Inessential detail apart, subject area measuring 187 kanals 01 marla having not been left by any migrant was not available for allotment to refugee(s) against his/their verified claim, whereas this land was part and parcel of Evacuee Trust Board, but Ghani, ascendant of the present petitioners managed its transfer on Register RL-II, which was kept under the carpet and finally brought into light after more than three decades, when the alleged transferee made application before the District Collector for its incorporation in the revenue record. The said authority referred the matter to the Assistant Commissioner for making a probe to scrutinize the genuineness or otherwise of the purported allotment, who after due inquiry found it to be forged and further authenticated that disputed area being vested to the Evacuee Trust Property Board stood duly leased out to different persons in series and continuity . The District Collect or having been appraised the said facts, dismissed application of Ghani through order of 30th March, 1991. The allottee being dejected approached the Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property Board through reference under sections 8 & 10 of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act XIII of 1975 for validation of his alleged transfer , which was declined through detailed order of 3rd January , 1995.
Although revision petition was made by Ghani before the Revisory Authority , but soon thereafter withdrawn and he instituted civil suit for confirmation of his title on the basis of afore-referred allotm ent allegedly made on Register RL-II, which though concurrently decreed all the way up to this Court through judgments of 23rd January , 1996, 16th March 1998 & 27th June, 2006 respectively , yet having been assailed by the Evacuee Trust Property Board, were reversed and suit of petitioners dismissed on 13th January , 2016 by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan through judgment reported as 'Khurshid Ahmad and others versus Rana Mumtaz Ahmad and others' (2016 SCMR 679). It would be pertinent to mention that in the meantime Abdul Rashid, Faqir Muhammad, Khurshid Ahmed and Ghulam Mustafa instituted suit No.186-1/1995 for specific performance of contract against Ghani (the alleged allottee) and procured somewhat consent decree on 25th January , 1996 qua part of subject land, which was satisfied in favour of said decree-holders vide attestation of sale deed No.3006 of 7th May, 1996. These proceedings were also quashed by the apex Court through aforesaid reported judgm ent, which was further affirmed when review petitions were dismissed as well on 17th January , 2018, as such verdict of the august Supreme Court declaring that it was Evacuee Trust Property since late 30s and that Ghani as well as subsequent decree-holders lacked locus standi much less a cause of action to lay their hands on its ownership in any form before any forum though attained finality , yet thereafter; firstly , on behalf of subsequent transferees (decree-holders), Writ Petition No.4616 of 2019 was preferred, but declined. Then those bootless writ petitioners approached the hon'ble Division Bench of this Court via ICA No.47445/2019, which too was dismissed with heavy costs vide order of 4th September , 1999. At least, after the said fruitless fresh cycle of litigation, there left nothing to be reopened, but now in second attempt, the legal heirs of Ghani initially made another unsuccessful reference before respondent No.1, which met with the result of dismissal on 11th June, 2020 and presently they dared to approach this Court through petition in hand with the following prayer:- 'It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that the instant petition may kindly be accepted, record of the case be called for, notices be issued to respondents and the impugned order dated 11.06.2020 passed by the Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property Board may kindly be set aside and be declared that the property was rightly transferred in the name of Ghani in his favour of its claim and the Chairman has no authority to interfere the matter and he has accepted the findings on this issue in the interest of justice and equity .
It is further prayed that the operation of impugned order dated 11.06.2020 passed by the Chairman Evacuee Trust Property Board may kindly be stayed till the final decision of the titled petition in the interest of justice and equity .
Any other relief, which this Honourable Court deemed appropriate in the peculiar facts and circumstances may also very kindly be granted to the petition to secure the ends of justice and fair play .'
2. During the course of deliberation, Mr. Tallat Farooq Shaikh, learned counsel for the petitioners on being faced to the history narrated above was left with no words to deny the same or justify the initiation of present litigation and when the matter in first round stood alrea dy finalized by the apex Court through reported judgment (supra) to the following ef fect:- 'A look at the extracts from the record of rights for the years 1938-1939 and onward would reveal that this property has been entered as Gaoshala Society Bar. These entries have been repeated till 1960-61. After 1960-61 the Auqaf Department took the control and management of this property and had been managing this property through lease to different persons as is evident from the entries made in the periodical records of 1964-1965, 1968-1969, 1980-1981, 1984-1985 and 1988-1989. Respondent No.1 claims to be the allottee of this property through RL-II mentioned above but at no stage of time any entry of its allotment to the respondent figured in any of the periodical records ever since 1946-1947. The respondent alleged that this property was confirmed in his name but the entries in RL-II do not conf orm to his claim. He moved a petition under sections 8 and 10 of the Evacuee Trust Property (Management and Disposal) Act No.XIII of 1975 in the Court of Chairman Evacuee Trust Board, Govt. of Pakistan but he could not substantiate his claim that the property in dispute was evacuee and that he was its lawful allottee. Even entries in naqsha taqseem do not support the contention that the property in dispute has ever been allotted to the respondent. The evidence led in this behalf overwhelmingly proves that the property is Evacuee Trust Property ever since late 30s. The surprising part of the litigation is that the respondent himself invoked the jurisdiction of the Evacuee Trust Board for its verdict about the nature of the property but when the verdict given by the Board turned against him, he turned the table on the Board and proceeded to question its verdict through a revision petition. Somehow he withdrew it and instituted a civil suit questioning the verdict of the Chairman Evacuee Trust Board notwithstanding such verdict being amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the Federal Government in the hierarchy established under the Act and then Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, could not have been challenged in the Civil Court especially when its jurisdiction was barred by Section 14 of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal)
Act, 1975. besides further solicited with the declaration below:- 'When preponderance of documentary as well as oral evidence on the record and verdict of the Chairman Evacuee Trust Board prove that the property in dispute is an evacuee trust property , the appellants and respondents in Civil Appeal No.1540 of 2006 are left with no locus standi much less a cause of action to lay their hand on its ownership in any form and in any forum.
As a sequel to what has been discuss ed above, appeal filed by the Evacuee Trust Board is allowed, the impugned judgments are set aside while the suit pending in Civil Court in respect of property in question together with the application under section 12 (2) C.P.C. is dismissed. Needless to say that where the basic order in favour of respondent No.1 has been declared void ab initio, entire superstructure raised thereon would automatically collapse. there left no scope for the alleged decree-holders as well as descendants of Ghani (bogus allottee) to reopen the pandora' s box buried for all times by the last Court of the State, whose verdict is not merely culmination of litigation rather in terms of Article 189 of the Constitution, 1973, the said pronouncement is the law declared by it, as such binding on all the Courts in Pakistan. The judgment reported as 'Sh. Muhammad Rafique Goreja and others versus Islamic Republic of Pakistan and others' (2006 SCMR 1317 ) is almost on all fours applicable, which further resolved that decision of the Supreme Court could not be treated as mere obiter dictum and even if taken to be so, due to the high place, which the said Court held in its hierarchy , enjoyed a highly respected position as precedent, as such respondent No.1 or even this Court cannot give findings contrary to what had already been held by the apex Court while deciding appeals and review petitions. Any contrary decision will be against the judicial dignity , which is unwarranted. See 'Muhammad Ajmal Khan versus Lt. Col. Muhammad Shafaat and 4 others'
(PLD 1976 Lahore 396), 'Abdul Majid and others versus Abdul Ghafoor Khan and others' (PLD 1982 Supreme Court 146) and 'Asif Jah Siddiqi versus Government of Sind and others' (PLD 1983 Supreme Court 46).
3. The dictum of the august Supreme Court declaring that jurisdiction of the Civil Court, for the purposes of deciding the question, whether an evac uee property is attached to charitable, religious or educational trust or institution, is expressly barred and that it could only be dealt with by the Court exercising jurisdiction under section 8 of the Act ibid is, in fact, judgment in rem to that effect. However , the remaining part of the judgment of the apex Court in its nature was personam to the sense that property in dispute was not part of compensation pool to be transferred to Ghani or any else claimant, rather Evacuee Trust Area having been declared so by the Court of plenary jurisdiction in view of the provision contained in section 21 of the Act, Ghani or subsequent transferees could not claim any nexus with it, as such all the parties to the dispute along with their successors are bound by said findings on the issues raised between them besides questions of fact and law necessary to the decision of such issues. It is the policy of the Courts to stand by the ratio decidendi, that is, the rule of law and not to disturb a settled point. This policy of the Courts is conveniently termed as doctrine of rule of stare decisis. The rational behind this policy is the need to promote certainty , stability and predictability of the law. As the clear decision of the apex Court was accepted by Ghani, hence, the petitioners having stepped into his shoes were estopped to initiate fresh round of litigation.
4. This petition, otherwise, is hit by doctrine of res judicata as well. The said principle gives respect and finality to the judicial decisions already pronounced, which is aimed that no one shall be vexed twice for the same cause, as such meant to bar/preclude re-litigation of a claim between the same parties or the successors. Of course, the doctrine of res judicata does not merely prevent future judgments from contradicting earlier ones, but also prevents litigants from multiplying litigations. The re-examination of adjudicated disputes, otherwise, will not be in any society' s interest, therefore, repeated efforts to reopen the past and closed chapter being unjustified are not tolerable as if such tendency is permitted to continue, then there would be no end of itigation. The shelves of the Courts of law are already crowded with the backlog and such type of false/baseless litigation needs to be nipped/buried at its inception, otherwise the real controversies among the people requiring prompt attention are likely to be prolonged under its heap. Thus, this Constitutional Petition is dismissed in limine with costs of rupee two lac. The office will also send a copy of this order to the concerned District Collector for the recovery of imposed costs as land revenue arrears through due process of law, who will submit compliance report within forty five days to this Court through Deputy Registrar (Judicial) and the latter will place the same before me in Chamber .