MUHAMMAD FARRUKH IRFAN KHAN, J.---Through the instant petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 the petitioner has assailed the orders dated 23.10.2013 and 30.3.2015, passed by the Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) and the President of Pakistan, respectively whereby recommendations were made to accommodate respondent No.3 for appointment on the basis of blood relation quota.
2. Brief facts of the case are that Muhammad Fazal Khan, father of respondent No.3/Nisar Ahmad Khan, was an employee in SNGPL. After his retirement respondent No.3 in response to an advertisement dated 11.12.2007 applied for appointment against the post of "Fitter", vide application No.1146, on the basis of employee's son quota. However, appointments could not be made due to some administrative issues. The petitioner-Company again invited applications through advertisement dated 21.3.2012. Respondent No.3 again applied for appointment against the post of Helper, vide his application No.5232, on the basis of Blood Relations Quota (employee's son). He was interviewed but not appointed against the post applied for by him under Blood Relations Quota. He filed complaint against the petitioner-Company before the learned Wafaqi Mohtasib, which was allowed, vide order dated 23.10.2013. The petitioner-Company assailed the said order before the President of Pakistan, but their representation/appeal was dismissed, vide order dated 30.3.2015. Hence, the instant writ petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that both the impugned orders being without jurisdiction are liable to be set-aside; that the petitioner being a public limited company is neither established nor controlled by the Federal Government; that complaint of respondent No.3 could not be entertained by the Wafaqi Mohtasib for the reason that the petitioner-Company has no statutory Rules; that no element of malpractice is proved on record attracting the jurisdiction of the Wafaqi Mohtasib; that 687 candidates were called for interview for competing against the available vacant posts of "Helper" and respondent No.3 stood at 307th position in the merit list; that only 159 candidates were appointed against Blood Relations Quota; that the impugned orders being non-speaking orders are liable to be set-aside; that Acting Wafaqi Mohtasib had no authority or power to adjudicate upon the complaint of respondent No.3; that the matter of recruitment in the petitioner-Company being executive function any complaint relating thereto could not be entertained by the Wafaqi Mohtasib under Article 9 of the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order (I of 1983) (hereinafter referred to as "Order 1983") and that the impugned orders being contrary to law and facts are not sustainable in the eye of law and deserve to be set-aside. Reliance has been placed on the cases of Kawaja Muhammad Asif v.
Federation of Pakistan and others (2013 SCMR 1205, Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Ltd. v. Wafaqi Mohtasib and 3 others (2015 MLD 1029), Peshawar Electric Supply Company Ltd. v. Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Islamabad and others (PLD 2016 Supreme Court 940) and Secretary Wafaqi Mohtasib and 6 others v. Capital Steel Re-Rolling Mills through Partner and 2 others (PLD 2012 Lahore 493).
4. Conversely, learned counsel for respondent No.3 submits that the impugned order has been validly passed by the Acting Wafaqi Mohtasib under section 7 of the Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983 and section 4 of the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013; that the petitioner is a company controlled by the Federal Government, therefore, it falls within the definition of "Agency" as defined in the Order 1983; that respondent No.2 has exercised its powers and jurisdiction in accordance with law; that neither any written test was held nor any standardized interview conducted and while making merit list respondent No.3 was ignored without any lawful reason or ground and this act on the part of the petitioner-Company amounts to maladministration; and that both the impugned orders have been passed with reasons, therefore, are speaking orders in all respect.
5. Arguments heard. Record perused.
6. Learned counsel has vehemently questioned the maintainability of the complaint before respondent No.2/Wafaqi Mohtasib. This question is, therefore taken up first. In the case of The Managing Director, Sui Southern Gas Co. Ltd. v. Saleem Mustafa Shaikh and others (PLD 2001 SC 176) it has been held that the petitioner was a company owned and controlled by the Federal Government, therefore, it could not be expected from the Government to enact rules and then not to enforce the same or to violate merely because the rules did not have the status of statutory rules. In the present case the petitioner/SNGPL has the same status as that of the petitioner- company in the above cited case. I am, therefore, of the view that the petitioner-Company falls within the definition of "Agency" as defined in Order, 1983. For facility of reference section 2(1) of the Order, 1983 is reproduced hereunder: "Agency" means a Ministry, Division, Department, Commission or office of the Federal Government or a statutory [body] corporation or other institution established or controlled by the Federal Government but does not include the Supreme Court, The Supreme Judicial Council, the Federal Shariat Court or a High Court."
From a bare reading of the above said definition as well as the dictum laid down by the August Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of The Managing Director, Sui Southern Gas Co. Ltd. v.
Saleem Mustafa Shaikh and others (supra) it is established that the petitioner-Company being an "Agency" was amenable to the jurisdiction vested in the Wafaqi Mohtasib under the Order, 1983.
7. I see no force in the argument of learned counsel for the petitioners that in the present case jurisdiction of the Wafaqi Mohtasib was barred under section 9(2) of the Order 1983. For better appreciation of this argument of the learned counsel it would be expedient to reproduce Art. 9(2) of the Order 1983 hereunder: "9. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (1), the Mohtasib shall not accept for investigation any complaint by or on behalf of a public servant or functionary concerning any matter relating to the Agency in which he is, or has been, working in respect of any personal grievance relating to his service therein.'
A careful reading of the above said section indicates that jurisdiction of the Wafaqi Mohtasib is barred under the aforesaid provision in case where the complaint has been filed by a public servant or functionary concerning any matter relating to the Agency in which he is, or has been, working in respect of any personal grievance relating to his service therein. Respondent No. 3 is neither a public servant/ functionary nor he is or has been working in the petitioner-company.
8. It is emphasized that the matter agitated in the complaint was not related to service of respondent No.3 in the petitioner-company rather it pertained to a complaint against the petitioner-Company with the allegation of maladministration in the matter of his appointment on the basis of Blood Relations Quota. This allegation has been fully established on record. It is on record that respondent No.3 is a son of a retired employee of the petitioner-company. He has been striving for getting job in the petitioner-company on the basis of Blood Relations Quota since 2007.
Admittedly, during the process of recruitment in the year 2013 no written test was conducted for appointment against the post of "Helper". Even no standardized interview was conducted by the petitioner-company. Though respondent No.3 has been shown at 307th position in , the final merit list but there is nothing on the record to show the criteria which was adopted by the petitioner- Company for preparing the merit list. It seems that the petitioner-company has not made appointments against Blood Relations Quota on the basis of any reasonable criterion. In the case of Almas Khanum v. Federation of Pakistan and others (1994 MLD 6) it has been held that "the action of an official agency if appearing to be unreasonable, unjust, oppressive and arbitrary shall amount to maladministration falling within the ambit of Art. 9 of the P.P.O. 1 of 1983 for the purpose of exercise of jurisdiction B by the Ombudsman in the matter to undo an act of administrative excess." In these circumstances, I am of the firm view that the impugned orders do not suffer from any legal infirmity or jurisdictional defect.
9. So far as the objection of the learned counsel for the petitioners qua passing of the impugned order by the Acting Ombudsman is concerned that is also without any backing of law. Under Art. 7 of the Order, 1983 Acting Mohtasib can be appointed when the office of Mohtasib is vacant, or the Mohtasib is absent or is unable to perform his functions due to any cause. In the present case the impugned order has not been passed by the Acting Wafaqi Mohtasib under delegated powers under Article 19 of the Order, 1983. There is no provision of law which restricts the powers and jurisdiction of the Acting Wafaqi Mohtasib. Therefore, the case of Secretary Wafaqi Mohtasib and 6 others v. Capital Steel Re-Rolling Mills through Partner and 2 others (supra) is distinguishable from the case in hand. Both the forums below have passed speaking orders without there being any legal flaw. The same, therefore, do not call for interference by this Court in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction.
10.In view of what has been discussed above, I see no merit in this petition, which is dismissed.