The disputed shop bearing Municipal No. 2-14/Q, Jinnah Road, Quetta was initially occupied by the appellant as tenant of the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent at a monthly rental of Rs. 150.
The respondent purchased this shop on 6th March, 1975, and on 24th May, 1975, she issued a notice to the appellant informing him about the change of ownership and demanding rent; besides asking him to vacate the shop as the same bona fide required by her for opening a medical clinic.
2. Since the shop in question was not vacated by the appellant as desired, the respondent filed an eviction application against him in the Court of the Rent Controller, Quetta on 8th April, 1976, on the grounds of non-payment of rent, subletting and bona fide personal use. The Rent Controller framed necessary issues in the case and after recording the parties evidence found the issues of non-payment of rent and subletting against the respondent, but found the issue of bona fide personal use in her favour and consequent upon this finding directed the appellant's ejectment vide order dated 7th February, 1981, impugned in the first appeal.
3. The decision of the case rests on the parties evidence on the point of bona fide personal use alone, as the respondent has not filed any cross---objections etc. In respect of the findings on the two issues going against her. The respondent examined four witnesses and on her own behalf her attorney appeared in the witness box. All these witnesses have categorically stated that the respondent as well as her husband, were doctors by profession and were in Government service; presently posted in Civil Hospital Quetta and that both were entitled to private practice. This position has also not been controverted by the appellant. It was also stated that no premises suitable for their requirements, was either owned by them or was presently in their occupation, and that she lived in a house provided by the Government and it was located in a residential area; far away from the Bazar. There is no denial to this fact as well by the appellant. All these witnesses have also stated that for several years past she was desirous of starting private practice and to that effect her husband had been making mention to A. Ws. Nos. 1 and 2. Her husband also appeared in the witness Box and stated that the respondent wanted to start her private practice in the shop and for that purpose, the shop was suitable by all standards. He also stated that she was not likely to be transferred out of Quetta as he was holding a non-transferable post and under the rules wife of a doctor, if herself a doctor and in service, was entitled to remain posted at her husband's station of posting.
4. In rebuttal very few words have come on record through the appellant's witnesses on the issue of bona fide personal use as their attention was focused mainly on the issues of non-payment of rent and subletting. All what has been stated on the point of personal requirement of the respon--dent is a bare word of denial, coupled with the allegation that the respondent either wanted to enhance the rent or would sell away the premises. But both these allegations have not been substantiated.
5. Mr. Basharatullah, learned counsel for the appellant criticized the respondent's evidence, as unacceptable and unconvincing on the ground that the first two witnesses had not heard it from the month of the respondent that she desired to establish private practice in the shop as their source of knowledge was her husband, as such, it amounted to hearsay evidence. He further contended that she did not require the shop exclusively for her bonafide use but also that of her husband and section 13(3)(a) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance did not cater for the requirement of the husband.
As to the first contention, it may be stated that even if the evident of these two witnesses was excluded from consideration, we would still having the statements of the respondent's husband and her attorney; and the credibility of both of them, goes un-assailed. They have categorically state that the shop was required for establishing private practice by the respondent. These statements, though sufficient by themselves to establish the respondent' case, if further read with the statement of first two witnesses, which at least has corroborative value, the unescapable conclusion would be that the respondent's need has been established without any iota of doubt, particular when such evidence has not been rebutted in the least by the appellant' evidence. This factum when examined with the legal position providing sufficient safeguard to the tenant against in genuine moves and extending u to conviction of the landlord besides putting the tenant back in the possession, the respondent's claim is further strengthened. Mr. Basharatullah's contention that there should have been some direct or more convincing evidence on the point of bona fide personal use, is also not of any substance. The reason being that no particular kind of evidence is required to be led by a person claiming a property for personal use. The Court has rather to see the' cumulative effect of the entire evidence and if it was confidence inspiring even the solitary statement of a landlord may be sufficient to establish his case. In Syed Akhtar Hussain v. Wali Bahadur and 3 others PLD 1981 Lah, 326the requirement with regard to evidence to prove the factum of bona fide personal use, was discussed and it was held that if the landlord had not been shown to be already occupying a building in the same urban area, suitable for his requirements it would be sufficient ground to establish his case and in such an event his solitary statement would be enough. In the instant case, there is no evidence available to prove that the respondent was occupying any premises, suitable for her needs in Quetta Town. It was attempted to be argued that some other doctors living in the same residential locality practised in medicine at their house in the evening hours; but it is not necessary that if other doctors practised there the respondent should necessarily follow suit or that by virtue of this fact then locality where she lived became a place suitable for running private practice. Mr. Munawar also invited my attention to the fact that the doctors practising at their residences, in this locality and named by the witnesses of the respondent were all Specialists in their fields, whereas the respondent was a simple M. B., B. S. And could not therefore attract sufficient practice there, as it could not be expected that people would be coming to her in a residential locality far away from the market, leaving other doctors with similar qualifications practising in the City Bazars.
6. Mr. Basharatullah, also contended that the evidence of the attorney of the respondent was not sufficient to prove her case and that she should have come in the witness box herself. In Mr. Muhammad Sharif v. M. S. Sultan 1981 SC M P 8,44the question that arose for consideration was as to whether the person for whose need the premises was required should have necessarily been examined as a witness. In that case the premises was required for the .Need of landlord's son. It was held that it was not incumbent upon the landlord to have produced the son also to speak of his requirement himself. Similar view was taken in Dilshad Muhammad v. Mst. Zubaida Begum 1981.
SC M X895 ,In fact no particular evidence is required to be produced for such purposes. The case of the respondent stands on better footings as her attorney has testified the fact on her behalf and that is enough to satisfy the requirements of law. I do not find any substance in, this contention as well. Mr. Basharatuilah further attempted to argue that the case was not one exclusively of the respondent's need but her husband was also to be accommodated in the shop and as section 13(3)(a) did not include the requirements of a husband the application served to fail. In this regard suffice it to say that the entire evidence led by the respondent is to establish her own requirement It is only casually that her husband has said that he would also be helping her. There is thus no harm in it. Even if the husband practised with the I wife that fact will not disentitle her from getting relief, as in any case thefact of her own requirement remains undisturbed. Even otherwise the expression "for his own occupation" is to be liberally construed so as to include all the family needs including the need of a .Husband. Such view was also taken in Adamali Hasanali v. Mst. Rubab Bai (PLD 1965 Kar. 408 and was affirmed by a Letters Patent Bench. See Adamali Hasanali v. Mst.
Rubab Bai (PLD 1967 Kar. 437).
7. Before I part with the case, I may also refer to the safeguard provided by law in cases where the landlord after ejecting the tenant, does not himself occupy the premises. As said above, in such an event, he can even be convicted and the tenant put back in the disputed premises. Adequacy of the safeguard to ensure that this provision of law was not misused by the landlord who might get a premises vacated on such a plea and capitalize on it by selling it on high price or giving it on higher rent, was considered, among others, in Muhammad Zaman v. Mahboob Ellahi (PLD 1981 Lah.
609 and it was held that the protection so given was sufficient to avoid possibilities of false applications on such a ground. I too hold this view.
For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. The appellant is however allowed four months time to put the respondent in vacant possession of the disputed shop subject to his depositing rent in the Court as per directions of the Rent Controller.