DECISION ' The appellant, who was originally appointed as an Assistant Food Inspector in the Ministry of Food, was subsequently transferred to the Rice Export Corporation and became a Food Inspector in 1976.
While he was posted at Pasroor Railway Station as Food Inspector, in place of Naeem Wahid, Food Inspector, who was on leave, he was charge-sheeted, on 22nd April, 1979, for committing irregularities and illegalities in respect of eleven consignments of rice from Pasroor. On the said charge he was dismissed from service vide order, dated 11th December, 1979, on the basis of more than one domestic enquiry that was held against him. The appellant challenged the order of dismissal before the learned Fifth Labour Court which has dismissed the grievance petition, vide its decision, given on 22nd November, 1981. The learned Labour Court has dismissed the appellant's grievance petition solely on the ground that the appellant, being a Food Inspector in the respondent Corporation, was not a workman for the purposes of the Sind Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, and consequently was not entitled to file and maintain a grievance petition against the termination of his services under clause (3) of Standing Order 12 read with section 25-A, I. R.
0. The learned Labour Court has based its decision on the judgment of this Tribunal in the case of .Rice Export Corporation of Pakistan, Ltd. v. Naeem Wahid, decided on 4th February, 1981. It may be pointed out that this Naeem Wahid is the same Food Inspector in whose place the appellant had been posted. In the decided case it was held that the main duties of the Food Inspector at Pasroor Railway Station were to procure stock of rice for the Rice Export Corporation in accordance with the instructions given by the Corporation. He said instructions lay down the limits of allowable refractions, the mode of inspection, sampling and spot analysis. It also provides for random checking by the Food Inspector of the bags of rice procured. As already pointed out, the appellant was appointed in the place of the aforesaid Naeem Wahid and was performing the same duties which the latter was required to perform. As such the decision of this Tribunal in the case of Naeem Wahid will be applicable with full force to the case of the appellant. It was, however, argued by Mr. Mahmood Mubassir, the learned Representative for the appellant, that this Tribunal itself in the case of Rice Export Corporation Employees' Union v. Rice Export Corporation of Pakistan Ltd., decided on 6th December, 1981, had observed that although in the case of Naeem Wahid this Tribunal had held that he being Food Inspector was not a workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders, the question whether other Food Inspectors in the Rice Export Corporation are workmen either for the purposes of the Standing Orders or the I. R.
0., can only be resolved on the basis of evidence as to the nature of their respective duties. The nature of the duties of the appellant, however, was precisely the same as that of his predecessor Naeem Wahid, in the case of Rice Export Corporation of Pakistan Ltd. v. Naeem Wahid. As such the observation of this Tribunal in the case of Rice Export Corporation of Pakistan Employees' Union would be of no assistance to the appellant as there is nothing on record to indicate that his duties involved the performance of clerical or manual work.
2. It was then sought to be argued by Mr. Mahmood Mubassir that the Standing Orders can be varied and altered by agreement between the parties if the alteration or variation improves the benefits or the terms and conditions of service of the workman. However, the definition of workman is given not in the Standing Orders but in the Sind Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, and the provisions of the said Ordinance including the definition of workman given therein, cannot be altered by agreement or understanding between the parties. Moreover, there is no evidence to show that there was any agreement between the parties that Food Inspectors would be treated as workmen for the purposes of the aforesaid Ordinance. The dismissal of the appeal is based solely on the ground that the Labour Courts have no jurisdiction in the matter. Needless to add that it will be open to the appellant to approach the appropriate Civil Court or other constituted authority for redress.
3. For the reasons discussed by me above, I find no merit in this appeal and would, therefore, dismiss the same in limine.