DORAB PATEL, J.--The petitioners in both these review petitions were aggrieved by the orders of the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner (Land) by which the land in dispute claimed by them was transferred to the respondents. They challenged the orders of the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner before the Rehabilitation Commissioner, but their revisions were dismissed. This was in 1960. Then on 1-5-1964, they filed applications under sections 10 and 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, (hereinafter called the said Act) before the Chief Settlement Commis- -sioner, but these applications too were dismissed on 18-12-1962, therefore, they challenged these orders in revisions under section 21 of the said Act in the Lahore Seat of the West Pakistan High Court. And, the petitioners in Civil Review Petition 57-R of 1980 filed their Revision in the High Court on the' 19th July, 1961. Whilst the petitioners in the other case filed their statutory revision in the High Court on the 5th of August, 1963. Both these revisions were returned to the petitioners as they were not in compliance with the rules of the Court. The petitioners represented them, after complying with the objections of the Court, on 3rd September, 1963, and in the events that happened, they came up for hearing before a Division Bench of the High Court on 24th April, 1967. Now according to the respondents, they contested these revisions, inter alia, on the ground that they were time- barred, therefore, the petitioners made a prayer to the learned Judges that they should be allowed to convert the revisions into writ petitions after paying the requisite difference in court-- fees.
Despite the objections of the respondents, this prayer was allowed and by its order dated 17th April, 1967, both the revisions filed by the respondents were convered into writ petitions.
2. The writ petitions, therefore, came up for hearing before a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court on the 5th of July, 1976 and they were both allowed on that date. Therefore, the respondents filed petitions for leave in this Court against the judgment allowing the two writ petitions against him.
And, their contention before this Court was that the learned Judges of the High Court had erred in law in allowing the petitioners to convert their time-barred revisions into writ petitions. Leave was granted to examine this question and the appeals were heard on the 5th and 6th of April, 1976. The contention of Chaudhry Khalilur Rehman (the learned Advocate for the respondents (who were the appellants in the appeals) was that section 21 of the said Act prescribed a period of sixty days for filing the statutory revision in the High Court, but that the petitioners (who were the respondents in the appeal before us) had filed revisions which were patently time-barred, therefore, they had, on the 27th of April, 1976 obtained an order from the High Court converting their revisions into writ petitions and had thereby circumvented and defeated the period of limitation prescribed for filing revisions under the said Act, therefore, the judgment of the High Court was illegal. This argument appealed to the majority of the learned Judges, who heard the appeal. But, Akram, J., as he then was, dismissed the appeals on merits and he was also of the view that the High Court was justified in converting the time-barred revisions of the petitioners into writ petitions. However, in accordance with judgment of the majority, the appeals of the respondents were allowed.
3. The petitioners (who were respondents in the appeal before us) now seek a review of the majority judgment on the ground that they had filed their revisions in the High Court within the statutory period of limitation, therefore, there was an error apparent in the majority view, because the finding on which it was based, namely, that the revisions of the petitioners were time-barred, was erroneous. The position thus taken by the petitioners in these review petitions is the exact opposite of the stand taken by their learned counsel before the Court when the appeals of the respondents were heard and allowed. Therefore, in order to clarify the position, we asked the learned counsel who had requested the High Court for converting the revisions of the petitioners into writ petitions, as the case of the respondents before us was that the revisions had been converted into writ petitions at the request of the petitioners, because they had, admitted that their revisions were time-barred. Mr. Arif feebly attempted to deny the contention of the respondents that the revisions had been converted into writ petitions at the request of the petitioners themselves. He, however, was not able to produce the High Court's order of 27th April, 1967 converting the revisions into writ petitions. And, on the other hand, even Akram, J., as he then was, has in his minority judgment given a categorical finding that the revisions had been converted into writ petitions at the request of the petitioners. The majority judgment also proceeds on the sane assumption, and we are satisfied that the position now taken by the petitioners in their review application is contrary to the position taken by them in the High Court.
4. Mr. Arif then stated that the revisions filed by them in the High Court were within time. And, he referred to reason No. (ii). In the concise statement of the petitioners, we have examined the entire concise state--ment of the petitioners, but we do not find any averment by them that their revisions had been filed within time in the High Court. On the contrary, the plea advanced by them in their concise statement was that the High Court was justified in converting the petitioners' revisions into writ petitions and this plea implies that the revisions were time-barred, otherwise the ques--tion of converting them into writ petitions would not arise.
We have also verified from the notes of one of us (Dorab Patel, J.) that the petitioners had not, in their arguments, contended that their revisions in the High Court were within time, therefore, this plea has not been examined either in the minority judgment or in the majority judgment. But, as a review of a judgment cannot be allowed on grounds which were not urged at the time of the hearing of the case, it is obvious that the petitioners are utterly devoid of merit.
5. Confronted with this difficulty, Mr. Arif's only reply was that the petitioners had filed applications on the 15th April, 1976 in which they had pleaded that their revisions were not time-barred. These applications were filed after arguments had been concluded in the appeal and the case reserved for orders, and further on inspecting the file, it transpires that the petitioners had not taken any steps to obtain orders on these applications. Therefore, the fact that they had merely presented these applications does not advance their case.
In the result, the petitions are without merit and are dismissed.