Anwaarul Haq Pannun, J.- Through this Constitutional petition, the petitioner calls in question the order dated 25.11.2017 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, D.G. Khan whereb y, accepting the application of respondents No.2 to 7 under section 265-K Cr.P.C. in a private complaint titled "Bashir Ahmad Khan v. Ijaz Ahmad and 5 others" under section 3 (2) of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, the learn ed trial court had proceeded to acquit the respondents.
2. The main plank of the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the learned trial Judge, instead of accepting an application under section 265-K Cr.P.C. when the trial was just half the way ought to have granted opportunity of producing full fledge evidence to the petitioner/complainant, there fore, the impugned order is not sustainable in the eyes of law .
3. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently opposed the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner .
4. The arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties have been heard and record perused.
5. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned trial Judge ought to have granted full fledge opportunity to the petitioner for producing his entire proposed evidence and thereafter the matter should have been decided on merits instead of accepting the application under section 265 K Cr.P.C. moved by the accused, half the way of the trial is concerned, the same is not even legally tenable. The provisions of section 265- K Cr.P.C. is reproduced herein:- 265-K Cr .P.C. Power of Court to acquit accused at any stage: "Nothing in this Chapter shall be deemed to prevent a Court from acquitting an accu sed at any stage of the case; if, after hearing the prosecutor and the accused and for reasons to be recorded, if considers that there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any of fence."
The perusal of the provision clearly indicates that the power vested under section 265-K Cr.P.C. can be exercised by the learned trial court at any stage of the trial. The language "Nothing in this Chapter shall be deemed to prevent a Court from acquitting an accused at any stage of the case" adequately conveys the underlying object of the provision that there exists no impediment on the way of trial court in exercise of its powers for acquitting accused at any stage, subject to certain pre-requisites, i.e.
(i) after hearing the Prosecutor and the accused both,
(ii) the reasons must be recorded for acquitting the accused,
(iii) the trial court shall exercise its powers only if it comes to the conclusion that there exists no probability of the accused being convict of any of fence.
(iv) Moving of formal application by the accused is not necessarily envisaged.
(v) The court can exercise its power on its own motion.
6. Keeping in view the provision of section 265-K Cr.P.C. in verbatim, I may add one thing that the law has vested a trial court with a wide power , enabling it to see through the wall on its other end. It may be observed here that in view of plethora of pending cases, instead of allowing the complainant/prosecution to produce weak, deficient, and inadmissible proposed evidence in the trial, it is high time for the trial courts to exercise such vast power vested therewith, to save precious public time, for conducting other meaning-full proceedings in some other matters pending in the courts objectively . Acceptance of the above noted contention of the learned counsel would amount to rendering the provision redundant which cannot be done. In order to appreciate the contention for the learned counsel for the petitioner of factual matrix, I feel it appropriate to reproduce a portion of the judgment under challenge:- "Admittedly , the disputed plots/land is situated in same khata in which respondents Ijaz, Maher Mai and Aftaf also own their plots/land. This fact is evident from the report of the SHO, PS Sadar , District D.G.Khan as well as Patwari concerned and also from petition u/s.22- A/22-B Cr.P.C. filed by complainant Bashir Ahmad Khan against accused Ijaz and Maher Mai wherein complainant Bashir Ahmad Khan admitted the said facts in Para No.2 thereof. Further , no time and date of incident has been mentioned in instant private complaint. The dispute, in fact, between the parties to present private complaint is of demarcation of land owned by them for which the remedy available to them is to file application to the Revenue Authorities or to institute a suit for declaration. If for the sake of arguments, it is admitted that the accused had taken possession of disputed plots/land in joint khata in absence of complainant even then it cannot be said that the accused illegally dispossessed the complainant from his land because in such situation, they would have dispossessed him without his consent of his immovable property otherwise in due course of law. So, the remedy available to the complaina nt is to institute a suit u/s.9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 for the reason that it cannot be said that accused would have dispossessed him without having any lawful authority with intent to grab it."
The perusal of the order of the learned trial Judge, hereinabove, clearly indicates that it is based on proper appreciation of facts and law and material available on record. No illegality , perversity or material irregularity could have been pointed out, in the impugned order by the learned counsel.
7. Even otherwise in order to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 199 (a) (ii) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 which is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:-
199. Jurisdiction of High Court. (a) (ii): "Declaring that any act done or proceeding taken within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court by a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province or a local authority has been done or taken without lawful authority and is of no legal effect; or "
The person invoking the Constitutional jurisdiction under the above Article seeking issuance of writ of certiorari, by way of setting aside the order, has to show that the order, under challenge, violates the condition mentioned in the above provisions of the Constitution, that the authority/court/tribunal was denuded of jurisdiction whatsoever to pass the order or that the order impugned is unsustainable on account of being result of extremely, improper exercise of jurisdiction or has clearly been passed in violation of any provisions of law or is product of excess or failure of jurisdiction, by the tribunal or that some principle of law laid down by the superior courts, which under Article 189 of the Constitution is binding on the subordinate courts has been violated. The scope of interference by the High Court is, therefore, limited to the inquiry whether the tribunal has in doing the act or undertaking the proceedings acted in accordance with law. If the answer be in the affirmative the High Court will stay its hands and will not substitute its own findings for the findings recorded by the tribunal. Cases of no evidence, had faith, misdirection or failure to follow judicial procedure, etc. are treated as acts done without lawful authority and vitiate the act done or proceedings undertaken by the Tribunal on this ground. Reliance is placed on the case law reported in RAHIM SHAH v. THE CHIEF ELECTIO N COMMISSIONER OF PAKIST AN AND ANOTEHR (PLD 1973 Supreme Court 24), there remains a failure on the part of the petitioner to show that the impugned order being hit by any of above referred conditions, hence this petition, being bereft of any force, is hereby dismissed.