Through this second appeal the appellant has challenged the judgment and decree dated 17.12.2015 passed by the learned Civil Judge 1st Class, Chiniot whereby an application moved by Respondent No, 1 Mian Khan for making the award dated 24.03.2012 rule of the Court was accepted and the award was made rule of the Court, and the judgment and decree dated 16.10.20 17 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Chiniot whereby the appeal filed by the present appellant was dismissed, whereas the appeal of Mian Khan against the order of levy of penalty and stamp duty passed by the learned trial Court was accepted.
2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at full length and also gone through the record minutely with their able assistance.
3. When confronted with the learned counsel for the appellant that how the second appeal is competent; he is unable to assist this Court. In this context, I have to consider Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 which deals with the appeal, same is reproduced as under: "39. Appealable orders--- An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act (and from no others) to the Court authorized by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order:--
(i) superseding an arbitration;
(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case;
(iii) modifying or correcting an award;
(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement;
(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement;
(vi) Setting aside or refusing to set aside an award; Provided that the provisions of this section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.
(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to [the Supreme Court]."
4. It is clear that no second appeal is competent against a judgment passed by the learned first appellate Court as one remedy of appeal is provided under the Act, which has been exhausted before the learned first appellate Court.
I am further of the view that even a revisi on petition against the judgment passed by the learned Additional District Judge is not competent is provided under the statute. If no power of revision is provided under the statute i,e, Arbitration Act, 1940, same forum is not available against the appellate judgment rendered in accordance with Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. In this eventuality , at the most the orders impugned through this second appeal could have been challenged throu gh a constitution petition if the same are without jurisdiction. Even it is not the case of appellant that the orders impugned are without jurisdiction. Further I am of the view that even this Court or the learned trial Court as well as first appellate Court cannot sit as an appellate Court on an arbitration award unless misconduct on the part of Arbitrator is pleaded, even the Court cannot scrut inize the reasons for grant of an award as the parties agree to refer the matter to the Arbitrator for its decision and the Arbitrator cannot be presumed to be a Court having all the laws on its sleeves, therefore, conducting the proceedings relating to the procedure and determination of question referred to, arbitrator cannot be adjudged on the basis of standard of adjudication before the Court. In this view of the matter , when an appeal or revision is not competent, the instant second appeal being not competent stands dismissed with no order as to costs.