' The appellants herein filed an application under section 34, T.R.O., in the Court of the learned IIIrd Labour Court at Karachi, praying for adjudication upon the right of the appellants to set-off the Cost of Living Allowance payable under subsection (5) of section 3 of the Employees' Cost of Living (Relief) Act, 1973, against the increases in wages provided to the workmen under a settlement which was arrived at between the appellants herein and the 1st respondent on 26th April, 1981.
2. The essential point of difference between the parties is founded on the interpretation of the aforesaid settlement. Thus the whole matter rests upon the interpretation of the settlement, dated 26th April, 1981, in the light of the provisions of the Employees' Cost of Living (Relief) Act, 1973, as amended by Ordinance No, XXV of 1981. The interpretation of the provisions of a settlement is the sole function of this Tribunal under section 50, I. R.
0.' as has been held by the High Court in Constitutional Petition No, 487/1974, Fouji Sugar Mills Employees' Union v. Fauji Sugar Mills and another. In fact an objection to the maintainability of the application under section 34, I.R.O., and the jurisdiction of the learned Labour Court to entertain the application was raised by the respondent union but the same was overruled by the learned Labour Court, as it has taken the view that for adjudication of a right of an employer, it has the power to interpret a settlement. This view has been expressly dissented from by the High Court in the case of Fauji Sugar Mills referred to above.
3. As to the contention that the application under section 34, I.R.O. Did not directly involve the interpretation of a settlement but involved the effect of the provisions of Ordinance No, XXV of 1981, upon the settlement, it may be pointed out that a settlement cannot be considered in the vacancy but has to be considered in the light of the law applicable to it.
4. Relying on the judgment of the High Court in the case of Fauji Sugar Mills, which judgment was also upheld by the Division Bench, I am of the view that the application under section 34, I.R.O., was not maintainable and hence the learned Labour Court has no jurisdiction to deal-with the matter.
The appeal is, therefore, dismissed in limine solely on that ground.