' The respondent, who was employed as a Security Guard in the Security Papers Limited, the appellants herein, was dismissed from service by the order, dated 12th December, 1979 issued by the Mill's Manager, on the basis of the report of the Enquiry Officer who had found the respondent guilty of making derogatory remarks against the Managing Director and inciting the workers against the management. The respondent challenged the orders of his dismissal before the learned IVth Labour Court, who has set aside the orders of his dismissal and directed his re- instatement in service with full back benefits. The appellants have accordingly come up in appeal to this Tribunal.
2. The main issue which falls to be considered in this appeal is whether the respondent is a 'workman' for the purposes of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, and is entitled to file a grievance petition under clause (3) of Standing Order 12 read with section 25-A, I.R.O. It may be pointed out that this Tribunal in the case of Johnson & Johnson (Pak.) Ltd. v. Zubair Ahmad (1) has held that a person whose services have been terminated for any reason is not a worker for the purposes of the Industrial Relations Ordinance and is consequently not entitled to file a grievance petition under section 25-A, I.R.O., unless the termination of his services is in consequence of or has led to an industrial dispute. However, if such a person falls within the definition of workman as given in the Standing Orders, he would be entitled to file a grievance petition against the termination of his services under clause (3) of Standing Order 12 read with section 25-A, I.R.O.
3. It has been admitted by the respondent that he was working as a Security Guard. According to the evidence on record the main duties of a Security Guard are to search the workmen entering into or leaving the mills premises. It is difficult to view such' work as involving manual work of the nature contemplated by the definition of "workman" as contained in the Standing Orders, though undoubtedly search is conducted with hands. Apart from searching of a workman, the duty of a Security Guard would be to keep the unauthorized persons out of the premises. In fact that appears to be the main function of the Security Guard. The consistent view of this Tribunal has been that a Watchman. Chowkidar or a Security Guard does not fall within the definition of a "workman" as given in the Standing Orders as he is not ordinarily employed to perform manual or clerical work. In the case of Sadra Zan v. Pfizer Laboratories Ltd., decided on 28th October, 1980, this Tribunal has held, relying on the decisions in the cases of (1) K.T.C. v. Muhammad Hafiz and others, decided on 2nd September, 1979, (2) Syed Lal Khan v. Rax Talkies Ltd., decided on 14th May, 1980 (3) Khudadad Khan v. National Construction Company, decided on 20th April, 1980, (4) Gul Matin Khan v. Hotel Mehran, and (5) Mehran Shah v. Hotel Mehran, decided on 14th May, 1980, that a Watchman or Chowkidar is not a workman for the purposes of Standing Orders and hence is not entitled to file a grievance petition under clause (3) of Standing Orders 12.
4. In view of the above decisions, I hold that the respondent, who is admittedly employed as Security Guard, is not a workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders and is consequently not entitled to file or maintain a grievance petition under clause (3) of Standing Order 12 read with section 25-A, I.R.O. The decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Shahzad Khan v. Sind Labour Court No, IV (2) does not help the case of the respondent, since that decision is based on the definition of a "worker" as given in the I. R.
0., and not as given in the Standing Orders. I would accordingly, set aside the impugned decision of the learned Labour Court and allow the appeal. The amount deposited by the appellants towards the back benefits awarded {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) 1980 PLC 622 (2) 1977 SCM R 103 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' to the respondent by the learned Labour Court is ordered to be refunded to the appellants.