ANWARUL HAQ, C. J.-The respondents 1 to 10 were employed in different capacities in the petitioner's establishment. As they absented them--selves from duty for long periods, they were given show-cause notices, and were dismissed from service after regular inquiries.
2. Aggrieved by these orders of dismissal, the respondents filed applica--tions before the Labour Court under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. The Labour Court consolidated all these cases, and held a joint trial with the consent of the parties. By its order dated the 30th of June, 1977, it allowed all the petitions and directed the reinstatement of the respon--dents in service, without any back benefits. The respondents preferred separate appeals before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal for obtaining relief of back benefits. The employer, namely, Packages Limited did not challenge the order of reinstatement of the respondents, but preferred cross objections, merely asking for the dismissal of the appeals of the respondents without calling in question the procedure adopted by the Labour Court in consolidating all the petitions.
By its order dated the 11th of March, 1979, the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeals filed by the respondents, and set aside the decision of the Labour Court on the ground that it had no inherent power under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code to consolidate all the petitions, and hold a joint trial. The Tribunal, accordingly, remanded the cases back to the Labour Court for disposal of each case separately in accordance with law.
3. The respondents challenged the correctness and legality of the appellate order by filing a writ petition in the High Court, which has been accepted by a learned Judge by his order dated the 16th of April, 1980. He has found that an order to consolidate proceedings in a number of suits or petitions filed by different parties is essentially of a procedural nature, and, accordingly, there was no bar in the Industrial Relations Ordinance in the way of making such an order. On this view of the matter, he has set aside the order of the Appellate Labour Tribunal, and has observed that the appeals of the respon--dents should be considered as still pending, requiring disposal in accordance with law.
4. Leave to appeal is sought on the following grounds :-
(a) That, as laid down by Article 175 of the Constitution, the Labour Court had no inherent powers except those conferred on it by law, and as consolidation had been ordered by the Labour Court in the exercise of its inherent powers, it was without lawful authority;
(b) That it was incorrect to say that the consolidation had been ordered with the consent of the parties, as the person who appeared for the petitioner-company on the second occasion when 7 cases were ordered to be consolidated with the other 3 which had already been ordered to be tried jointly, had no authority to give any consent, as he was merely a Personnel Officer employed by the petitioner ; and
(c) That even if consolidation of a number of petitions for joint trial be held to be permissible in law, this was not at all a fit case for joint trial as identical questions of law and fact did not arise in the 10 cases consolidated by the Labour Court, and each one required separate determination.
5. At the very outset it may be mentioned that before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, as well as in the High Court, the petitioner does not appear to have disputed the authority of the gentlemen, who appeared before the Labour Court, to give consent to consolidation of proceedings on behalf of the petitioner. In these circumstances, it is not possible for us to give effect to this submission at this late stage, and on this short ground alone the petition would be liable to be dismissed for the reason that consolidation of the 10 cases in question was done with the consent of the petitioner's representative.
6. However, even otherwise, there is no merit in the contention raised by Mr. Altaf Hussain, for the reason that the consolidation of several suits o petitions for the purpose of a joint trial is entirely a procedural matter, and the Labour Court did not have to invoke any inherent power for making such an order. As observed by this Court in Sind Employees' Social Security Institution etc. v.
Adamjee Cotton Mills, Ltd. (PLJ 1975 SC 36), relying upon an earlier decision of the Court in Commissioner of Khairpur Division v. Ali Sher Sarki (PLD 1971 SC 243), there is a distinction between what is described as the inherent jurisdic--tion of a Court and a power ancillary or incidental to its main jurisdiction. What is inherent is an inseparable incident of a thing or an institution in which it inheres ; but the power to regulate its own procedure or to grant interim relief would only be incidental or ancillary so as to enable the Court or Tribunal to exercise its statutory jurisdiction, expressly conferred upon it, more effectively and in accordance with the undisputable requirements of justice and reason. It does not need any elaborate argument to see that it is entirely a matter of procedure whether Labour Court would try each application o petition presented before it separately, or hold a joint trial in several matters raising similar or identical questions of law and fact. The procedure adopted can have no substantive bearing on the merits of the cases dealt with by the Labour Court in this manner, unless it can be shown that the cases did not, in fact, raise identical questions of law or fact, and that the joint trial had resulted in material prejudice to one party or the other. But such a consideration does not in any manner, affect the basic fact, namely, that the matter remains in the domain of procedure.
7. As to the contention that this was not at all a fit case for joint trial as identical questions of law and fact did not arise in the 10 cases consoli--dated by the Labour Court, suffice it to say that no such objection was raised by the petitioner before the Labour Court or the Labour Appellate Tribunal, and for that reason we cannot permit this objection to be raised in the present proceedings before us. However, as the High Court has remitted the appeals to the Labour Appellate Tribunal for disposal in accordance with law, we leave it to that Tribunal to decide whether the petitioner could be permitted to raise such an objection, and if so, with what effect.
8. Mr. Altaf Hussain also attempted to argue that the matter brought before the Labour Court was, in fact, not an industrial dispute at all, and, accordingly, did not fall within the ambit of subsection
(2) of section 36 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, and, therefore, the powers of a Civil Court were not available to the Labour Court. We notice once again that this point was also not raised before any of the Courts below, and, accordingly, we are not called upon to examine the same.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed. It will be for the Labour Appellate Tribunal to decide .The appeals of the res--pondents on merits, as directed by the High Court.