DECISION ' By order, dated 22nd August, 1978, the appellant, who was working as nursing orderly under the Assistant Medical Officer, Karachi, was transferred temporarily, in the interest of administration, and posted to Mirpurkhas. It appears that upon issuance of the said order of transfer the appellant applied for leave. He also approached the Divisional Superintendent, Karachi, for cancelling the orders of this transfer. It appears that the Divisional Superintendent rejected the appellant's request for cancellation of his posting orders at Mirpurkhas and accordingly by letter, dated 4th February, 1979 the appellant was asked to join his duties at Mirpurkhas. This letter, as stated therein, was issued with the approval of the Divisional Superintendent. The appellant challenged the orders of his transfer by way of grievance petition before the learned Vth Labour Court mainly on the ground that the transfer orders were mala fide. The learned Labour Court, mainly relying upon the decision of this Tribunal in the case of Messrs M. F. Sons Food Industries v. Ajmal Mian has dismissed the appellant's grievance petition. The appellant has, accordingly, come up in appeal to this Tribunal against the impugned decision of the learned Labour Court which was given on 2nd March, 1981.
2. It was admitted by Mr. Muhammad Ahmed that it was the condition of service of the appellant that he could be transferred and that the appellant had no right under any law, settlement or award to be permanently posted or not to be transferred from Karachi. His contention, however, was that the transfer orders were mala fide and consequently the appellant had a right to challenge such mala fide order. Since admittedly the Railway Administration were entitled to transfer the appellant, the burden of establishing mala fides was upon the appellant. That burden the appellant failed to establish. As already pointed out the transfer orders were issued as far back as on 22nd August, 1978. By various devices the appellant has managed to postpone the implementation of his transfer for two and half years. If the transfer orders had been motivated by malice or mala fide the Railway Administration would have quickly implemented the same. The very fact that the Railway Administration have all along taken a lenient view of the matter and allowed the appellant to work at Karachi, at least till 18th January, 1979 when he appears to have been released from his duties at Karachi, shows that the allegation of mala fides against the Railway Administration is misconceived. Even after he was released from his duties from Karachi the appellant did not report for duty at Mirpurkhas but approached the Labour Court for cancellation of orders of transfer.
3. The mala fides alleged against the Railway Administration are, firstly, the at the appellant was wrongfully drawing medicine charges amounting to Rs, 212 and, secondly, that he was a signatory to an application regarding an incident which took place in the Railway Hospital, Karachi on 25th December, 1978. As regards the latter incident it may be mentioned, firstly, that it took place long after the original orders of transfer of the appellant, dated 22nd August, 1978 and secondly, it appears from the evidence of Muneer Baig, Head Clerk in the office of the Divisional Superintendent, that on investigation no substance was found in the allegation concerning that incident and the matter was settled amicably between the parties. As regards the first incident, it may be mentioned that apart from the bare word of the appellant there is no evidence to show that his transfer to Mirpurkhas was on account of his demand for payment of medicines prescribed for. In fact, as already pointed out, The transfer order specifically mentions that the transfer was temporary and was in the interest of Administration. As pointed out by this Tribunal in the case of Messrs M. F. Sons Food Industries v. Ajmal Mian the Management has a right to transfer an employee from one station to another in the exigencies of service and cannot be considered as punishment.
4. For the reasons discussed by me above, I find no merit in this appeal and would, accordingly, dismiss the same in limine.