FAISAL ARAB, J.---Brief facts giving rise to this matter are that in the year 1980, Mir Allandad Khan Talpur son of Mir Imam Bakhsh Khan Talpur transferred disputed property bearing No. C.S. No.1312/1 measuring 5644 square feet in Ward-B Mirpurkhas in the names of his wife and grandson through a registered Gift Deed dated 0'7.09.1980. Both the donees are appellants in the present case. The appellant No. 1 (the grandson) at the time of transfer was seven years of age, hence the gift deed shows that appellant No. 2 accepted the gift on her and her grandson's behalf. It is claimed that after Mir Allandad Khan Talpur passed away in the year 1984, the father of the appellant No. 1 looked after the disputed property and after his death no one looked after the disputed property as the appellant No. 1 at that time also was still a minor and the appellant No. 2 was a 'pardanasheen' lady. The appellant No. 1 attained majority in the year 1991. In the year 2008, the appellant No. 1 claims that he made enquiries and came to know that the disputed property was fraudulently sold through a registered sale deed dated 09.01.1985 to Respondents Nos. 01 to 03, which was further transferred in the names of Respondents Nos. 03 to 06 through instruments of sale and gift deed. The appellants then filed suit in 2008 claiming that the sale deed dated 09.01.1985 was fraudulently executed, hence the transaction was illegal and void ab initio and based on such illegality the subsequent transfers are also of no legal consequence. It is stated in para 7 of the plaint that the appellant No. 1 enquired from the appellant No. 2 as to whether she had sold the disputed property but she declined, showing her ignorance about any such transaction.
2. In the suit, the respondents filed application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the C.P.C. pleading that the suit is barred by time and hence the plaint is liable to be rejected. The trial court allowed the application and rejected the plaint as time-barred, which decision was upheld by the Appellate as well as the Revisional Court.
3. The counsel for the appellants argued that the suit was filed well within time as the period of limitation started when the appellant No. 1 came to know of the fraudulent transfer in 2008 and thus the suit filed in that very year was well within the prescribed period of limitation.
4. The appellants have taken the plea that they even had no knowledge of the gift made by Mir Allandad Khan Talpur in their favour prior to 2008. It is the appellants case that the father of the appellant No.1 used to look after the property during his lifetime, which means that his father also had the knowledge of the gift in question. Then the appellant No. 2 also cannot deny the knowledge as the registered gift deed executed in favour of the appellants show that she herself accepted the gift and took possession of the disputed property, as is clear from her thumb impression on the gift deed. Hence, we do not accept the plea of the appellants that they came to know of the gift as well as of the sale made in 2008 as late as 2008. As to the power of attorney on the basis of which one Mir Habibullah Khan Talpur son of Mir Imam Bux Khan Talpur sold the disputed property to respondents Nos. 1 to 3, the appellants have taken the plea that appellant No. 2 did not authorize anyone to sell her share or the share of appellant No. 1 as his guardian, hence the sale deed dated 09.01.1985 and all subsequent transactions based on such sale deed are void and of no legal effect.
However, in para 7 of the plaint there is no categorical denial on behalf of appellant No. 2.
5. The submissions of the appellants so far as the knowledge of the gift is concerned contradict each other inasmuch as the gift deed and the registration of the gift are concerned, which shows that the gift was accepted by the appellant No. 2 and she had the knowledge of the same from the very beginning. Appellant No. 1 further submits that appellant No. 2 was a pardanasheen lady, hence, she never appeared to execute the power of attorney before the Mukhtiarkar. However, the gift deed is a registered document, which means that she accepted the gift on her as well as on behalf of appellant No. 1.
6. Mir Habibullah Khan son of Mir Imam Bakhsh Khan who acted as attorney and sold the disputed property to the respondents was not arrayed as defendant in the suit. He was a necessary party as it was he who on the strength of the disputed power of attorney sold the suit property to the respondents. He also appears to be real uncle of the appellant No. 1 and brother of the donor as his father's name is the same as of the donor and their residential addresses, as reflected from the gift deed and power of attorney, are also the same. In Mian Zafar Ali v. Mian Khursheed Ali (2020 SCMR 291). this Court while dealing with an issue pertaining to non-joinder of a party held that non-joinder no doubt does not amount to dismissal of the suit in terms of Order I, Rule 9, C.P.C., however, where the Court considers it necessary that a person B ought to have been made a party in the suit and has not been made, this would certainly lead to failure to prove one's case. The case of the appellants ought to be cancellation of disputed power of attorney and the resultant sale deeds executed by Mir Habibullah Khan on the basis of such power of attorney by playing fraud and forgery.
Therefore, Mir Habibullah Khan, brother of the donor and the real uncle of the appellant No. 1, ought to have been made party in the suit as forgery, if any, can only be pointed towards him. Unless it is established that forgery has been committed by Mir Habibullah Khan the suit of the appellants could not be decreed. The fact that the appellants have not made him a party shows that such an omission is fatal to the suit even if it had been filed within the period of limitation. The omission looks deliberate as the person who could only commit fraud has not been sued and thus the appellants appear to have not come to the court with clean hands.
7. In any case, the cause of action accrued to appellant No. 2 in the year 1985 when the sale deed was executed. For appellant No. 1, the cause of action accrued in the year 1991, when he attained the age of majority. Therefore, the present case filed in 2008 is hopelessly barred by time. No plausible reasons have been demonstrated for the inordinate delay of several years in filing of the suit. This Court cannot allow the law of limitation to be bypassed. The assertion of the appellants that they remained unaware of the gift and the sale for nearly two decades is not acceptable. This Court would not come to the rescue of the persons who were sleeping over their rights.
8. We may point out here that limitation is not merely a technicality. The importance of the law of limitation has been beautifully explained in the case of Dr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi v. Syed Rashid Arshad and others (PLD 2015 SC 212) in the following terms:- "From the various dicta/pronouncements of the superior court, it can be deduced without any fear of contradiction that [the law of limitation] is founded upon public policy and State interest. This law is vital for an orderly and organized society and the people at large, who believe in being governed by systemized law.
The obvious object of the law is that if no time constraints and limits are prescribed for pursuing a cause of action and for seeking reliefs/remedies relating to such cause of action and a person is allowed to sue for the redressal of his grievance within an infinite and unlimited time period, it shall adversely affect the disciplined and structured judicial process and mechanism of the State, which is sine qua non for any State to perform its functions within the parameters of the Constitution and the rule of law... The law of limitation requires that a person must approach the Court and take recourse to legal remedies with due diligence, without dilatoriness and negligence and within the time provided by the law; as against choosing his own time for the purpose of bringing forth a legal action at his own whim and desire."
9. For the reasons stated above, we dismiss the present appeal.