1. SALAHUDDIN PANHWAR, J.----Granted. 2&3. At the very outset, learned Counsel for the petitioner refers order dated 28.05.2015, which is reproduced herein under:- "Learned Counsel for the petitioners and respondent No,1 state that the parties have finally arrived at an out-of-Court settlement, whereby the petitioners have agreed to purchase the dentised premises from respondent No,1, in consideration of Rs,2,500,000/- (Rupees two million five hundred thousand only). They have further agreed that the entire sale consideration shall be deposited by the petitioners with the Nazir of this Court within two months, whereafter the Nazir may be directed to execute sale deed forthwith in favor of the petitioners at their cost. Learned Counsel have filed a statement dated 28.05.2015, containing the above terms and conditions, which is taken on record. The statement is signed by the learned Counsel for the parties who state that they have been specifically instructed by their respective clients to seek disposal of this matter in the above terms.
2. Accordingly by consent this petition and the listed application are disposed of in the above terms".
3. Having referred the above, it is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that though as per above order, the petitioner was bound to deposit entire sale consideration within two, months with Nazir wherein he (petitioner) failed however it is stressed that C.M.A. No,8317/2015 with regard to extension of time to pay the entire sale consideration amount in installment is yet pending. He further contends that despite pending disposal of such application (C.M.A. No,8317/2015) the learned executing court has issued writ of possession, hence, he has challenged the same through C.M.A. No,1997/2018. He lasted while saying that without disposal of such application the issuance of writ of possession is not legal hence he is seeking suspension of order passed by the executing court, whereby writ of possession has been issued.
4. Heard the learned counsel for petitioner; perused the record, including order (s) of Executing Court carefully.
5. The referred order dated 28.5.2015 prima facie reflects that both parties i,e, petitioner (Judgment debtor) and respondent No, 1 (Decree Holder) had consented for disposal of the petition in terms which were agreed by both parties in consequence of an 'out-of-court settlement'. The petition was accordingly disposed of without disturbing the findings of lower forums. At this point, it would be pertinent to mention that a consent decree or order is a kind of agreement / contract between the parties with a superadded command of the Court. The Courts legally can neither force the parties to change their intentions nor itself can grant to one party what would otherwise require consent of other party. However, the parties to such consent / compromise decree /order may competently come forward to seek any addition in earlier compromise which however would entirely depend upon consent of other party to such compromise decree / order. In other words, if both parties intend to vary a consent order then they may jointly approach the Court or themselves can jointly vary the same out of Court even. Reference in this regard may well be made to the case of Peer Dil v. Dad Muhammad 2009 SCMR 1268 wherein it was held as: "4. In such like eventualities the judicial consensus seems to be that "a compromise decree is a contract between' the parties and its breach would give cause of action to the other party to approach the Court to seek remedy. Compromise decree is but a contract with superadded command of a Judge. It is possible to vary a term of an original contract in such a way to keep alive the original contract. Where a decree is passed on a compromise, the decree and not the compromise in decree bound the parties especially in view of the parties' intention, indicated in the compromise preceding the decree itself that a "decree should be obtained on the basis of the compromise".
6. The status of consent decree / compromise has been reaffirmed as nothing more than 'agreement between parties with superadded command of Judge' in a recent case of Muhammad Iqbal and others v. Khair Din through L.Rs, and others 2014 SCMR 33.
7. The above dicta is sufficient to help me in concluding that in case of breach of any of the terms of the compromise decree / order, the aggrieved would party would be, required to seek enforcement of such agreement (compromise decree) by filing an independent fresh suit because such breach would require determination of subsequent events and conduct of parties, which could not be determined by the Court which did nothing but dispose of the matter on basis of compromise (consents of parties). In the case of Peer Dil supra it was also observed as:- "4 ....... judgment / decree being a consent decree was obviously passed pursuant to the provisions as enumerated in Order XXIII, rule 3, C.P.C. and being a consent decree based on compromise between the parties can safely be equated to that of a contract, breach whereof would give rise to the fresh cause of action and a fresh suit can be filed by an aggrieved person for the rederessal of his grievances........"
8. Prima facie, the petitioner (Judgment debtor) has not been claiming to have complied with such consent / compromise order but has been seeking suspension of order of Executing Court with reference to some pending application for extension / variation in compromise decree (intention of parties). A referral to case of Syed Imran Ahmed v. Bilal and others (PLD 2009 SC 546), would be sufficient for such contention wherein it is categorically held as:- "5 It is principle too well established by now that a sale agreement interest, even a charge on the property in dispute that unlike the law in England, the law in Pakistan did not recognize any distinction between the legal and equitable estates that a sale agreement did not confer any title on the person in whose favour such an agreement was executed and in fact it only granted him the right to sue for such a title and further that such an agreement did not affect the rights of any third party involved in the matter. It may be added that till such time that a person suing for ownership of a property obtains a decree for specific performance in his favour, such a person cannot be heard to deny the title of the landlord or to deprive the landlord of any benefits accruing to him or arising out of the property which is the subject-matter of the litigation. Postponing the ejectment proceedings to await the final outcome of a suit for specific performance would be causing serious prejudice to a landlord and such a practice, if approved by this Court, would only give a license to un-scrupulous tenants to defeat the interests of the landlords who may be filing suits for specific performance only to delay the inevitable and to throw spanners in the wheels of law and justice."
9. In view of above discussion coupled with binding application of enunciated principles of law, I find no substance in instant application which is accordingly dismissed. This however would not prejudice the legal rights of the petitioner (Judgment debtor), arising out of said compromise order, if he so wishes to resort to. The listed applications are also dismissed.