1. ' Syed Abdul Rehman has filed the present petition against Chief Executive, Charsadda Sugar Mills and Muhammad Siddique, Deputy Electrical Engineer of the Charsadda Sugar Mills, Charsadda under section 25-A of the I. R.
2. 0., 1969 with the prayer that the petitioner be declared lawfully entitled to be promoted to the post of Deputy Electrical Engineer.
3. ' The petitioner has alleged that he is working as Electrical Supervisor for the last 13 years in the Charsadda Sugar Mills. He holds diplomas equivalent to the diploma of Associate Engineer and was thus entitled to be promoted as Deputy Electrical Engineer/Assistant Electrical Engineer. In utter violation of rule the respondent No, 1 has promoted respondent No, 2 who is not a diploma holder and thus discriminated against the petitioner. This order of promotion is without lawful authority and ineffective against the right of the petitioner. The petitioner served a grievance notice which was considered as a misconduct and the petitioner was served with a show-cause notice.
4. That office Note No, 56/E., dated 17th December, 1978, whereby the respondent No, 2 was promoted was fraudulently kept concealed from the petitioner and hence the petitioner failed to bring the present petition in time. The condonation application has been filed with the petition wherein it has been alleged that the promotion order of respondent No, 2 was kept concealed from the petitioner and therefore the period during which the impugned order was so concealed has been sought to be condoned by the petitioner. The written statement was filed on 26th November, 1979 in which legal and factual pleas were raised repudiating the charge levelled against the respondent. The plea of the condonation has also been vehemently contested.
5. ' Evidence of the parties has been recorded, arguments heard and record perused.
6. ' The preliminary objection of the respondent is to the effect that the petition is miserably time- barred and that the period that has been sought to be condoned in the condonation application cannot be condoned. The impugned order was passed on 17th December, 1978, copy thereof has been placed on record but it is not exhibited on record. However I consider it in evidence. Now the petitioner should have served the grievance notice within three months of this order i. e. On or before 17th March, 1979. The grievance notice has been served on 13th August, 1979, i. e. Well beyond the statutory period prescribed for serving grievance notice. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner on this score is that the petitioner was not aware of the impugned order and the moment he came to know about it the grievance notice was served on the respondent establishment. In this regard he pressed into operation the condonation application. The condonation application is to be considered in the light of the evidence adduced by the petitioner in support of his condonation application. There is only one statement on record made by the petitioner himself in support of his entire case including the plea of the condonation. The petitioner has nowhere mentioned in his statement as to how, when and where be came to know about the impugned order. Therefore the condonation application has gone unsubstantiated and plea of the condonation has not been supported by the petitioner in his own statement. Similarly when the period of limitation is reckoned from the date of the issuance of the impugned order i. e., 17th December, 1978, then the petition should have been filed by the latest, including maximum period of service of grievance notice on or before 1st April, 1979. The present petition has been filed on 12th November, 1979, and the petition is as such also time barred. The plea of condonation for filing the petition beyond the period of limitation has not been supported by the petitioner in his own statement. The respondent has placed on record Exh. R.W. 1/1 to Exh. R.W. 1/12 to prove that the petitioner has been submitting his leave application in the respondent establishment which was allowed by respondent No,
2. This fact proves beyond the shadow of doubt that the petitioner had the knowledge of the promotion of the respondent No, 2, and failed to seek his legal remedy in this Court within the prescribed period of limitation. The petitioner's case may be very strong on its merits but unfortunately for him the grievance notice and petition both are miserably time barred and the condonation sought cannot be allowed because the plea of the condonation does not find support from the evidence led on the condonation application by the petitioner.
7. ' In view of above circumstances, the petition fails on the technical plea of limitation and the petition is dismissed as time-barred.