1. ZAFFAR HUSSAIN MIRZA, J.-This is an appeal arising out of an order, dated 8-3-1966, passed by a Division Bench of the erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan, Karachi Bench, Karachi, dismissing the Letters Patent Appeal of the present appellant in limine. Leave was granted by this Court on 10-1- 1969 to consider only the question of law whether it was rightly held that on the declaration of the status of Moolchand and his property as non --evacuee on 25-5-5U, the order of allotment in favour of the appellant ceased to confer any right on him in view of section 19-A of the Pakistan (Adminis--tration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance (XV of 1949), or the reenacted section 24 of the Pakistan Administration of Evacuee Property Act (XII of 1957).
2. The material facts necessary for the . Purpose of this appeal may be briefly stated. The first and the second respondents, namely, Assandas and Khushaldas are the sons of one Moolchand who died in Pakistan on 24-12-1954. The Custodian of Evacuee Property, Mr. Akbar Hussain declared Moolchand and his property to be non-evacuee on 25-5-1950. It appears that after the declaration of the status of Moolchand, some of his property was allotted to certain persons by way of temporary allotments which resulted in the order passed by the Custodian in revision on 14-6-1954, whereby Moolchand was directed to proceed under section 18 of Ordinance (XV of 1949).
3. Consequently, Moolchand made an application under section 18 of the said Ordinance. But pending the decision of this application, Moolchand died with the result that the application was persued by his two sons, respondents Nos. 1 and 2 herein. By order, dated 12-8-1955, the Assistant Custodian declared the applicants before him as non-evacuee and their properties as non- evacuee properties, details of which were mentioned in Schedule B/1. The present appellant claims to be a claimant displaced person and was given land measuring 72 acres and 6 ghuntas situated in Deh 49 Jamrao and 47 acres and 15 ghuntas situated in Deb Liari Jagir, under the permanent scheme in the year 1960. Subsequently, on 26-3-1960, on a representation made by the first two respondents, the transfer in favour of the appellant was cancelled. 1n the year 1962, after about the lapse of seven years, the appellant preferred an appeal against the order of the Assistant Custodian, dated 12-8-1955 before the Additional Custodian. The latter made a reference to the Custodian to reconsider the order passed by the Assistant Custodian. The first two respondents thereupon filed a Writ Petition No. 210 of 1962 in the High Court of West Pakistan, Karachi Bench, Karachi, seeking to restrain the Settlement and Rehabilitation Authorities from passing orders of allotment in respect of the lands of the said respondents and also to quash the orders passed in that behalf already. A learned Single Judge of the High Court accepted the plea of the respondents and held that since Moolchand and the first two respondents had been declared non-evacuee and the property in dispute was also expressly declared as non-evacuee property, the Rehabilitation Authorities had no jurisdiction to allot the land belonging to the said respondents under the permanent settlement scheme or under any other scheme, vide judgment, dated 19-8- 1965. On a Letters Patent Appeal filed by the present appellant, a Division Bench of the same High Court summarily dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the learned Single Judge. As already stated, the present appeal has been filed by leave of the Court to challenge the judgment and order passed by the High Court.
4. Now, as observed earlier, the only question for consideration in this case is whether on the declaration of the property of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 as non-evacuee, the allotment of land made in favour of the appellant, is saved by virtue of the provisions of section 19-A of Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance, 1949, which provision has been re-enacted in section 24 of Act XII of 1957. Mr. Muhammad Ali Sayeed learned counsel for the respondents has invited our attention to a decision of this Court on the precise question of law, which concludes the matter and was given since after the leave granting order in this case. The case is reported as Zahid Hussain v. Dharamomal (1980 SCMR 645and the following observation is pertinent to the question under consideration :- "Although no legal bar has been pleaded from the side of the Depart--ment or the allottee, we find that section 28 (perhaps misprinted for section 24) of the Act was intended to preserve only the allotments of these properties intact (against the orders under sections 22 and 23) which properties were "subject to an allotment under the Pakistan Rehabilitation Act, 1956. Under section 6 of the latter Act only 'evacuee property' could be pooled by the Rehabilitation Commissioner for allotment."
5. The admitted position of this case is that respondents Nos, 1 and 2 and their properties were declared as non-evacuee on 12-8-1955, whereas the appellant was settled on the disputed portion of the land out of the properties of the said respondents much thereafter in the year 1960 under the Settlement and Rehabilitation Scheme. As already held in the decision referred to above, section 19-A of the 1949 Ordinance and section 24 of Act XII of 1957 had the effect of saving allotments made under the Pakistan Rehabilitation Ordinance, 1948 and not permanent. Settlement under section 15 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 as is the case here. Once the property of a person is A declared as non-evacuee property, it would cease to be subject to the jurisdiction of the Settlement Authorities and cease to be a part of the compensation pool constituted under section 5 of the said Act. Such land cannot be made the subject of permanent settlement under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme.
6. Mr. M. M. A. K. Zai, learned counsel appearing for the appellants did not challenge the legal position enunciated above but sought to advance arguments on questions that were neither raised in the petition nor were taken notice of in the leave granting order, which as already observed is confined to the consideration of the sole question of law already dealt with. We were, therefore, not prepared to permit the learned counsel to address us on any other question in the present case.
7. For the foregoing reasons, no exception can be taken to the view taken by the learned Judges of the High Court. This appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs.