Through this Intra Court Appeal filed under Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 (the "Ordinance" ), the Appellant has challenged the validity of impugned order dated 08.06.2020 passed in Writ Petition No. 24016 of 2020 by the learned Single Judge (the "Impugned Order") whereby the Constitutional petition filed by the Appellant was dismissed.
2. Learned law officer objected to maintainability of Appeal on the ground that the learned Single Judge has 'rightly passed the impugned order; that there is no illegality or perversity in the impugned order; that the instant Appeal is not competent before this Division Benc h as the proviso to Section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 prohibits an Intra Court Appeal where the law applicable provides for at least one Appeal or one Revision or one Review to any Court Tribunal or Authority against the original order; as such the Appeal is liable to be dismissed.
3. Arguments heard. Record perused.
4. It evinces from the record that against order dated 09.05.2018 passed by the Managing Director/Respondent No.2, the Petitioner filed an appeal under Section 16 of the Punjab Employees Efficiency , Discipline and.
Accountability Act, 2006 (the "Act") which too was dismissed vide order dated 22.02.2019. Section 19 of the Act provides a remedy of appeal before the Punjab Service Tribunal against any order passed under Section 16 or 17 of the Act. The said section is reproduced for ready reference.
"19. Appeal before Punjab Service Tribunal. ---(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, any employee aggrieved by any final order passed under Section 16 or 17 may, within thirty days from the date of communication of the order , prefer an appeal to the Punjab Service Tribunal established under the Punjab Service T ribunals Act, 1974 (Punjab Act, IX of 1974)".
5. Reading of above section clearly demonstrates that any employee aggrieved by any final order passed under Section 16 or 17 of the Act A may prefer appeal to Punjab Service Tribunal. Admittedly , in the case in hand, the proceedings were initiated under the provision of the Act and the Respondent No.1 being appellate authority passed the order dated 22.09.2019 under Section 16 of the Act.
6. The instant Intra Court Appeal has been filed under Section 3 of the Law Reform s Ordinance, 1972 whereas the object of proviso to subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 bars the remedy of Intra Court Appeal in those cases in which the relevant law provides the remedy of appeal, revision or review . It is important to note that against original order dated 22.02.2019, the Appellant instead of availing the remedy as provided under Section 19 of the Act, filed constitutional petition which was dismissed vide impugned order .
7. Now the question arises whether Intra Court appeal is maintainable in such a case where a remedy in the form of appeal was available to the Appellant. Proviso to it Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 provides that where appeal, revision or review is provided, then intra court appeal is not maintai nable. Reliance in this regard is placed on the case titled "SME Bank Limited v. lzharul Haq" (2019 SCMR 939) wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: "We are of the view that where the proceedings from which the writ petition has arisen provided for either review , revision or Appeal, in terms of proviso to Section 3 of the Ordinance of 1972, remedy of ICA will not be available against the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge in the writ petition".
Reliance is further placed on case law reported as "Muhammad Aslam Sukhera and others v. Collector Land Acquisition, Lahore Improvement Trust, Lahore and another" (PLD 2005 Supreme Court 45) wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has held as under: "7. There is no doubt in our mind that the award by the Tribunal is treated to be an original judgment and decree within the meaning of section 26 of the Act. Being an original decree, the award has been specifically made appealable before the High Court and then before this Court under section 54 of the Act of 1894. In view of express provisions of section 54 of the Act it is not possible for us to hold otherwise. It cann ot be said that the award by the Tribunal is not an original order for the purposes of bar contained in proviso of section 3(2) of the Ordinance.
Therefore, it is not necessary for us to determine as to whether the award made by the Collector could also be treated to be an original order or not. The object of Proviso to subsection (2) of section 3 of the Ordinance, 1972 seems to be to bar the remedy of Intra Court Appeal in those cases in which the relevant law provides the remedies of appeal, revision or review ."
8. It was held by August Supreme Court in "Federation of Pakistan through Secretary . Revenue Division, Islamabad and others v Messrs Sahib Jee and others" (2017 PTD 1481 ) that "remedy of representation, though not stricto sensu akin to an appeal is nevertheless a statutory remedy and, therefo re, the provision must be strictly construed and applied". This Court through various judgments has already held that remedy of representation is equal to remedy of appeal as envisaged under Proviso of Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 thus debar remedy . of Intra Court Appeal. Reference is placed on "Muhammad Shakoor v. Federal Public Service Commission through Chairman, Islamabad and 2 others" (2003 PLC (C. S.) 414), "Yamin v. Mst. Jajan and others" (2005 CLC 978),"Messrs Shahzadi Polypropylene Industries through Proprietor v. Federation of Pakistan through President and 4 others" (2017 PTD 2019 ), "Muhammad Ashraf Saeed v. Habib Bank Limited and another" (2018 PLC (C.S.) Note 13) and "Haji Ahmad Khan and another v. Province of the Punjab and 5 others" (2018 PLC (C.S.) 36). Therefore, the instant appeal is not main tainable as the proviso to subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 specifically bars the remedy of Intra Court Appeal.
9. In view of above situation, the instant appeal is not maintainable; consequently the same is hereby dismissed.