Pakistan Case Law← Search
1982 CLC 1175

Shri MAHANT BAWA MANOBHAGIR MANGALGIR vs DIVISIONAL EVACUEE TRUST

Citation1982 CLC 1175
CourtSindh High Court
Case No.Constitutional Petition No. D-484 of 1979
Date1981-10-19
Judge(s)Saeeduzzaman Siddiqui, Ghulam Muhammad Kourejo
ResultPetition dismissed

ORDER

1. SAEEDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.---The petitioner has challenged the two orders, passed by the Chairman, Evacuee Trust Board, and the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Religious Affairs and Minority Affairs, dated the 22nd January, 1978 and 29th July, 1978, respectively in this petition.By these two orders agricultural lands bearing Survey Nos. 361 to 367 and 176 to 178 of Deh Gujro, Tapo Songal and Survey Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Deh Songal held under the name of Trustees, Pinjrapore were treated as Evacuee Trust Properties belonging to Karachi Pinjrapore Association (hereinafter to be referred as the Association). The admitted position in the case is that the Association was held to be an evacuee by the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Madhavji Dharasibhai v. Karachi Pinjrapore. Association (PLD 1957 SC (Pak) 83), and a writ of mandamus was issued to the Custodian to take action according to section 6(2) of the Ordinance XV of 1949 in respect of properties of the Association which may be found after enquiry to be properties held in trust for religious or charitable purposes. It is not disputed that pursuant to the above order of Supreme Court, the Additional Custodian (Judi.) E. P., Karachi held enquiries in respect of the properties owned and possessed by Association and came to conclusion that the Association was possessed of properties both urban and agricultural. It is admitted before me that the agricultural properties referred to in the report of Addl. Custodian (Judi.) are the same which are subject-matter of this petition. The Additional Custodian. However, further reached the conclusion that out of those properties only urban properties, 3 in number mentioned as Nos. 9 to 11 in his report were the properties held by the Association in trust for public purposes of religious and charitable nature while the remaining urban and agricultural properties were found not held for public purposes of charitable and religious nature. Mr. Maroof Ali Khan, the learned counsel for the Petitioner relying on the above-mentioned observation of the Addl. Custodian (Judi.) that remaining urban and agricultural properties were not held by the Association for public purposes of religious and charitable nature urged that the agricultural land which are subject-matter of this petition were not possessed by the Association and in any case were not the Trust properties. The contention of the learned counsel has not impressed us at all. Firstly, the observation of the Additional Custodian relied upon by the learned counsel by no stretch of imagination could mean that the association did not own or possess the agricultural land. The above observation of the Additional Custodian could at best mean that though the agricultural properties were possessed by the Association but they were not held for the public purpose of religious and charitable nature. Secondly, the learned counsel for the petitioner overlooked the fact that this report of Additional Custodian (Judi.) came up for consideration before the Custodian of Evacuee Properties, who, by his order dated 26th March, 1976, while agreeing with the report of Additional Custodian that all the Properties namely the urban as well as agricultural properties were owned and possessed by the Association disagreed with the view expressed by the Additional Custodian (Judi.) that out of those properties only 3 properties were field in Trust by the Association, while other properties were not Trust properties. The learned Custodian came to conclusion that since the Association was formed for religious and charitable purposes, all properties held by it were Trust properties. The learned counsel for the petitioner then attempted to argue that the learned Custodian, in his above order, appointed two persons as managers of the properties until framing of a scheme under section 16- A of the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and since the scheme under section 16-A of Act XXVIII of 1958 was referable to urban properties only, therefore, the agricultural land were not held to be the properties of the Association. The contention of the learned counsel has no merit. The Custodian, while disagreeing with the report of the Additional Custodian (Jud1.) held as follows: "For reasons given above, disagreeing with the views expressed by the Additional Custodian in his report dated the 11th June, 1959, I hold that the case is clearly covered by subsection (3) of section 7 of the Act, and, therefore, until the appointment of new trustees, the properties held by the Karachi Pinjrapore Association and their income will have to be applied, as far as possible for fulfilling the purposes of the trust. The order dated the 18th August, 1953, passed by the Deputy Custodian Karachi, is, therefore, modified accordingly."

2. The above observation of the Custodian clearly indicates that it had in its purview all the properties of the Association and it did not exclude the agricultural land owned by the Association from consideration. The absence of a reference in the order of Custodian to the scheme to be framed under section 14 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, is immaterial in view of the observation of Custodian referred above. It was lastly contended by Mr. Maroof Ali Khan that the properties having not been treated as evacuee properties before 1-1-1957 and the respondent having no control over the management of these properties, the properties could not be treated as evacuee trust properties now. This contention of the learned counsel has no force. It is admitted ' before us that right from the very beginning the status of the Association as an evacuee was under dispute and the controversy was set at rest finally by the order of the Supreme Court dated 31-1- 1957 in the case of Mahadavji Dharsibhai v. K. P. A., where the association was held to be an evacuee. The result of the above order of Supreme Court clearly, was that all the properties held by the association were treated as evacuee properties. Apart from it, the Custodian of Evacuee Properties, by his order dated 26-3-1960, held that all the properties belonging to association were evacuee trust properties. This order, it is admitted before us, was not challenged by the present petitioner at any timer. The present petitioner, who alleges to have the control and management of the agricultural land, made an application on 25.1-1977, to the Chairman, Evacuee Trust Board, complaining of alleged interference with his right of management and praying for deletion of these properties from the list of evacuee trust properties. The Chairman, Divisional Trust Committee took up the matter and after holding enquiry-came to the conclusion that Prinjapore Association and Trusts, Pinjrapore, are one and the same and that the pro--perties which are shown in the name of Trustees Pinjrapore, are in fact the properties belonging to Karachi Finjrapore Association. The revision petition filed by the petitioner against the above order also failed. We have notbeen able to discover anything in these orders which could render them either illegal or orders without jurisdiction. The clear import of the order of Custodian dated 26:3-1960 .Was that all the properties held by the Association were treated as Evacuee Trust Properties and by the impugned orders the Chairman, Divisional Evacuee Trust Committee and Joint Secretary, Ministry of Religious Affairs and Minorities Affairs, also took the same view, The findings of the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 that 'trustees, Pinjrapore and Karachi Pinjrapore Association are one and the same is based on cogent reasoning and find full support from the order of Custodian of Evacuee Property, dated 26-3-1960.

3. There is no merit in this petition, which is dismissed summarily.

For educational and research use only — not legal advice. Verify against the official report before relying on it. See our Disclaimer.
Disclaimer·Privacy·Terms·Search