C.M.No.1-C of 2019 This is an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 for condonation of delay in preferring an appeal under Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, that is, Intra Court Appeal No.765 of 2019 challenging the judgment dated 07.11.2018, passed by the learned Single Judge in Chamber in a constitutional petition brought by respondent No.1 under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, i.e. Writ Petition No.153913 of 2018, whereby the applicant and proforma respondent No.2 were directed to issue appointment letter to respondent No.1.
2. The judgment, under challenge, was made on 07.11.2018 whereas the memorandum of appeal was presented on 09.01.2019. It means that the appeal is barred by time. The applicant thus seeks condonation of delay on the grounds: that law favours adjudication of matter on merits; that lengthy procedure and formal requirements were required to be fulfilled before filing the appeal; and that, the delay was not deliberate rather due to the circumstances beyond his control.
3. It is now well settled that an appeal from a judgment, passed by the High Court in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction, whether ordinary or extraordinary , in which the forum as well the right of appeal (Intra Court Appeal) is given by the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, is governed by Article 151 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908, which prescribes a period of twenty days from the date of judgment. Another provision regulating the procedure for filing of Intra Court Appeal is provided in Rule 4, Chapter 1-A, Volume V of the Lahore High Court Rules and Order , which reads as follows: "Every Intra Court Appeal to the High Court under the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 from a judgment of a Judge sitting singly shall be presented within 20 days from the date of judgment appealed from, unless the admitting Bench in its discretion, for good cause shown, in writing, grants further time.
In an Intra Court Appeal the memorandum of appeal need not be accompanied by a copy of decree, order or judgment appealed from. The period of limitation prescribed in this rule shall be computed in accordance with the provisions of section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908."
Conjoint reading of Article 151 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and above cited Rule 4 of the Lahore High Court Rules and Orders makes it pellucid that a judgm ent passed by a Single Judge of the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under clause (1) of Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 not being on Order made under sub-paragraph (i) of paragra ph (b) of that clause, may be challenged before a Bench of two or more Judges of that Court within a period of twenty days even without filing a copy of the judgment appealed from.
4. Upon being confronted with the above noted provisions of law, learned Addl. Advocate-General tried to persuade us that period of limitation in the present case would start running from the date when the copy of the impugned judgment was communicated to the applicant through the letter issued from the Office of the Addl. Registrar (Judicial), Lahore High Court, Lahore which was received in the Office of the District Police Officer, Narowal on 13.12.2018 and from that date the instant appeal was within time.
5. This argument has not persuaded us. It is an admitted fact that under Rule 8, Part-J (PART-II), Chapter 3 of Volume V of the Lahore High Court Rules and Orders, office of this Court serves copy of the Court's order/judgment passed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 upon the party to whom direction is issued by the Court. The said Rule is reproduced below for facility of reference: "The writ under these rules shall be served personally, if possible, upon the parties to whom it has been directed or in such manner as the Court issuing the writ may direct."
The judgment, under the above referred Rule, was served upon the applicant for immediate compliance; and this service could not be construed as a point furnishing fresh period of limitation. It is not disputed that the judgment, under appeal, was announced in the presence of Addl. Advocate-General and also the representative of the applicant, namely , Ilyas, S.I.
It is also admitted fact that the applicant had not made any application for obtaining the certified copy of impugned judgment dated 07.11.2018. The benefit of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was thus not available to the applicant. In these attending circumstances, the applicant being aware of the impugned judgment should not have remained lax. In fact the applicant, if so aggrieved, could have filed an appeal within a period of twenty days without a copy of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge in Chamber. The time for filing the appeal had begun to run from 07.11.2018 and it did not re-start from the date of receiving the copy of the judgment through letter dated 11.12.2018 issued from the Office of Addl. Registrar (Judicial) of this Court. Thus, presentation of memorandum of appeal in the office of this Court on 09.01.2019 was out of time.
6. Now we advert to the grounds for condonation of delay urged in this application. We are of the view that these grounds do not constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay. In fact the averments made in this application demonstrate sheer negligence on the part of the applicant to pursue the remedy of appeal before this Court. Government functionaries are equal before the Courts and no preferential treatment can be shown to the Government Agencies. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has repeatedly laid down that the Government enjoys unusual facility for the preparation and conduct of the cases and its resources are much larger than those possessed by ordinary litigants and thus it cannot claim to be treated in any manner differently from any ordinary litigant. The applicant was required to explain each day of limitation properly and satisfactorily and his excuse that matter got delayed because of fulfilment of formal requirements at different department levels is never a valid ground for extension of period of limitation and does not constitute a sufficient ground for condonation of delay. In this regard reliance may be placed on the case of "The Deputy Director, Food, Lahore Region, Lahore, etc. vs. Syed Safdar Hussain Shah" (1979 SCMR 45), "Custodian of Enemy Property vs. Hoshang M. Dastur and others" (1979 SCMR 191) and Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Rais Pir Ahmad Khan" (1981 SCMR 37).
7. In the sequel this application being devoid of any merit is dismissed.
MAIN CASE
8. Since C.M. No.1 of 2019 has been dismissed, this appeal is also dismissed being barred by time.