DECISION ' The sole issue which falls to be considered in the instant appeal is whether the grievance petition filed by the appellant workman is not maintainable on account of the grievance notice not having been served on the employer, the Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works Ltd., within three months of the appellant being not permitted to perform his duties.
2. The appellant and three other workmen of the Karachi Shipyard had filed grievance petitions before the Learned Fourth Labour Court complaining that the Karachi Shipyard had unauthorisedly refused to permit them to perform their duties on the ground that they were striking workmen. The learned Labour Court by a common decision, given on 4th October, 1980, dismissed all the four grievance petitions. The grievance petition of the appellant was dismissed solely on the ground that the requisite grievance notice was served by the appellant on the employer after the expiry of the prescribed period of three months, though on merits the learned Labour Court has held that the appellant was not a striking workman and in fact had been performing his duties during the period of the alleged strike. The grievance petitions of the remaining three workmen were dismissed both on the grounds of limitation as well as on merits.
3. Since the learned Labour Court has held that the appellant was not a striking workman and no cross-appeal has been filed in respect of this finding, the decision in the appeal turns on the question whether the grievance notice was not served by the appellant on his employer within the prescribed period of three months. The learned Labour Court decision is based on the view that the grievance of the appellant arose on 9th June, 1979 when he was refused admission in the Karachi Shipyard, and therefore, the grievance notice should have been served within three months of the said date, but in fact it was given on 3rd October, 1979. It appears that the learned Labour Court was under some misconception in taking the view that the grievance of the appellant arose on 9th June, 1979. In this grievance petition the appellant has stated that from 9th June, 1979 the Shipyard was closed as a 'Lock-out' had been declared by the management. The grievance of the appellant was not against the 'lock out' but against the refusal of the management to allow him to perform his duties with the shipyard when it again opened after the lifting of the `lock-out'. The `lock-out' was reported in the national papers and hence there appears to be no serious dispute in this behalf. The grievance of the appellant, according to his grievance petition, arose on 13th August, 1979, when pursuant to some agreement between the management and the workers the appellant reported for duty but was refused entry in the shipyard and was not allowed to perform his duties.
The grievance of the appellant in respect of which he had sought redress from the Labour Court was thus, not the 'lock-out' of the shipyard but arose when the appellant was not permitted to perform his duties after lifting of the 'lock-out'. It is not clear from the record when the `lock-out' was lifted but according to the appellant he had gone to report for duty on 13th August, 1979, after the lifting of the `lock-out' but he was refused entry and to be permitted to perform his duties. As such, the grievance of the appellant specifically arose on the said date.
4. For the above reasons I am of the view that the grievance notice given by the appellant was within the prescribed period looking to the nature and time of the grievance having accrued to him. As already pointed out, the learned Labour Court has held that the appellant was not a striking workman but had performed his duties during the period of strike. I would, accordingly, set aside the finding of the learned Labour Court and direct the reinstatement of the appellant. In my view the appellant is not entitled to back benefits, firstly, because it is not clear as to when the 'lock-out' in regard to the Shipyard was lifted, secondly, according to his own version the appellant appears to have waited until some sort of agreement between the management and the workmen was reached and, thirdly, there is nothing on record to indicate whether since the date of his dismissal the appellant has not been gainfully employed. It is, however, clarified that the appellant would be entitled to benefits on account of his past service.