TARIQ SALEEM SHEIKH, J.---Brief facts giving rise to this petition are that the District Police Officer, Vehari (Respondent No. 5), vide Letter No.433 4-SP dated 23-09-2019, requested the Deputy Commissioner , Vehari (Respondent No. 4), for issuance of detention order of the Petitioner under Section 3 of the Punjab Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960 (the "Ordinance"), on the ground that he is a habitua l offender and a threat to public order during Moharram-ul-Haraam , 2019. Respondent No.4 acceded to the said request and vide order dated 23-9- 2019 directed that the Petitioner should be arrested and detained in the District Jail, Vehari, for a period of 30 days.
The Petitioner through his wife submitted an application for review of the said detention order but without fruition.
Thereafter , vide order dated 22-10-2019, the Additional Secretary , Home Department (Respondent No. 2), extended his detention for a further period of 30 days on the recommendation of the District Intelligence Committee. Through this petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (the "Constitution"), the Petitioner has assailed his detention orders dated 23-9-2019 and 22-10-2019.
2. Learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that the impugned orders were bad in law. Section 3 of the Ordinance could only be invoked when the competent authority had sufficient evidence that there was a threat to public peace and tranquility . He maintained that in the instant case no such material was available to justify impugned action. He further contended that mere involvement of the Petitioner in a few criminal cases could not form basis for his preventive detention. Lastly , Respondents Nos. 2 and 4 had accepted the reports of the police and other agencies without applying their own independent mind to the material placed before them which was mandatory under the law .
3. The learned Assistant Advocate General vehemently opposed this petition. He contended that it was not competent because the Petitioner had not availed alternate remedy under Secti on 5(5) of the Ordinance which provided for representation before the government. He further contended that no exception could be taken to the impugned orders because the Petitioner was a threat to public peace and he could not be let loose. It was the constitutional duty of the administration to maintain law and order and protect lives of the people.
4. Arguments heard. Record perused.
5. The objection relating to maintainability of this constitutional petition deserves a short shrift. Article 4 of the Constitution stipulates that every citizen, wherever he may be, and every other person for the time being in Pakistan has an inalienable right to enjoy the protection of law and to be treated in accordance with law. In particular , no action detrimental to his life, liberty , body , reputation or property shall be taken except in accordance with law. Then, Article 9 commands that no person shall be deprived of life or liberty save in accordance with law and Article 10 provides safeguards as to arrest and detention. Articles 9 and 10 are contained in Part-II Chapter-I of the Constitution which relates to Fundamental Rights. In Ismaeel v. The State (2010 SCMR 27), the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the rights guaranteed under Articles 4, 9 and 10 are sacrosanct and jealously guarded by our Courts.
6. In view of the foregoing, when it comes to enforcement of these rights, the mere availability of alternate remedy by way of representation to the government against detention order does not fetter constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199. In Abdul Latif Shamshad Ahmed v. District Magistrate, Kasur (1999 PCr.LJ 2014), this Court repelled the objection relating to maintainability of the constitutional petition as has been raised in the instant case holding as under: "At the very outset, I would express that before the filing of this writ petition, the making of a representation or preference of appeal before the Secretary Home Department, Government of the Punjab, is not necessary . It has been held in Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani v. Government of the Punjab (PLD 1984 Lah. 222) and Azad Papers (Jasarat) v. Province of Sindh and others (PLD 1974 Kar. 81) that availability of alternate remedy of making representation to the Provincial Government against the impugned order does not oust and eclipse the jurisdiction of the constitutional court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction in a matter of the instant nature. This objection of the learned Assistant Advocate General is overruled."
7. Respondents Nos. 2 and 4 have passe d the impugned orders purportedly under Section 3(1) of the Ordinance which is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:
3. Power to arrest and detain suspected persons .---(1) Government, if satisfied that with a view to preventing any person from acting in any manner prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order , it is necessary so to do, may, by an order in writing, direc t the arrest and detention in such period as may be specified in the order , and Government, if satisfied that for the aforesaid reasons it is necessary so to do, may, subject to the other provisions of this section, extend from time to time the period of such detention for a period not exceeding six months at a time.
8. Section 3(1), supra, does not give unbridled powers to the government to curtail the liberty of a person. In Federation of Pakistan through Secretary , Ministry of Interior Islamabad. v. Mrs. Amtul Jalil Khawaja and others (PLD 2003 SC 442), the Hon'ble Supreme Court ruled that every detention order should conform to the following criteria:
(i) the Court must be satisfied that the material before the detaining authority was such that a reasonable person would be satisfied as to the necessity for making the order of preventive detention;
(ii) the satisfaction should be established with regard to each of the grounds of detention, and, if one of the grounds is shown to be bad, non-existent or irrelevant, the whole order of detention would be rendered invalid;
(iii) the initial burden lies on the detaining authority to show the legality of the preventive detention;
(iv) the detaining authority must place the whole material, upon which the order of detention is based, before the Court notwithstanding its claim of privilege with respect to any document, the validity of which claim shall be within the competence of the Court to decide;
(v) the Court has further to be satisfied, in cases of preventive detention, that the order of detention was made by the authority prescribed in the law relating to preventive detention and that every requirement, of the law relating to preventive detention had been strictly complied with;
(vi) the "satisfaction" in fact existed with regard to the necessity of preventive detention of the detenue;
(vii) the edifice of satisfaction is to be built on the foundation of evidence 'because conjectural presumption cannot be equated with satisfaction; it is subjective assessment and there can be no objective satisfaction;
(viii) the grounds of detention should not be vague and indefinite and should be comprehensive enough to enable the detenue to make representation against his detention to the authority , prescribed by law;
(ix) the grounds of detention had been furnished within the period prescribed by law, and if no such period is prescribed, then "as soon as may be"
9. Respondent No. 4 directed detention of the Petitioner for 30 days vide order dated 23-09-2019. Thereafter , Respondent No. 2 extended his detention period for another 30 days through his order dated 22-10-2019. Although the period mentioned in the first order has expired, it is necessary to look into its vires as well as because the second order is premised on it.
10. Respondent No.4 passed the detention order dated 23.9.2019 against the Petitioner on the following grounds: i) that he has a criminal history and associates with other people of such backgrou nd. He has been involved in the following cases: a) FIR No.438 dated 13.8.2016 registere d under sections 379/427/ 148/149, P.P.C. at Police Station Model Town, Burewala; b) FIR No. 27/2017 under section 9(c) of the CNSA registered at Police Station Model Town, Burewala; c) FIR No. 404/2019 dated 7.6.2019 registered under section 5/7 of the Gambling Act at Police Station Model Town, Burewala; d) Rapt No. 27 dated 1 1.4.2019 under section 107/151 Cr .P.C. registered at Police Station Model Town Burewala; e) Rapt No. 30 dated 31.5.2019 registered under section 13/14 Gunda Act at Police Station Model Town, Burewala. ii) that he instigates young people against the present regime; iii) that he intimidates people which creates sense of insecurity in them and is likely to create law and order situation; iv) that there is grave apprehension that he would commit "untoward incident" in the month of Moharram-ul- Haraam, 2019 and pose threat to public property and cause breach of public peace and order in District V ehari.
11. I first take up Ground (i). The learned Law Officer has not placed any document on record which may show that the Petitioner has been convicted in any of the cases mentioned in the aforementioned order . Even otherwise, the mere fact that a person has been involved in certain criminal cases and associates with other people of bad character can hardly justify his preventive detention. Reliance is placed on Liaquat Ali v. Government of Sindh through Secretary , Home Department and another (PLD 1973 Kar. 78), Mst. Shazia Perveen v. District Magistrate, Okara (PLD 1988 Lah. 611), Bashiran Bibi v. The District Magistrate, Kasur (1990 PCr.LJ 913), Said Ahmed v. The Province of Sindh through Secretary , Home and 2 others (1991 MLD 8), Arif Khan v. The District Magistrate, Lahore (1993 MLD 2245 ), Muhammad Yasin v. District Magistrate, Kasur and another (1997 MLD 221 1) and Kausar Ali alias Kausary v . Government of NWFP and others (PLD 1999 Pesh. 82 )
12. So far as Grounds (ii) to (iv) are concerned, they are vague and IF indefinite and no material is available on record to support them. It is by I now well settled that grounds of detention must be precise and the F detention order can be struck down if they are not so. In Noor Mohammad v. District Magistrate Hyderabad Sindh and 2 others (1990 PCr .LJ 2052) , a learned Division Bench of Karachi High Court held-: "It is, therefore, quite clear that grounds Nos. 1 and 2 are vague and indefinite, whereas ground No.3 is insuf ficient and unsupported. Reliance was placed in the Division Bench decision of this Court in the well-known case of Dr. Saleem Haider reported in 1988 PCr.LJ 486, where it was held following the decision in the cases of inter alia, Hyderbux Jatoi (PLD 1969 SC 210), Ghulam Jilani (PLD 1967 SC 373), Abdul Baqi Baloch (PLD 1968 SC 313), Begum Shorish Kashmiri (PLD 1969 SC 14), and Muhammad Younas v. Province of Sindh (PLD 1973 Kar. 694) that the grounds of detention to be communicated to the detenue must contain particulars of facts which would enable him to make representation. If the grounds are not precise and lack particulars, this would constitute an omission to comply with do requirements of law, and therefore, cannot be considered as sufficient and valid in the eyes of law. It was further held in the case of Dr Saleem Haider supra that if one of the grounds of detention is found to be unsustainable, the entire detention order would be vitiated since in that case it would be hard to determine which of the grounds had led to the passing of the detention order or whether the same was the result of all the grounds taken together . Even in subsequent D.B. decisions of this Court reported in 1988 P Cr.LJ 1087 (Muhammad Abdullah v. District Magistrate ) and 1988 P Cr.LJ 1451 (Tariq Khan Akbar v. Government of Sindh ) the same view is taken."
13. Respondent No.2 passed order dated 22-10-2019 on the ground that the Petitioner is likely to create law and order situation in District Vehari if he is released from the jail. It has purportedly been passed on the recommendation of the District Intelligence Committee and "the evidence placed on record which corroborates that the activities of the said activist are pmjudicial to public safety and maintenance of public order". This Court directed the learned Assistant Advocate General to provide the evidence/material referred to in this order but he could not produce any. Even the alleged recommendation of the District Intelligence Committee was not submitted.
In this situation this Court can reasonably infer that Respondent No. 2 had no occasion to apply his independent mind to the question whether Section 3(1) of the Ordinance should be invoked against the Petitioner . In Government of West Pakistan and another v. Begum Agha Abdul Karim Shorish Kashmiri (PLD 1969 SC 14), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that "an action which is mala fide or colourable is not regarded as action in accordance with law. Similarly , action taken upon extraneous or irrelevant consideration is also not action in accordance with law. Action taken upon no ground at all or without proper application of the said of the detaining authority would also not qualify as action in accordance with law and would there fore, have to be struck down as being action taken in an unlawful manner ."
14. For what has been discussed above this petition is accepted . The impugned orders are declared to be without lawful authority and quashed. The petitioner shall be released forthwith if not- required in some other case.