' FAKHRUDDIN H. SHAIKH, J.-The petitioner was granted lease of a building situated in Larkana Town by the Municipal Committee, Larkana in the year 1960 for a period of five years. The lease was extended from time to time, but in the year 1978, the Deputy Commissioner, Larkana gave notice to the petitioner that the lease was reviewed under M. L.O. 60 and was found to be in violation of rules and, therefore, in exercise of the power vested in him (the Deputy Commissioner), the lease was cancelled forthwith. This order was passed on 5th August, 1978. Against this order the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Commissioner as provided by Paragraph 5 of the M. L.O. 60 (of Zone C). The Commissioner remanded the case to Chairman, Municipal Committee, Larkana, who under M. L.O. 60, was the competent authority to review the lease. The latter by his order dated 4th November, 1980 cancelled the lease in exercise or purported exercise of powers under the said M.L.0.
The petitioner has challenged this order by this Constitutional petition on the ground that the action of the Chairman was not strictly covered by the provisions of M. L.O. CO. Paragraph 6 of M.
L.O. 6 contemplated that the process of scrutiny of leases shall be completed not later than 30th June, 1978 and concerned Secretary to Government of Sind shall ensure the completion of the process on schedule by obtaining periodical progress reports from all concerned.
' It has, therefore, been urged that as the present process of scrutiny in respect of the lease in question was completed in 1981, hence the action of the authority concerned would not be covered by M. L.
0. 60 and that this Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain the petition, provisions of P. C.
0. 1981 notwithstanding.
' The main question to be determined in this case is whether the action which was taken or purported to have been taken under M. L. O. 60 by the competent authority before 30th June, 1978, shall become null and void and without jurisdiction, if it was taken after 30th of June, 1978.
We have heard Mr. Inayat Ali and the learned Additional Advocate General who was given notice to assist the Court in the matter. The learned Additional Advocate General has argued that the provision in Paragraph 6 of completing the process of scrutiny before 30th June, 1978 is directory and not mandatory or imperative. Further clarifying the c point, he says that Paragraph 6 is a direction to the Secretary to Government of Sind to ensure that the completion of the process is over within the scheduled date. He, therefore, submits that contravention of a directory provision of law by an authority would not render the action of that authority null and void. In support of this plea, he has referred to the dictionary meaning of the word "directory" as given to Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 141 which is as under :- "A provision in a statute, rule of procedure, or the like, which is a mere direction or instruction of no obligatory force, and involving no invalidating consequence for its disregard, as opposed to an imperative or mandatory provision which must be followed. The general rule is that the prescriptions of a statute relating to the performance of a public duty are so far directory that, though neglect of them may be punishable yet it does not affect the validity of the acts done under them, as in the case of a statute requiring an officer to prepare and deliver a document to another officer on or before a certain day.
' A "directory" provision in a statute is one, the observance of which is not necessary to the validity of the proceeding to which it relates; one which leaves it optional with the department or officer to which it is addressed to obey or not as he may see fit. Generally, "statutory provisions which do not relate to essence of thing to be done, and as to which compliance is matter of convenience rather than substance are "directory", while provisions which relate to essence of thing to be done, that is, matters of substance, are "mandatory".
We are inclined to agree with the argument of the learned AdditionaltD Advocate General.
It has also been urged that when a competent authority has jurisdiction to pass an order, it has jurisdiction to pass even a wrong order and even a wrong application of Martial Law Order or Regulation by a competent authority shall be beyond the power of judicial review of this Court according to Article 15 (4), (5) and (6) of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981. In this connection, we may quote with advantage the observations made by Ajmal Mian J. Of this Court in Constitutional Petition No, D-133011978. After quoting the provisions of Article 15 the learned Judge observed as under :- "A perusal of the above quoted paras, indicates that this Court cannot go into the validity or effect of an order or Martial Law Regulation made by the Chief Martial Law Administrator or any Martial Law Order made by the Chief Martial Law Administrator or a Martial Law Administrator or of anything done or action taken or intended to be done or taken thereunder. In our view the phrase 'anything done' or 'action taken' or 'intended to be done or taken thereunder' employed in the above quoted para. (a) of the P. C.
0. Is of wide import as to exclude the "jurisdiction of this Court to go into the validity of an order, though prima facie it seems that the impugned order is not in accordance with the M. L.
0. We are sure that if the petitioner will approach the competent authority his grievances will be redressed.
(3) In view of the above quoted clause (6) of Article 15 of the P. C. O., the above petition stands abated."
We are in respectful agreement with the above observations and consequently are of the view that this petition is barred by Article 15 of F the P. C.