This is a Second Rent Appeal filed by the appellant/tenant. Rent Case No. 4086/75 was filed by the respondent/landlord against the appellant/tenant on the ground of default. The rate of rent was admitted. A tentative rent order was passed by the Rent Controller on 16-8-1978 and the same is reproduced here :----- "RENT ORDER Advocates for the parties present. Rate of rent i.e. Rs. 330 per month is admitted. The applicant claims arrears from March, 1975 to August, 1978. The opponent claims - to have paid to the Advocate for the applicant a sum of Rs. 3,000. The Advocate for the applicant states without admitting the said arrears and that rent order be passed without prejudice to the case of the parties and subject to determination and through by means of evidence.
The opponent is further directed to keep on depositing the future monthly rent at the above said rate commencing from September, 1978 Before 15 of each subsequent calendar month till the final decision of this case. Adjourned to 23 - --11-1978 for settlement of issue, Announced is open Court This 16 day of August, 1978.--- A perusal of the above order would show that the arrears amounting to Rs. 10,860 were to be deposited by the appellant on or before 14-11-1978. It is an admitted position that these arrears were not deposited before by the date but were deposited on 22-11-1978. In the circumstances an application under section 13 (6) of the 1959 Rent Ordinance was filed which was allowed by order dated 27-3-1979 of the Rent Controller and the defence of the appellant was struck of andth th ejectment ordered. An appeal was fled being Rent Appeal No. 256 of 1979 by the appellant which came to be dismissed by order dated 21-4-1980 of the First Appellate Authority namely 1st Additional District Judge, Karachi. In the circumstances, the present Second Appeal has been filed challenging the aforesaid orders of two Tribunals.
2. I have heard Mr. Nasrullah Awan, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Sirajuddin Zafar, learned counsel for the respondent. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the appellant as well as the Advocate for the appellant misunderstood the Tentative Rent Order dated 16-8-1978 and they were under the impression that the arrears were to be deposited on 23- 11-1978, which was the next date of hearing after 16-8-1978 on which date the tentative rent order was passed. I see no force in this contention. A persual of the tentative rent order shows that the said order has been passed in very clear terms. There is a separate paragraph relating to arrears in which the date has been clearly mentioned as 14-11-1978 on or before which date the arrears had to be deposited. For current rent there is a separate paragraph. In the circumstances it could not be said that there was any ambiguity in the tentative rent order or there was any room for any misunderstanding on the part of the appellant or his Advocate in interpreting the said orders. It is a case of wilful default.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant then relied upon the case of Hashim Khan v. Ghulam Nabi (1973SCMR 112). This judgment of the Supreme Court was. Passed where different language was used by the Rent Controller while passing the tentative rent order and according to the Supreme Court, in view of the language employed in the circumstances of that case, the counsel of the tenant interpreted the tentative rent order of the Rent Controller in his own light and on account of that interpretation advice was given by the counsel to the tenant which was followed by the tenant and the Supreme Court considered it a case of a bona fide mistake on the part of the counsel as well as the tenant in the construction of the order of the Rent Controller. The facts of the Supreme Court case are clearly distinguishable. In the instant case, the tentative rent order has been reproduced hereinabove, and as observed earlier, there is no ambiguity in the tentative rent order at all and there was no room for any interpretation different to that which is obvious from the order itself. I do not see any illegality or infirmity in the impugned orders.
4. In the circumstances there is no merit in this Second Appeal 247/80, which is dismissed, but with no order as to costs. The appellant, however, is granted time till 31-3-1982 to vacate the premises.