The petitioner, displaced person from District Karnal, which is included in the `prescribed area' filed claim Form No. 2916, with regard to the land abandoned by her in village Bolrkoli Khurd, Tehsil and District Karnal. It is alleged by, the petitioner that as the aforesaid claim form was misplaced she filed a duplicate bearing No. 2916 in the year 1952, whereas the original has been filed in the year 1948. The petitioner was allotted 20587 produce index units on 2nd November, 1952.
2. As special Jamabandi from village Babkoh Khurd has not been received from India it was decided by the Settlement Authorities to determine the claim of such persons- by resorting to the procedure prescribed for the verification of claims under Schedule V to the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956.
3. The petitioner filed claim registration No. 2644 and her claim was verified by the Deputy Claims Commissioner on the 6th of March, 1959. She then obtained allotment to different villages on the strength of the verification order but with the promulgation of Martial Law Regulation No. 84 as amended by Martial Law Regulations 89 and 91, the entitlement of the petitioner was considerably reduced. On a representation been made by the petitioner, respondent No. 2 issued Fard dated the 5th December, 1963, for 6,408 Pacca Bighas; on the strength of which an area equivalent to 36,907 produce index units was allotted to petitioner on the 16th May, 1964 which was confirmed on the 30th of May, 1964, in different villages. On the 20th of August, 1966, a robkar (Annexure `A') was issued by respondent No. 2 -to respondent No. 3 with the direction that the confirmed area in favour of the petitioner be reviewed and that all previous fards be deemed to have been cancelled.
The petitioner by means of the present writ petition has challenged the vires of memorandum No. 1006-63/2017-R (L)., dated the 12th of April 1963, by means of which a progressive cut under paragraph 5 of Martial Law Regulation 89 had been made applicable to the case of the petitioner.
She has also challenged the validity of the robkar issued by respondent No. 2.
4. Learned counsel appearing in support of this petition argued that the case of the petitioner had been dealt with as if her claim pertained to -Non-Agreed Area", which .Was factually incorrect.. It was argued that according to West Pakistan Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme the displaced persons from 'prescribed areas' were entitled to be compensated in full for the land which they abandoned in India at the time of migration to Pakistan and, therefore, the petitioner under no circumstances could be deprived of this right. Learned counsel then challenged the vires of memo dated 12th April, 1963, referred to above.
5. Mr. Maqbool Elahi Malik, learned counsel appearing for the Settlement Authorities raised the preliminary objections ; the first one being that the petitioners filed a civil suit on the 10th of June, 1967 for permanent injunction, in which she challenged the validity of the robkar dated 20th August 1966 (Annexure `)r') and specific issue was framed by the Civil Court which was whether defendant No. I was not competent to issue Robkar dated 20-8-1966'. Learned counsel then argued that after the issues had been framed, the Civil Court gave a definite finding on this issue and ultimately dismissed the suit on merits by tat dated the 23rd of June, 1972. It was, therefore, submitted that the petitioner having already impugned the Robkar (Annexure `B') before the civil Court, was debarred from invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court for. The same purposes. The second objection was that even if the order of the civil Court, was to be ignored, then the petition would by hit by laches, because the vires of memorandum dated the 12th April, 1963 was being challenged for the first time before this Court in the year 1972, learned counsel accordingly submitted that taking these two objections in considera--tion, either individually or collectively, the petition merits dismissal.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner tried to meet these objections by submitting that although Robkar dated the 20th August, 1966 was examined by civil Court, but as the petitioner had not impleaded the Chief Settlement Commissioner as one of . The defendants in the civil suit nor bad she challenged the vires of the memorandum, the decision of the Civil Court, therefore, would be no bar to the filing of the present petition before this Court. Learned counsel submitted that the only adequate remedy available to the petitioner, where she could successfully challenge the vires of the memorandum was the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court under Article 201 of the Interim Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. On the question of ]aches no convincing explanation was given by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
7. In my view both these objections are fatal to the present petition, because once, the petitioner has resorted to a civil action then she would not be permitted to invoke the constitutional jurisdic-- tion of this Court, subsequently especially when the civil Court had determined the main point which the petitioner wanted to restitute before this Court. The decision of the civil Court being against the petitioner she had a remedy that in law and would thus be not permitted to leave the matter half-way-house and to resort to, the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. $ The objection of delay has to be examined in the light of equitable doctrine of laches and for that the equitable maxim 'Delay defeats equities' is the proper answer and to quote the words of Lord Camdan, a Court of equity "has always refused its aid to stale demands, where a party has slept upon his rights and acquiesced for a great length of time. Nothing can call forth this Court into activity, but conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence ; where these are wanting, the Court is passive and does nothing".
9. As the petitioner has failed to meet these objections I do not feel necessary to examine the contention of the learned counsel with regard to the vires of the memorandum in the instant case and in view of the two aforesaid objections I would dismiss the petition with no order a s to costs.