' The respondent was employed with the appellant organization as Film Librarian and pursuant to his conviction under C. M. L. A's Martial Law Order No, 18 and 23 on 23rd February, 1978 to a term of one year R. I. And ten lashes, his services were terminated on the following day i. e. 24th February, 1978 by the Managing Director, Pakistan Television Corporation Islamabad, the first appellant herein. Consequent upon a Constitutional Petition filed by the respondent in this Court the punishment of lashes was suspended. Later on the petition was withdrawn and not only that the punishment of lashes was remitted but the remaining sentence was also remitted by the relevant authority. As a result of it, the respondent was released from custody sometime in the last week of April, 1978. Thereafter he served a grievance notice upon the appellants on 5th March, 1979, say about a year after his release from custody. Subsequently on 25th March, 1979 he filed an application before the Labour Court under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the 'I. R.0') for his reinstatement in service. On behalf of the respondents two objections were raised before the Labour Court to challenge the maintainability of the application namely ; that the notice as envisaged by section 25-A of I. R. O. Having not been served within the prescribed period of two months from the date of termination of service the application was not sustainable under I. R.
0. And that Pakistan Television Corporation having been excluded from the operation of I. R.
0. By means of amendment in section 1 of I. R.
0. Which deals with its applicability on 8th April, 1978, and effective from 16th February, 1978, hence on this score too the Labour Court had no jurisdiction in the matter. Both these objections were turned down by means of order dated 3rd May, 1979 impugned in this appeal.
2. Mr. Mohammad Aslam Chisbti, the learned counsel for the appellant while challenging the Labour Court findings given on the above-referred grounds has added yet another ground to establish non maintainability of the application before the Labour Court namely that the appellant's organization having been declared an Essential Service under section 3 of Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952 (Act LIII of 1952), and persuant to Rule 3 of Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Rules, 1962 made under said Act (LIII of 1952) the powers to regulate the terms as to wages and other conditions of services were delegated upon the specified authority who was to be the Chairman or a Member of the National Industrial Relations Commission. Further, by virtue of such authorization necessary regulations had also been framed by a Member of National Industrial Relations Commission which inter alia provided for a remedy in cases of termination of service. Such Regulations were published in the relevant Gazette dated 25th January, 1978. Accordingly he submitted that now the remedy for the respondent's grievance lay under these regulations and not under section 25-A of I. R.
0.
3. Dealing with the first ground Mr. Chishti, submitted that this objection was not considered by the Labour Court at all which was illegal as the maintainability of an application under section 25-A of I. R. O. Is dependent upon valid notice. Since in this case notice was served after more than a year from the date on which cause of action accrued to the respondent the application was ex facie unsustainable in law. The provisions of section 5 of Limitation Act which applied to I. R.
0. Could also not come to his rescue as service of notice, is an act which preceded the invocation of Labour Court's jurisdiction under I. R. O. There is much substance in this argument. The benefit of section 5 of Limitation Act can be availed of after the proceedings are initiated but it has no relevance to an act which is required by law to be performed at an earlier stage. Accordingly notice in question Navin admittedly been served with inordinate delay, the application was not maintainable before the Labour Court. The Labour Court should have dilated upon this point in suitable detail as the law required that a specific finding on such preliminary objections which go deep down the root of the case should be given before entering upon the merits of the case.
4. As to the applicability of I. R.
0. Appellant organization suffice it to say that by virtue of amendment in section 11 of I. R.
0., referred to above this organization was excluded from the governance of I. R.
0. The only objection raised in this contest by Mr. Abdul Rashid, appearing for the respondent was with reference to retrospective application of this amendment. Admittedly this amendment was introduced by means of President's amending Ordinance issued on 8th April, 1978 but was made effective from 16th February, 1978. It is true that the respondent's services had been terminated on 25th February, 1978 and he filed application under reference on 25th March, 1979, as such, amendment was not in the field either on the date when cause of action accrued to the respondent or when be submitted application to assail his dismissal from service but the amendment is purely procedural in nature and does not affect any vested right of the respondent, hence is not open to challenge. It is settled proposition of law that there exists no vested right with regard to procedure or a particular forum in any party and retrospective effect to statutes made in such field does not offend the principles of any law. I am therefore unable to contribute to the view canvassed by Mr. Rashid, that I. R.
0. Being admittedly a combination of procedural as well as substantive law could not be amended retrospectively. On the other and I am clearly of the opinion that such a restriction can at best be placed on such provisions of I. R.
0. Which are in the nature of substantive law, but not to its procedural aspects.
5. In respect of the last contention that the appellant's organization was an Essential Service since Mr. Chishti invited my attention to the Regulations dated 25th January, 1977 known as Pakistan Television Corporation Limited Employees Service Rules made by the specified authority under powers enjoyed by him by virtue of the rules of 1962 made under Act LIII of i952, referred to above, which inter alia catered for the cases involving termination of service. Mr. Abdul Rashid Khan contended that the powers of the Labour Courts remained intact despite a declaration that an organization was to be treated as Essential Service, in matter of termination of service as this did not come within the ambit of 'terms and conditions of services, which a specified authority was supposed under law to regulate. He tried to fortify this argument by placing reliance on Tasneemur Rehman v. Resident Engineer, WAPDA, Lahore (1). This case is absolutely inapt in the circumstances of the present case. In this case Regulations had not at all been framed under Rule 3 of the Rules made under Act LIII of 1952, therefore, the Court was of the view that in such circumstances Labour Court was not divested of its jurisdiction to act under section 25-A of I.R.O. It has nothing to do with the proposition whether termination of service was a matter covered by the scope of activity provided by Act LIII of 1952 or the rules made thereunder or not. However what is most pertinent to note in this case is that the dispute before the Court was with regard to dismissal from service and it was not held that even if the regulations were available in the field the specified authority could not deal with it as it was outside the scope of its jurisdiction. In this case reliance has been placed on the General Manager, Heavy Mechanical Complex Taxila v. Mr. Mamoon A. Kazi, Senior Member, NIRC, Islamabad (2), wherein the principle that Labour Court occupied the field until such time that the necessary regulations were made by specified authority was enunciated. In General Manager, Heavy Mechanical Complex Taxila v. Mr. Bashir Ahmed Malik, Member NIRC (3), the question with regard to the scope of the Regulations also came under consideration and after detailed review of the relevant law on the point it was held that in case of the employees of such organization which had been declared Essential Service the Labour Court will not be competent in matters pertaining to Regulation of (i) Wages, and (ii) conditions of service of a workman. Reference may also be made to Civil Servants Act, 1973 and Baluchistan Civil Servants Act, 1974 which include termination of service, among the-terms and conditions of service. Accordingly, I find myself unable to agree with this contention that in respect of cases pertaining to dismissal from service the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is still intact.
' For the reasons given above the appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated 3rd May, 1979 is set aside. As a corollary of this order the application of the respondent pending before the Labour Court stands dismissed. It will however, be open to the respondent to approach the proper forum available to him under law, There shall be no order as to costs. {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) 1978 PLC 101 (2) PLD 1977 Lah. 998
(3) PLD 1977 Lab. 982 {{FOOT NOTE}}