MUNIB AKHTAR, J.-- The facts, briefly stated, are that the present respondent No. I filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell regarding the subject property, against the vendor, one Dost Muhammad. The vendor filed his written statement and issue was joined between the parties. During the pendency of the suit Dost Muhammad purported to transfer the property to his wife by way of gift and it was then subsequently sold to the present petitioners who are therefore the real interested, and hence contesting, parties. The suit was dismissed but an appeal against the same was allowed by the learned Additional District Judge, who decreed the suit. The present petitioners filed an appeal before the learned High Court, which was dismissed by means of the impugned judgment. Hence this leave petition.
2. Before us the principal point taken for the petitioners was that the agreement to sell was not properly proved in evidence. Indeed, in the leave petition four questions of law are said to arise out of the impugned judgment, and the first two relate to this point. Now, the record and in particular the pleadings of the parties clearly show that the vendor (i.e., the original contesting defendant) did not deny execution of the agreement to sell. A fact admitted need not be formally proved. Reliance in this regard was correctly sought to be placed on Muhammad Iqbal v. Mehboob Alam 2015 SCMR 21, where (at pg. 25) this settled principle of law has been reiterated. Indeed, the cited judgment was also in relation to a suit for specific performance and the admission of the agreement to sell in the written statement. It was also sought to be argued that the relief of specific performance, being discretionary in nature, could not be claimed as of right and could be withheld in appropriate circumstances. It was submitted that such was the case at hand. With respect, we are unable to .agree. Nothing has been shown as would lead to such a conclusion on the facts and circumstances of the case, as established by the pleadings of the parties and the evidence led at the trial. In our view, the learned appellate forums have reached the correct conclusions and the impugned judgment of the learned High Court does not call for anpy interference.
3. In view of the foregoing, leave to appeal is refused and the petition stands dismissed.