Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to this revision petition under section 115, C. P. C. Are that a suit for possession through pre-emption was filed against the petitioner to pre-empt the sale of plot of land in dispute. The suit was resisted by the petitioner on various grounds includ--ing that of estoppel and limitation. It was also averred that improve--ments were made on the plot by spending Rs. 10,000. Learned trial Court framed necessary issues and evidence of the plaintiff concluded on 11th November, 1975. The evidence of the petitioner/defendant was closed on 22nd June, 1976 on account of failure to produce evidence. However, permission was granted to him to appear in the witness-box as his own witness. The order closing evidence was, however, not challenged by the petitioner. However, he appearing as his own witness stated that be had constructed the house spending Rs. 9/10 thousand over the plot in dispute which was purchased by him for Rs; 625 only. He, however, admitted in cross-examination that the house was built with clay bricks, but he was not in a position to tell the time when the house was construc--ted. He further stated that the house was constructed soon after the purchase of the plot. Later on, however, on 20th December, 1976, the petitioner made a statement before the learned trial Court to the effect that the suit be decreed in favour of the plaintiff/respondent on payment of Rs. 825. This statement was thumb-marked by the petitioner and was also signed by his learned counsel.
Thereafter, statement of the respon--dent/plaintiff was recorded, accepting the statement made by the petitioner/ defendant. This statement was also signed by the plaintiff/respondent as well as his learned counsel. The learned trial Court, therefore, decreed the suit on the basis of the statements of the parties. Later, the petitioner filed an appeal challenging the decree passed with his consent. In the grounds of appeal, the position taken was as under :---- "That since the defendant-appellant was a poor man and was fed up of the pendency of the litigation so the counsel of the appellant --defendant asked the appellant to compromise the suit and the appellant to have Rs. 5,000 from the plaintiff-respondent ... When the suit was compromised in the Court, the counsel of the appellant asked to thumb-mark the papers of the court on the condition of the payment of Rs. 5,000 to which the appellant agreed and thumb- marked the Court papers considering bona fidely the statement of the counsel of the appellant to be correct` that the appellant is being paid Rs. 5,000 as the sale-price as well as the construction etc. Over the plot in dispute, but unfortunately when the copy of the order was obtained from the copying agency the fact was revealed that the suit has been decreed at Rs. 825 including 1/5th amount already deposited, so the appellant was taken aback to see that the appellant .Has been kept under mis--representation and then he has undergone a huge loss financially, hence 'the appellant is constrained to file this appeal in this Hon'ble Court."
The appeal was, however, dismissed by the learned District Judge vide judgment and decree dated 20th October, 1977 observing that the state--ments of the parties had been recorded by the lower Court which were signed by the parties as well as their learned counsel, and in appeal different counsel had represented the appellant row petitioner before this Court.
2. In this revision petition it was urged that the appeal was compe--tent as nature of compromise was in dispute and that in fact the peti--tioner/appellant had never agreed to receive Rs. 825 i.e. Only. Rs. 200 more than the sale-price of the plot and in fact he was made to under--stand that the suit was to be decreed on payment of Rs. 5,000. Reliance was made on certain observations contained in Qaim Din and another v. Mistri Muhammad Ibrahim (PLD 1960 Lab. 296), Dwarka Nath v. Atul Chandra (AIR 1928 Cal. 108) and Jamnabaf v. Fazalbhoy (AIR 1923 P C 184). Before attending to the precedent cases, it is appropriate to note the precise grievance of the petitioner. A perusal of para. 4 of the memorandum of appeal and the memorandum of grounds of revision reveal that the factum of compromise itself is not being dis--puted. The dispute is with respect to the quantum of the amount on receipt of which the decree was prayed to be passed in favour of the respondent. The plea of the petitioner is that he agreed to receive Rs. 5,000 and not Rs. 825 as noted in his statement by the learned trial Court. But the petitioner failed to bring on record anything in support of this plea. If nothing else, an affidavit of the counsel could be produced as otherwise presumption of truth attaches to the judicial record. His statement recorded by the learned trial Judge was also signed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It is too much to believe that in the said state--ment, Rs. 825 were entered incorrectly. Had there been any mistake committed by the learned trial Court in this regard, an application could have been submitted immediately before the trial Court itself to rectify the mistake. The petitioner did not adopt the course of moving the application before the learned trial Court. The counsel who represented him, did not support him in this respect and it was for this reason that the learned District Judge observed in the impugned judgment that in appeal a different counsel has represented the petitioner before him. As the petitioner has failed to substantiate the plea taken by him, there is no alternative but to hold that the appeal filed by him was rightly held to be incompetent and non- maintainable.
3. A few words may be said now about the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In the Lahore case (Qaim Din v. Muhammad Ibrahim), the learned Judge observed that section 96, C. P. C. Shuts out appeals against decrees which give effect to the consent of the parties, but not where the gravamen of the charge is that it has traveled beyond consent. The question mainly involved in this case was whether revision was competent against the order impugned therein under section 115, C. P. C. In any case, in the instant case, the petitioner has failed to establish that the impugned decree traveled beyond the terms of the compromise, as such, the observation made in the cited case is of no assistance to the petitioner. In the Calcutta case (Dwarka Nath v. Atul Chandra), again it was observed that a plaintiff has a right in appeal to show what the compromise was, where the dispute is with respect to the nature of the compromise.
However, on facts, this case bears no resem--blance to the case of the petitioner. In the Privy Council case (Jamnabai v. Fazalbhoy) it was observed that before an order passed on the consent of the Pleader, though under a mistake of fact is set aside, serious and substantial injustice to the party concerned must be established. This case again is of no help to the petitioner because there is nothing on record to show that the compromise was effected on payment of Rs. 5,000. Moreover, it cannot be argued on behalf of the petitioner that serious and substantial injustice was done to him, as except for his own bald statement, there is nothing on record to establish the raising of construction over the plot in dispute, what to say of the fact that the superstructure raised, if any, was of the value of Rs. 9/10 thousand. The petitioner in his state--ment admitted that it was a kacha structure. No further description of the structure or the construction was given out. Moreover, he failed to raise any objection against the closure of his evidence. Had he made improvements costing Rs. 9/10 thousand, he would not have failed to prove the said fact by adducing evidence. In these circumstances, the plea of miscarriage of justice cannot be pressed intoservice.
4. The petitioner has thus failed to make out a case for interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The revision petition is, therefore, dismissed with costs.