DECISION ' This appeal is directed against a decision of the learned IV Labour Court, given on 23rd April, 1981, dismissing the grievance petition of the appellant, challenging the orders of his dismissal on the ground that he was not a workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders and consequently was not entitled to file or maintain a grievance petition against the termination of his services under clause (3) of Standing Order 12 read with section 25-A, I. R.
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2. The sole point which falls to be considered in the present appeal is whether the appellant is a workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders. It is not disputed that the appellant was a Chowkidar in the Rice Export Corporation of Pakistan Ltd., the first respondent herein. Relying on the various decisions of this Tribunal to the effect that ordinarily a Chowkidar, Watchman or a Security Officer is not employed to do manual or clerical work and consequently would not come within the definition of workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders, the learned Labour Court has held that the appellant was not a workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders and has, accordingly, dismissed his grievance petition It was, however, contended by Mr. Mehmood Mubbashir, the learned representative of the appellant, that besides the ordinary duties of Watchman, the appellant was required to perform other duties such as checking of each and every track coming in and going out of the premises of the first respondent, counting the number of bags received and sent out, taking sample of rice received for the purposes of checking its quality and sometimes making tea for serving the same to the staff of the first respondent. The learned ,Labour Court has considered this contention of the appellant but was not impressed with it, as no question was suggested to the Manager Security', who was over all incharge of the Chowkidars and who was examined' on behalf of the first respondent, that the appellant was required or was' performing the aforesaid duties. However, even if it be assumed that the appellant was either required to perform or was in fact performing the aforesaid duties then also he would not come within the definition of workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders as his primary duty as that of Chowkidar and the aforesaid duties were merely incidental to his main functions.
This point has been considered by this Tribunal in the case of Muhammad Sadiq v. Cotton Export Corporation of Pakistan Ltd., decided on 27th May 1981, wherein it was held that a Chowkidar in the Cotton Export Corporation of Pakistan was not a workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders notwithstanding the fact that he was performing or required to perform other duties involving manual or clerical work. In the case of Brooke Bond (Pak) Ltd. v. General Secretary, Union Karkunane Brooke Bond (1), a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court observed that the true nature of the duties performed by the employee is the determining factor in ascertaining if he was a workman or no, within the definition of workman as contained in the Standing Orders. It was further observed by their Lordships of the Lahore High Court that in case the manual work forms only a small and an auxiliary part of his responsibilities or he is incidentally required to perform prepare a statement, maintain a register or submit a report, he cannot be considered to be a workman if otherwise his main and primary duties did not belong to this category. The true test, therefore, is to look to the direct, immediate and the substantial part of the work for which he is employed and not the sundry duties incidentally performed or required to be performed by him. As such, even if the appellant was performing or was required to perform the aforsaid duties, they are to be considered as incidental to his main and primary of Chowkidar.
3. For the reasons discussed by me above, 1 find no merit in this appeal and dismiss the same in limine. {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1969 Lab. 717 {{FOOT NOTE}}