ROZI KHAN BARRECH, J.---The appellant was involved in case FIR No.80/2013 dated 16.12.2013 registered under section 302, P.P.C. at Levies Headquarter , District Pishin and was tried by learned Sessions Judge, Pishin ("trial court"). The trial court seized with the matter in terms of judgment dated 14.11.2018 ("impugned judgment "), convicted and sentenced the appellant in the following terms:-- "37........As such accused Sanaullah son of Hazrat Gul is convicted under section 302(b), P. P.C. and sentenced to death as Tazir and he is also required to make payment of compensation amountin g to Rs.600,000/- (six lac) to the legal heirs of deceased as per provisions contained under section 544-A Cr.P. C. or in default to suffer R.I for six
(06) months."
Aggrieved from the impugned judgment the appellant has assailed his conviction and sentence through criminal appeal bearing No. 352 of 2018, while the trial court forwarded murder reference No. 08 of 2018 for confirmation of the sentence of death inflicted upon the convict/appellant in terms of section 374, Cr.P.C. as both the cases are arising out one and the same judgment of the trial court, therefore same are being disposed of through this single judgment.
2. The prosecution story as disclosed in the complaint Ex.P/1-A recorded on the statement of Muhammad Naeem, complainant/PW -1 is that on 14.11.2013 at 9:30 am the appellant/accused Sanaullah took the complainant's brother namely Muhammad Ismail (deceased) in his vehicle bearing Registration No. KT-415 from his house. At about 2:08 pm his cousin Shahidullah (PW-9) received a telephone call on his mobile phone number (0300- 9383390), who along with Muhammad Asif (PW-2) were sitting in the guestroom (Baithak) from the cell phone of Muhammad Ismail. He turned the speaker on, it was stated from the other side that Muhammad Ismail is with them and in lieu of his release, demand of ransom amounting to Rs.25,00,000/- was made for his release. Thereafter , they tried to contact the said number time and again, but found the same switched off. On the next day, the complainant came to know that tie appellant/accused Sanaullah has come back, he went to meet the appellant at his house, who was very nervous, and was unable to disclose the whereabouts of Muhammad Ismail satisfactorily , therefore, he was handed over the accused (Sanaullah) to Sariab police, whereby it was revealed by accused that he along with Muhammad Younas the bakery owner , Pehlwan and Younas Levies official with consultation of each other abducted Muhammad Ismail and due to non-payment of ransom demanded for release of the abductee they killed Muhammad Ismail and threw him in Pishin area. On 16th December 2013 the complainant received information that the dead body of his brother is lying in civil hospital Quetta. On the said information the complainant and his relatives went to the hospital and found the dead body of his brother at the hospital, which had four gunshot injuries behind his head on other parts of his body . Hence the criminal report.
3. After completion of the investigation the challan was submitted before the trial court, charge was framed on 24th September , 2014 to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial, whereafter the prosecution in order to substantiate the accusation against the appellant produced as many as twelve witnesses during the trial.
Muhammad Naeem (PW-1) was the complainant of the case. Muhammad Asif (PW-2) was witness of last seen.
Muhammad Tahir, Levies Khasadar (PW-3) was witnesses of proceedings carried out under Section 174, Cr.P.C.
Wajid (PW-4) was circumstantial witness. Niaz Muhammad (PW-5) is recovery witness of blood stained clothes of the deceased (Ex.P/5-A) and disclosure memo of the appellant (Ex.P/5-B). Abdul Nafay , Levies Khasadar (PW-6) was the witness of pointation of place of occurrence by appellant (Ex.P ./6-A). Abdul Nafey , Levies Khasadar (PW-7) was witness of recovery memo of handkerchief, waistcoat and shoes of the deceased (Ex.P/7-A) and recovery memo of bullet empties of TT pistol (Ex.P/7-C). Shahidullah Jatak (PW-9) was the circumstantial witness of the occurrence, who received telephone call from unknown person with regard to demand of ransom. Noor Bakhsh Mengal Judicial Magistrate-X, Quetta (PW-10), who recorded the confessional statement of the appellant Sanaullah under Section 164, Cr.P.C., (Ex.P/10-A, Ex. P/10-B and Ex. P/10-C). Ghul am Mustafa Naib Tehsildar (PW-11), was the investigation officer of the case who stated about various steps taken by him during investigation of the case. (Ex.P/1 1-A to Ex.P/1 1-F). Junaid Khan Naib Tehsildar (PW-12) produ ced the supplementary challan (Ex.P/12-A).
Dr. Ghulam Sarwar Hashmi Medico-Legal Officer (PW-8), who examined the dead body of deceased Muhammad Ismail and found the following injuries (Ex.P/8-A): "Injuries: 1) One bullet entrance 1 x 1 cm lower occipital skull.
2) Exit right side lower neck.
3) two bullet entrance right shoulder 1 x 1 cm interiorly chest.
4) One bullet entrance right scapular 1 x 1 cm exit arterially right upper chest.
5) One bullet exit mid lower back 1 x 1 'cm and exit mid abdomen.
Probable cause of death: Cause of death is head injury caused by firearm.
Duration: Above 12 hours also torture signing present."
4. The statement of the appellant/accused was recorded under section 342, Cr.P.C. wherein he rebutted the allegation leveled against him and professed his innocence. The appellant neither opted to appear as his own witness under Section 340(2), Cr.P.C. nor produced any witness in his defense. After hearing arguments advanced by learned counsel appearing on behalf of both the parties, the, trial court while evaluating the evidence available on record found the version of the prosecution proved beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt. Resultantly , recorded conviction to the appellant in the above terms.
5. Arguments advanced from both the sides have been heard. We have also minutely zone through the record available on file with the able assistance of learned counsel for the parties. We have noted that the learned counsel for the appellant during trial filed an application under section 7 of the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000 (repealed) for determination of age of the appellant as juvenile with the request that the case may be transferred to juvenile court, on the ground that the date of birth of the appellant was 01.08.1998 according to his school leaving certificate. On basis of application filed by learned counsel for the appellant the trial court sent a letter to the Medical Superintendent of Bolan Medical Complex Hospital Quetta on 17.07.2013, for constitution of Medical Board for determination of age of the appellant. Subsequently , on direction of the trial court, the Provincial Health Directorate Balochistan constituted a medical board and after examining the appellant, the medical board issued a certificate on 27.08.2014, according to which the age of the appellant was about 17 years.
6. The question of age of a person facing trial, who has been put to the trial to face the charge of murder has got a significant importance in view of Section 16 of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018. According to said section no person who was a juvenile offender at the time of commission of an offence shall be awarded punishment of death.
The Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018, was promulgated in order to provide protection for the right of children involved in the criminal litigation, where as its preamble states that it is expedient to provide for protection of children in criminal litigation, their rehabilitation in society , reorganization of Juvenile Courts and matters connected therewith and incidental thereto; whereas its clause (b) of Section 2 states that: "2. Definitions: (a)... (b) 'child' means a person who at the time of an offence has not attained the age of eighteen years."
7. We are mindful that once it was brought to the knowledge of the learned trial Judge that the appellant was a child under section 2(b) of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018, his trial should have proceeded under section 4 thereof rather than under ordinary law. The conviction and sentences of the appellant is tantamount to throwing him away in a prison with adults with R.I. in violation of section 16 of Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018, which states that no child should be given corporal punishment at any time while in custody . The above provision of law clearly provided that the appellant being juvenile cannot be awarded death. Similarly he cannot be ordered to labour etc in view of the clear bar contained under the law, which is applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, the trial court has wrongly awarded death punishment to the appellant.
8. As far as merits of the case are conc erned, the record transpires that no one came forward to furnish ocular account of this unfortunate incident, thus, one may say that it is an unseen occurr ence. The material collected by the prosecution are; last seen evidence furnished by Muhammad Asif (PW-2), pointation of place of occurrence by the appellant, confessional statement of the appellant and circumstantial evidence in the shape of last worn clothes of the deceased, recovery of bullet empties and blood stained earth from the place of occurrence and medical evidence.
9. Before dilating upon the above referred circumstantial evidence, we are fully conscious of the principle that if the case is based on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must ensure, that the circumstances from which the inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established. The circumstances must unerringly point towards the guilt of the accused and when taken cumulatively , should form a chain so complete, that it must demonstrate in all probabilities that the crime was committed by the accused. It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be in the first instance be fully established and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidenc e so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. In case titled "Sheikh Muhammad Amjad v. State" (PLD 2003 SC 704), the august Supreme Court while dealing with circumstantial evidence, has been held that:-- "According to the standard of proof required to convict a person on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances relied upon in support of the conviction must be fully established and the chain of evidence furnished by those circumstances must be so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused. The circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn have not only to be fully established but also that all the circumstances so established should be of a conclusive nature and consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and should not be capable of being explained by any other hypothesis, except the guilt of the accused and when all the circumstances cumulatively taken together should lead to the only irresistible conclusion that the accused alone is the perpetrator of the crime."
10. First of all we would take the last seen evidence, which is usually not considered to be strong piece of evidence. In the case in hand the same has was furnished by Muhammad Asif (PW-2). According to this witness on 14.12.2013 he was present with Muham mad Ismail (deceased) in the house. The appellant asked Muhammad Ismail about going to Pishin. Then Muhammad Ismail took his vehicle 2.0-D car and told him to sit with him in the car. Thereafter they reached near Balochistan University , wherefrom they took Sanaullah and went to Kasi cemetery ({{URDU TEXT}}). He was left there, whereafter appellant Sanaullah and Muhammad Ismail left. The above story narrated by PW-2 has neither been corroborated from the FIR as well as the statement of the appellant recorded under Section 164, Cr.P.C., nor the prosecution produced any other corroborating evidence in this behalf.
This version of PW-2 establishes his status as a witness of last seen, which is an afterthought and seems concocted and fabricated one. Had he seen the appellant Sanaullah on the very first day of Muhammad Ismail's missing he would have definitely disclose d before the police regarding missing of the deceased, when he was last seen with one Sanaullah and he would have also inquired from the appellant about the whereabouts of the deceased but he did not lodge the report on the first day rather his statement was recorded by the police on 17.12.2013 after three days from missing of the deceased Muhammad Ismail. Admittedly the last seen evidence is the weakest type of evidence unless corroborated by other strong pieces of evidence. It is difficult to award punishment of capital charge on basis of evidence of last seen. The statement of PW-2 does not find any support from alleged confessional statement of the appellant and other piece of evidence. Thus, this belated story of PW-2 regarding last seen of the deceased in the company of the appellant is unbelievable and not trustworthy .
11. The next piece of evidence is deman ding ransom from the complainant party . The complainant alleged in his report that on 14th December 2013 at 2:08 pm, he along with his cousin PW-9 Shahidullah were sitting in his Baithak, when Shahidullah received a call on his mobile phone number 0333-9383390 from the mobile phone of deceased Muhammad Ismail. He turned the speaker on and Muhammad Asif (PW-2) was also sitting in Baithak.
The person who called the number of PW-9 Shahidullah from the mobile phone of the deceased told them that Muhammad Ismail was in their custody and demanded an amount of Rs.25,00,000/- in lieu of his release, whereby the said person disconnected the call. The record reveals that neither the complainant informed the police about receiving of a phone call with ransom demand nor lodged the report in respect of the deceased Muhammad Ismail.
He lodged the report on 16.12.2013 when the dead body of the deceased was lying in civil hospital Quetta. Even otherwise, the complainant did not collec t the record of the telephone from which they received call, neither the approached the police for collecting the Call Data Record about receiving calls. PW-2 Muhammad Asif and PW-9 Shahidullah, who were allegedly sitting with the complainant at the time of receiving call also did not inform the police or levies about receiving of the said call. The question arises here as to what was the occasion for the said witnesses to have been present at the Baithak of complainant on 14.12.2016 at 2:08, the very time at which they received call from the unknown person that too on Shahidullah's phone, with ransom demand in lieu of release of the deceased from his mobile, who are also not close relatives of the deceased. In this regard no explanation whatsoever has been rendered by the prosecution. Under such circumstances the alleged call for ransom appears to be fabricated and cooked story , simply because no voice data of the phone call was collected either by the police or levies or produced by the complainant party . The testimony of the above witness is neither truth-worthy nor inspiring confidence. Reliance in this regard is placed in the case of Azeem Khan and another v. Mujahid Khan (2016 SCMR 274 ).
12. The occurrence took place on 14.12.2013 and the FIR was lodged on 16.12.2013 at 10:00 pm. The record reveals that the complainant knew about the occurrence on 14.12.2013. The complainant in his report as well as in his statement stated that on 15.12.2013 when they came to know that juvenile Sanaullah is at his home, they met him who was very nervous and could not satisfactorily answer about the whereabouts of the deceased, therefore they handed him over to Sariab police, whereby Sanaullah disclosed that " he and absconding accused put the deceased to death on account of non-pyment of ransom and threw his body at the area of Pishin Tehsil".. The statements of Muhammad Naeem (PW-1) and Ghulam Mustafa (PW-11) investigation officer I0 reveal that the accused was handed over to Levies Pishin on 15.12.2013 and the JO stated that when Kuchlak police handed over the accused to him they told that "the accused is involved in murder of deceased Muhammad Ismail" meaning thereby that the complainant and I0 and the police officials of Kuchlak police were having knowledge about missing of the deceased and his murder on 15.12.2013 but despite that the complainant did not lodge the report and he lodged the report on 16.12.2013 at 10:00 pm. Lodgment of the FIR with such delay has not been plausibly explained by the prosecution as well as complainant. Which create reasonable doubt in the prosecution case.
Reliance in this behalf is placed on the case of Mehmood Ahmad and 3 others v. The State and another 1995 SCMR 127 .
13. The judicial confession made by the appellant is another piece of evidence that has been relied upon to convict the appellant. He was produced before PW-10 Judicial Magistrate, Pishin namely Noor Bakhsh Mengal, who recorded his statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. on 23rd December 2013. The accused stated in his statement that "he and deceased Muhammad Ismail were friends and the deceased Muhammad Ismail did a wrongful act with him in his baithak despite his resistance. One day he met with Muhammad Younas Levies official (absconding accused) who came to his home from Pishin to Quetta. He told him about the story of wrongful act of the deceased with him.
Muhammad Younas told him to bring Muhammad Ismail to Pishin; that on 14th December he went to Pishin in Muhammad Ismail's GLI silver colored car, whereafter they picked up Muhammad Younas and his other friends; that they took the deceased to mountain area and made firing upon him."
14. Having given our anxious consideration to the foregoing background of the matter of murder of the deceased contained in the FIR as well as in view of the statements of PW-1 Muhammad Naeem, PW-2 Muhammad Asif, PW- 9 Shahidullah on one hand and the retracted confession of the appellant on the other, it has been observed that there are two sets of evidence on record. First set of evidence as already discussed consists of FIR, court statement of the complainant, PW-2 and PW-9 and the second and crucial set of evidence consists of the confessional statement of the appellant before the Judicial Magistrate recorded under Section 164, Cr.P.C. The statement of appellant recorded under section 164, Cr.P.C. has not corroborate d with the FIR as well as the statements of so-called witnesses.
15. During the trial the appellant retracted his judicial confession. At the time of alleged occurrence, age of the accused was 15/16 years. Admittedly , the appellant was a minor when he was tried under the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000 (repealed) now the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance Act, 2018, which is a special law.
The question before this court is as to whether the appellant who was a minor at the time of alleged occurrence could have been dealt with under the ordinary law. In the present case the trial court has mainly relied on circumstantial evidence and on the stance of the accused, the trial court was under obligation to consider the age and every aspect of the confessional statement for getting satisfaction as to whether all the formalities have been complied with or not. It is well settled that before recording the confessional statement of the accused, the Judicial Magistrate should essentially observe all the mandatory precautions as I per High Court Rules and Procedure so that all signs of fear inculcated by the investigation agency in the mind of the accused are to be shed out. Reliance is place on the case titled as Azeem Khan and another v. Mujahid and others (2016 SCMR 274). But we see no such precautionary measures in the present case, which in the circumstances of the case were pre-requisite for recording the confession of a minor . Before this Court is the case of a minor who has mainly been convicted on the basis of his judicial confession, .therefore, extra ordinary care and caution was required to have been taken by the concerned Judicial Magistrate before recording his confessional statement. Record shows that the appellant j was arrested on 15.12.2013 before lodging the FIR, which was registered on 16.12.2013 and produced him before the Judicial Magistrate on 23.12.2013. The appellant, being a minor , was provided no opportunity of counseling neither by his guardian nor by a lawyer . It was desirable in the interest of justice that the appellant, being a juvenile, should have been provided counseling facility of guardian or a lawyer of his choice but no such opportunity has been afforded to him by the Judicial Magistrate before recording his confessional statement. Reliance in this regard is placed on the judgment of the apex Court in the case titled "Hashim Qasim and another v. The State" (2017 SCMR 986 ).
16. The learned Judicial Magistrate did not state a single word in his statement as well as in the certificated issued by him i.e. Ex.P/10-A that neither any offer was made to the appellant for counseling. Under such circumstances, we have no other option but to presume that no offer was made to the appellant for counseling. It appears that the learned Judicial Magistrate did very little in the current case to comply with the letter and spirit of recording judicial confession. He did not explain the appellant that who he was and even the appellant was not told that "he will not be handed over to police/levies after his confession". Indeed, the learned Judicia l Magistrate after recording the confession, handed over the appellant to the same levies officials, who produced him for purpose of taking him for judicial remand. This fact is also confirmed by PW-11 Ghulam Mustafa (10). Who conducted investigation of the case. He stated during cross:examination that on 23.12.2013 after recording the confessional statement of the accused under Section 164 Cr.P.C, he was handed over to him and thereafter he sent the accused to judicial lockup through levies. Under the above circumstances, the confession of the accused was not voluntary and gross illegality was committed by the learned Judicial Magistrate.
17. The confession of the minor is to be assessed on the same touchstone as to that of statement of a child witness rather child witness is brought to the dock by relatives while on the contrary child accused is brought to the court by police officials for recording his confessional statement where possibility of tutoring and police fear is always there. Reliance is place on the case of State through Advocate General Sindh, Karachi v. Farman Hussain and others (PLD 1995 SC 1). Whether the appellant was able to under stand the nature of questions put to him by the Judicial Magistrate or otherw ise, in this regard even the judicial magis trate did not put question to the appellant for recording his statement that after recording his statement he would not be handed over to police or levies and in this regard another example is the answer given by the appellant to Question No. 5 that why he is recording his statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C.? the answer of the appellant was that "because I have committed crime, I have done wrong."
18. It can easily be assessed from the answer given by the appellant that he was unable to understand the nature of question or to give rational answer thereof. Under such circumstances, when utmost care is to be taken while assessing the testimony of a child witness, on the same yardstick extraordinary care and caution should have been taken by the Judicial Magistrate while recording the confessional statement of the appellant and the trial court as well as by evaluating his such statement for his conviction specially when the offence carries capital punishment.
The learned judicial magistrate filled the answers without adhering to the codal formalities and without considering the intellectual level of the minor who was unaware of the consequences of his statement. Likewise the possibility of the appellant being minor to have been tutored or tortured by the local police before recording his confessional statement cannot be ruled out especially when no opportunity of counseling by parents or a lawyer was afforded to him. The learned judicial magistrate did not go through the case file before recording the confessional statement of the accused. It is stated earlier that the accused was arrested on 15.12.2013 before lodging of the FIR and it came on record that at first he was brought by relatives of the deceased to police station Sariab and he was handed over to them, thereafter the accused was handed over to Kuchlak police and then the Kuchlak Police handed over the accused to Levies Pishin. It has also been admitted by PW-1 that before taking the accused to police station Sariab they manhandled the appellant. As per PW-11 Ghulam Mustafa, when the appellant was handed over to him by Kuchlak police no document was handed over to him by the concerned police of ficials of Kuchlak about his arrest.
19. The record further transpires that the police and levies wrongly confined the accused before lodging of the FIR without taking remand from the concerne d Judicial Magistrate. By considering the above facts and circumstances regarding the judicial confession of the appellant, we feel no hesitation in holding that the requisite care and vigilance has neither been taken by the learned Judicial Magistrate before recording L confessional statement of the appellant nor by the trial court in recording conviction against the appellant on basis of the same statement and the said confessional statement was recorded after torturing the accused and the same is not voluntary , therefore , it would be highly unsafe to rely upon the confessional statement of the appellant for maintaining his conviction.
Reliance is placed on the case of Abdul Haleem v The State (1984 PCr.LJ Karachi 611). Reliance is also placed on the case of Abdul Hameed v The State (PLD 1980 Peshawar 25 ).
It has been stated earlier that the appel lant was arrested on 15.12.2013. He was produced before the learned Judicial Magistrate on 23.12.2013 i.e. eight days after his arrest for recording his statement under Section 164, Cr.P.C. Such delay has not plausibly been explained by the prosecution, which has highly injured its credibility and same cannot be accepted as confidence inspiring against the appellant. Reliance is placed in Naqeebullah's case (PLD 1978 SC 21) and Khalid Javed and another v. The State (2003 SCMR 1419 ). Reference may also be made to the case of Shoukat Saeed v. The State PLD 1978 Quetta 1, Patoo and another v. The State (2012 MLD 1358 ).
20. The confessional statement is not to be accepted as a substantive piece of evidence and to place conviction on it alone unless it is corroborated in each and every detail by other corroborative and circumstantial evidence is not warranted. The prosecution case is full of contradictions and manner and mode of occurrence is highly doubtful and the evidence produced in support of its case is not confidence inspiring. The courts are always vigilant, that the prosecution shall prove in all the circumstances that the confessional statement or extract thereof was free of all kinds of coercion, threat, promise and that it was voluntary . Retracted confession shall not be accepted as Gospel's truth. The court shall carefully scrutinize such confessional statement to ascertain as to whether all the formalities required thereto of recording of such statement were fulfilled by the court, which is recording such statement of a juvenile accused. Reliance is placed on the case of Muhammad Parvez and others v. The State (2007 SCMR 670), Muhammad Ali v. The State (2008 PCr.LJ 87). In the case of Muhammad Yousuf v. The State (1995 SCMR 351 ) it was held as under: "Section 302-Retracted confession---Courts generally refrain from basing conviction solely on retracted confession and have always sought for some reliable corroborative evidence regarding material particulars in the confessional statement."
21. The above discrepancies in the prosecution evidence not only create serious and reasonable doubts in prudent mind the benefit of which must go the accused, being a well cherished principle of criminal justice but the same have further obscured the retracted confessional statement of the appellant. It is settled principle of law that conviction cannot be based only on the confessional statement of the accused unless the prosecution is able to substantiate its case against the accused by trustworthy and inspiring evidence which is not available in the present case. Even otherwise, the confes sion here in this case being retracted one which is not corroborated by the other oral as well as circumstantial evidence on the record, hence, the same cannot be used for conviction of the accused. Reliance is placed on the judgment in the case titled Muhammad Ismail and others v. The State (2017 SCMR 898 ) the Superior Court held that:- "The only other piece of evidence remaining in the field was a judicial confession allegedly made by Muhammad lqrar, Khalid Hussain and Shakir Ali appellants before a Magistrate under section 164, Cr. P . C. but admittedly the said judicial confession had been retracted by the appellants before the trial Court and in the absence of any independent corroboration such retracted judicial confession could not suffice all by itself for recording or upholding the appellants' convictions".
In view of the above discussion, the trial Court has failed to properly analyze the prosecution evidence especially the confessional statement of the appellant according to the principles laid down by the Superior Courts, therefore, this appeal is allowed, the judgment dated 14.11.2018 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Pishin ("trial court ") is set aside, consequent upon the appellant is acquitted of the charge in FIR No. 80/2013 dated 16.12.2013 registered under Section 302, P.P.C. at Levies Headquarter , District Pishin. The appellant is in custody . He is directed to be released forthwith if not required in any other case.
The Murder Reference No.08 of 2018 is answered in NEGA TIVE. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.