal as required under section 25 (4) of the Act, could have been filed within thirty days of its pronouncement, till 29.04.2020, instead thereof , the same was filed on 03.05.2018 which is clearly three days barred by limitation, therefore, the appeal may be dismissed on this score alone.
3. Conversely , learned Deputy Prosecutor General contends that in view of Subsection (2) of Section 25 of the Act, learned trial court was under a legal obligation to supply copy of the impugned judgment dated 30.03.2018, free of cost, on the day it was pronounced, instead it was supplied to the Public Prosecutor subsequently on 04.04.2018, therefore computing the prescribed limitation period of 30 days if the time consumed in supplying copy of the impugned judgment, is excluded, the appeal filed on 03.05.2018, is within time. He further contends that the above noted delay in supplying copy of the judgment to the Public Prosecutor is an act of the Court as the appeal can only be filed under Section 25(4) of the Act after supplying copy of impugned judgment by the Court, therefore, the prosecution cannot be held responsible for the delay in filing the appeal, he prayed that in the interest of justice, the delay , if any , in filing the appeal may be condoned while exercising inherent powers of this Court.
4. Heard. Record perused.
5. In order to appreciate the above-noted rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, we feel it appropriate to examine the issue under discussion while seeing through the prism of provisions of relevant Statutes. For ready reference, Section 25 of the Act is reproduced hereunder:-
25. Appeal .- (1) An appeal against the final judgment of (an Anti-terrorism Court) shall lie to [a High Court ].
(2) Copies of the judgment of (an Anti-ter rorism Court) shall be supplied to the accused and the Public Prosecutor free of cost on the day the judgment is pronounced and the record of the trial shall be transmitted to the "a High Court " within three days of the decision .
(3) An appeal under sub-section (1) may be preferred by a person sentenced by (Anti-terrorism Court) to "a High Court" within [ fifteen days ] of the passing of the sentence.
(4) The Attorney general (Deputy Attorney General, Standing Counsel) or an Advocate General (or an Advocate of the High Court or the Supreme Court of Pakistan appointed as Public Prosecutor , Additional Public Prosecutor or a Special Public Prosecutor) may, on being directed by the Federal or a Provincial Government, file an appeal against an order of acquittal or a sentence passed by (an Anti-terrorism Court) within [ thirty ] days of such order .
[(4A) Any person who is a victim or legal heir of a victim and is aggrieved by the order of acquittal passed by an Anti-terrorism Court, may within thirty days, file an appeal in a High Court against such order .
(4B) If an order of acquittal is passed by an Anti-terrorism Court in any case instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an Application made to it by the complainant in this behalf, grant Special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the complainant may within thirty days present such an appeal to the High Court.]
(5) An appeal under this section shall be heard and decided by [a High Court] within seven working days .
[(6) * * * * * * *
(7) * *
(8) Pending the appeal a [High Court] shall not release the accused on bail.
[(9) For the purposes of hearing appeals under this section each High Court shall establish a Special Bench of Benches consisting of not less than two Judges.
(10) While hearing an appeal, the Bench shall not grant more than two consecutive adjournments.] The above provision, without any ambiguity , determines forum for filing an appeal against the final judgment of the learned trial court, places the court under a statutory obligation to supply the copy of the final judgment free of cost on the day of its pronouncement to the accused and the Public Prosecutor , vests a statutory right of appeal in some persons, besides enabling the complainant, in case of acquittal of an accused in a private complaint to seek leave of the High Court for filing an appeal to challenge such acquittal, prescribes the period of limitation for filing appeal against the final judgment. The provision of subsection (3) of Section 25 of the Act further enables to a person sentenced by the Anti-T errorism Court to prefer an appeal, within fifteen days of the passing of sente nce, to High Court. Under sub-section (4) of Section 25 of the Act, the Attorney General (Deputy Attorney General, Standing Counsel) or an Advocate General (or an Advocate of the High Court or the Supreme Court of Pakistan appointed as Public Prosecutor , Additional Public Prosecutor or a Special Public Prosecutor) may on being directed by the Federal or a Provincial Government , file an appeal against an order of acquittal or a sentence passed by (an Anti-terrorism Court) within [thirty] days of such order . Apart from above, under Section 4-A of the Act any person who is a victim or a legal heir of the victim or otherwise is a person aggrieved of the order of acquittal passed by the Anti-T errorism Court, may also file an appeal against such order within a period of thirty days in the High Court.
By providing a period of thirty days as limitation for filing an appeal to State i.e. the Federal or the Provincial Government, the victim or legal heir of the victim or any other person aggrieved by order of acquittal passed by the Court, they all have been treated at par .
6. On browsing of various provisions of the Act, one may not feel any difficulty in coming to the conclusion that enacting its provision to achieve its avowed object inter alia of speedy trial, behind the promulgation, a special emphasis has been made right from the registration of a case, in respect of the offence(s) triable under the provisions of the Act, cognizance, a special procedure prescribing a period for conclusion of trial including the provisions providing limitation for appeal and decision thereof by the appellate court. Before we leap forward, it may also be beneficial to consider some other important and relevant aspects of the matter. The Act is a Special Law and its provisions prevail upon, insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of General Law. However , in the absence of any particular provision in a Special Law dealing with any specific aspe ct, the provisions of the General Law are to be applied and invoked. Deeming it to be an opportune moment, after reaching at the trajectory of the discussion, it is observed that there exists no express provision in the Act, providing distinctly to regulate the special procedure of the appellate court except the pending appeal, the High Court shall not release accused on bail and the appeal shall be heard by a special Bench consisting of not less than two judges and the Bench while hearing an appeal shall not grant more than two consecutive adjournments and the appeal shall be heard and decided within seven working days. It appears that in absence of any express provision catering a legal requirement embodied in the provision of Section 419 Cr.P.C., (hereinafter to be referred as "the Code") which states that an appeal shall be in the form of a petition in writing, accompanied by a copy of judgment appealed against unless directed otherwise by the Court it is presented , under Section 25(2) of the Act, the Anti- Terrorism Court has been directed, to supply to the Prosecutor and the accused, as the case may be, copy of the judgment free of cost on the day it is pronounced.
7. After above analysis of Section 25 of the Act, we feel it expedient, for measuring the substance and strength of the arguments of the learned Deputy Prosecutor General, regarding exclusion of time consumed in delivery of the copy of the judgment, to examine, as of necessity , Section 3 of the Limitation Act (Act IX) of 1908 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Limitation Act'), which reads as under:- "Dismissal of suits, etc., instituted, etc., after period of limitation. Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 25 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made, after the period of limitation prescribed therefore by the first schedule shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence."
8. The gist of command contained in the above-quoted provision, may be expressed in simple words by saying that subject to Provisions of Section 4 to 25 of the Limitation Act (both inclusive) every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made, after the period of limitation prescribed therefor in the First schedule , inspite the Limitation is not set up as a defence by an adverse party , shall be dismissed. The Court, seized with the matter , of its own, shall examine the question of limitation and pass an order accordingly . Needless to observe that the Provisions of Sections 4 to 25 of the Limitation Act are the exceptions meant for excluding such period by condoning the delay on the application of the concerned party on its showing sufficient cause in computing the period of Limitation. The First Schedule, which finds mention in Section 3 of the Limitation Act, being its progeny , has been divided into three parts i.e. (i) First Division: Suits , (ii) Second Division: Appeals, (iii)Third Division: Applications.
9. In order to elaborate the issue under discussion, the relevant Articles dealing with the appeals mentioned above, are reproduced as under:- The First Schedule (See Section 3)
Second Division: Appeals Description of suit Period of limitationTime from which period beings to run 1 2 3
150. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, (V of 1898), from a sentence of death passed by a Court of Sessions or by a High Court in the exercise of its original Criminal Jurisdiction.Seven days The date of the sentence
151. ......... ......... .......
152. ......... ......... .......
153. ........ ......... ........
154. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, (V of 1898), to any Court other than a High Court.Thirty days The date of the Sentence or order appealed from
155. Under the same Code to a High Court, except in the case provided for by Article 150 and Article 157.Sixty days The date of the Sentence or order appealed from
156. ....... ........ ........
157. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, from an order of acquittal.Six months The date of the sentence or order appealed from
10. The provision of sub-section 4 of Section 25 of the Act, when read parallel to the above Articles, makes it vivid that in the said schedule, a different perio d of limitation for filing appeals against an order/judgment of conviction or acquittal, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1908 as compared with the Act has been prescribed. Article 157 of the Act, referred above, is only relevant for the purpose of our discussion. It provides a period of six months as limitation for filing an appeal under Section 417 Cr.P.C against the acquittal order , from the date of passing of the impugned order/judgment by the State. Needless to observe that Criminal Procedure Code, 1908 is a procedural law generally regulating the procedure before the criminal courts established under it. A person aggrieved by order of acquittal passed by any Court, other than High Court, is vested with a right of appeal under Section 417(2-A) of the Code to be filed within a prescribed period of 30 days as limitation against such order from the date of its pronouncement. Having discussed the above provisions in length and depth, still we feel ourselves tempted to examine the provision of Section 29 of the Limitation Act 1908, being relevant, which reads as under:- "29. Savings .(1) Nothing in this Act shall af fect section 25 of the contract Act, 1872 (IX of 1872).
(2) Where any special or local law prescr ibes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the First Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply , as if such period were prescribed therefor in that Schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law:
(a) The provisions contained in section 4, sections 9 to 18, and section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and
(b) The remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply ."
3. ------------------.
4. ------------------."
11. The provision, reproduced hereinabove, on its close scrutiny , manifests that where a different period of limitation for the institution of a suit, preferring an appeal or making of an application is prescribed under the provisions of any Special or Local Law, than the Limitation Act, it shall be deemed as if the same has been prescribed by the First Schedule under Section 3 of the Limitation Act. The provision of Section 3 of the Limitation Act shall apply , as if such period of limitation were prescribed therefore in that schedule. It has further been mentioned that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation, prescribed for any suit, appeal or application under any Special or Local Law, the provisions of Sections 4, 9 to 18 & 22 of the Limitation Act, shall apply only in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by special or local law and the remaining provisions of the Act shall not apply .
12. It may further be observed that Sectio n 4 of the Limitation Act extends the period of prescribed limitation where it expires on a day when the court is closed for institution of the suit, appeal or application, as the case may be, till the day the court re-opens. It is an established principle of law that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in its applicability , has a limited scope, as the same is only applicable where it has specifically been made applicable to certain kind of proceedings "by or under any enactment". The conspicuous non-making of application to this provision in proceedings under Special or Local Laws thus has very obvious reasons. The law of limitation is not merely a reflection of public policy . It creates and extinguishes the rights of the parties with the efflux of time.
Out of the remaining provisions of Sections 9 to 18 & 22 of the Limitation Act, only Section 12 is relevant for advancing our discussion, which is reproduced as under:- "12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings .(1) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned shall be excluded.
(2) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an application for a review of judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced, and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be reviewed shall be excluded.
(3)Where a decree is appealed from or sought to be reviewed, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of decree on which it is founded shall also be excluded.
(4) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an application to set aside an award, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.
(5) For the purpose of subsections (2)(3) and (4), the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence, order , judgment or award shall be deemed to be the time intervening between the day on which an application for the copy is made and the day actually intimated to the applicant to be the day on which the copy will be ready for delivery .
13. It may be reiterated that Sections 4, 9 to 18 & 22, according to Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act, shall apply only insofar as and to the extent of which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law and no other section shall apply . We have found no express provision in the Act excluding the application of Section 12 of the Limitation Act but dealing with the arguments of the learned Deputy Prosecutor General that non-compliance of the provision of Section 25(2) of the Act requiring supply of copy of the judgment, to the Public Prosecutor , free of cost, on the day it was pronounced, being an act of the Court, when the appeal can be filed under Section 25(4) of the Act only after supplying of copy of impugned judgment free of cost to him, the prosecution therefore cannot be held responsible for the delay in filing the appeal, if any, and prayed for condoning the delay while exercising inherent powers by the Court, it may be observed with good quantum of ease that under sub-sections 1 & 2 of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, it is legally permissible while computing the prescribed period of limitation only the exclusion of time requisite for obtaining a copy of decree, sentence or order appealed for or sought to be reviewed. Sub-section 5 of Section 12 of the Act further clarifies the position leaving no room for entertaining any doubt that for the purpose of sub-sections 2, 3 & 4, regarding exclusion of time, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of decree, sentence, order , judgment or award shall be deemed to be the time intervening between the day on which an application for the copy is made and the day actually intimated to the applicant to be the day on which the copy will be ready for delivery . In addition to above, even in case the copy of the judgment is not supplied either to the public prosecutor or the accu sed, as the case may be, there exists, under sub-section 4 of Section 25 of the Act, no bar in filing an appeal after obtaining a copy of the judgment on their own, therefore, the maxim "Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit" has not application in the instant case. The above referred Section 421 of Cr.P.C., also permits the filing of appeal in the form of a petition in writing accom panied by a copy of judgment appealed against, however , at the same time, the court to which the appeal is presented, if requested, can dispense with such requirement. Dealing with the second limb of arguments of learned Deputy Prosecutor General that while exercising inherent power vested with this Court, the delay in filing the appeal may be condoned, it may be suffice to observe that despite perusing the memorandum of appeal keenly we have found not a single word showing any sufficient cause for seeking condonation of delay . Even on Court' s query , the learned Deputy Prosecutor General, after perusing the memorandum of appeal and copy of impugned judgment, failed to show that the copy of the judgment appended with this appeal was the first ever and no copy prior to that had been supplied to the Public Prosecutor . Even, the judgment is also silent in this regard. The doub t, which has arisen in the afore- referred circumstances about the exact date of supply of copy of judgment to the learned Prosecutor for computing the prescribed period of limitation for filing of appeal requires its resolve in favour of the respondents-accused, who have earned double presumption of their innocence. It may further be observed that in most of the criminal jurisdictions, acquittal of the charge recorded by the court of competent jurisdiction is not appealable and is deemed to be final. In our law, however , acquittal can be challenged in certain circumstances within a period of limitation prescribed by law. The request for condonation of delay by invoking jurisdiction of the superior courts, in the larger interest of justice, if made, can only be entertained on showing that delay in filing the appeal was caused either by an act of the acquitted accused or by circumstances of some compelling nature beyond human control, which as discussed above, do not exist in the instant case, therefore, repelling the arguments of learned Deputy Prosecutor General, we hold that the appeal at hand being barred by limitation is not maintainable .
14. For what has been discussed, it is un-hesitantly observed that the appeal in hand has been filed beyond a prescribed period of limitation i.e. 30 days from the date of pronouncement of the judgment, therefore, the same is dismissed on the score alone being barred by limitation.