This appeal has been filed by the appellant/tenant against the order dated 13-9-1981 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge/Rent Controller, Karachi in R. C. No. 2921/81 on an application filed under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. .
1. The brief facts of the case are that the respondent is the owner of house bearing No. 212-U Block 2, Mehmood Ghaznavi Road, Karachi. A portion of the said house was let out on monthly rent of Rs.
1,000 to the Appellant after the respondent had retired from the Government service on 15-6-1977.
According to the case of the respondent/landlord he was previously residing in the Government accommodation in Jacoblines, Karachi. The said quarter was however got vacated by Government from the respondent on 20-1-1981 after the announcement of the Lines Area Redevelopment Project of K.D.A. Scheme No. 35. According to the respondent he took shelter along with his family, in the quarter of a friend and has been facing serious residential problems.
In the circumstances after. He attained the age of 60 years on 28-6-1981, a notice was given by the respondent to the appellant and at required under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979.
The appellant, however, in the reply sent to said notice through his counsel denied the demand made by the respondent and refused to vacate the premises.
This led to the filing of the above-mentioned application by the respon--dent on 7-7-1981 under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 in the Court of the Rent Controller, Karachi.
2. The learned Rent Controller after giving opportunity of being heard to the parties, by order passed on 13-9-1981 allowed the said application and ordered the eviction of the appellant.
3. Against the aforesaid order the present appeal has been preferred. The learned counsel for the appellant at the hearing raised the following two grounds in support of the appeal;
(i) That the premises in question were let out to the appellant by the respondent after the latter had retired from the Government service and as such on his allegedly attaining the age of 60 years he could not apply for eviction by resorting to the remedy provided under section 14.
(ii) That the Respondent bad not attained the age of 60 years when the application was filed by him in July, 1981.
4. In support of the first ground the learned counsel submitted that under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance a landlord who is, (1) a widow or (2) a minor whose both parents are dead or (3) a salaried employee .Due to retire within six months or has retired, or (4) a person who is due to attain the age of 60 years within the next six months or had attained the age of 60 years may apply for summary eviction of a tenant for his personal use and occupation, subject to his complying with the other prescribed conditions. According to the learned counsel, the respondent having let out the premises in question to the appellant after he had retired from the Government service was not entitled to apply for eviction of the appellant under section 14 on the ground that he subsequently attained the age of 60 years. In support of his arguments the learned Counsel after .Referring to the first proviso to section 14 as originally existed, placed reliance upon the new proviso submitted in its place by Sind Rented Premises (Second Amendment) Ordinance No. XII of 1980.
The first proviso as now exists, is reproduced hereinbelow;- "Provided that nothing in this subsection shall apply where the landlord has rented out the building after he has retired or attained the age of 60 years or, as the case may be, has become widow or orphan."
While the original proviso which now stands deleted, read as follows :- "Provided that nothing in this subsection shall apply where more than six months have elapsed since a landlord has retired or attained the age of 60 years or as the case may be has become widow or orphan."
5. The learned counsel further contended that "or" which has been used in the first Proviso, is intended to have been used to express an alternate or to give a choice to one among two or more things. Reliance was placed on Black's Law Dictionary and the cases reported as C. E. Gibbon, Deputy Speaker, National Assembly and 3 others v. Pakistan and others (PLD 1957 Kar. 956), Haji Ashfaq Ahmad Khan and others v. Custodian of Evacuee Property and others (PLD 1966 Kar. 597) and Mian Jamal Shah v. The Member Election Commission of Pakistan and others (PLD 1966 SC 1) in support of his plea that ordinarily the word "or" is used in a distinctive sense.
The learned counsel then referred to the case of Mumtazuddin Ahmed v, Sultan Jehan Begum PLD 1981 Kar. 329, where a learned Single Judge of this Court while dealing with case filed under section 14 by a landlord for eviction of his tenant on the ground of having attained the age of 60 years, observed as follows :- "It may be noted that the aforesaid amendment has made substantial difference as to the period for availing the remedy provided for under section 14. Whereas prior to the above amendment a landlord falling within any of the above categories could file application within 6 months from the date of his qualifying to one of the above categories.However, under the above substituted proviso no such period has been specified, which means that an application under section 14 can be filed even after expiry of more than 3 years after qualifying to any of the categories specified in the above section, the only requirement under the substituted proviso is that a landlord within the ambit of the above section should not have let out after qualifying to one of the above categories."
6. I have carefully considered the above arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the Appellant but find that the interpretation sought to placed upon the existing first proviso to section 14 cannot be spelt out from words used therein. It will be seen that each one of the eventuality mentioned therein gives a distinct and separate cause of action to apply for summary eviction of a tenant. The intention of the legislature in incorporating section 14 is to provide speedy remedy to a widow or a minor whose both parents are dead or salaried employee due to retire or retired or who is due to attain the age of sixty years to get his/her building vacated in the summary manner. The landlords eligible to apply under this provision of law are person who suffer or are likely to suffer from certain disadvantages or disabilities I life. Lengthy trials and consequent delays resulting in hardships are intended to be avoided by the Legislature.
The above reasoning finds support from the scheme of the statute itself which in subsection (3) of section 14 provides for eviction of a tenant from the building in a "summary manner" and Proviso to section 21, puts restriction on powers of Appellate Court to grant injunction if an appeal is preferred from the order of eviction passed under section 14.
Without disputing the proposition that while considering the provision of a statute each word used is to be given meaning but it cannot at the same time be forgotton, as laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Divisional Superintendent P. W. R. v. Bashir Ahmad that it is, well-established principle of interpretation that remedial statute should be constructed in a manner so as to advance the remedy and suppress the mischief or else it would frustrate the legislative intendment .,
7. Thus it becomes relevant in the circumstances of the care to keep in' mind the object of the statute while construing section 14 and the proviso thereto. It has been observed by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of East and West Steamship Company v. Pakistan P LD 1959 S 41, that :- a Proviso is to be regarded as something which excepts a particular case from a general principle.
The effect of the proceeding portion of the enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for the proviso would be within it."
It was further observed;-- "In principle also the words of a Proviso are to be construed strictly and confined to the special case which its words enact, it would be wrong to construe those words as being co-extensive with those used in the purview, particularly where the effect might be of bringing a repeal of . The purview."
8. Another important observation of the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan whereby distinction between an exception and proviso was pointed, has also to be noted here in order to appreciate the scope of the 'first proviso to section 14 referred to above. The Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan "In reference by the President" PLD 1957 SC (Pak.) 219 at page 245 cited with approval the following principle.
"While there is considerable similarity between an exception and a proviso each restrains the enacting clause and operates to except something which would otherwise fall within the general terms of the Statute, there is a technical distinction between them, although even that is frequently ignored and the two terms used synonymously. The exception, however, operates to affirm the operation of the Statute to all cases not excepted and excludes all other exceptions, that is, it exempts something which would otherwise fall within the general words of the Statute. A Proviso, on the. Other hand, is a clause added to an enactment for the purpose of acting as a restraint upon, or is a qualifi--cation of the generality of the language which it follows. Sometimes, however, as a precautionary measure, it is used to explain the general words of the Act and to exclude some ground of misinterpretation which would extend it to cases not intended to be brought within the operation or purview."
It was further held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court :- "In order to decide whether a provision is "or is not in the nature of a proviso or an exception, what has to be seen is the scope of the enact--ment, the object it was intended to achieve, the scheme of the enactment and the language used in, and the reasons for enacting the exception or special provision."
11. In the light of the above principles authoritatively laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan it can safely be inferred that the first Proviso to section 14 when speaks that nothing under subsection (1) of section 14 shall apply where the landlord has rented out the building after he has retired or attained the age of 60 years or, as the case may be, has become widow oil orphan, should strictly be confined to that particular category alone during the' existence of which the property was let out.
Let us take an example. Suppose A, a girl of tender age had let out her property about 50 years back after she became an orphan at the age of 10 years, and now after coming into force of the Sind Rent Premises Ordinance (as amended) having attained the age of 60 years, applies for eviction of her tenant in summary manner under section 14 (1) of the said Ordinance, can it be argued that her application must fail in view of first proviso to the above-mentioned section 14 (1)2 Such a plea cannot succeed as the state of facts leading to the filing of the case has given rise to a totally different cause of action making the landlord eligible to apply under subsection (1) o1 section 14 of the Ordinance under a different qualifying category.
I am therefore of the opinion that each one of the category enmerated in subsection (1) of section 14 provides a distinct cause and independent right to apply under the said section for the summary eviction of a tenant. The said right of the respondent is not lost under. The First Proviso referred to above merely for the reason that at the time of first letting out he was a retired Government servant eligible to have filed application, and after lapse of- time he attained the age of 60 years and became entitled to apply on happening of events subsequent, qualifying him to apply under a different and independent category enumerated in section 14. A factor to be taken note in the instant case while reaching the above conclusion is that in 1977 when the respondent, a retired Government, let out the premises to the appellant, the Ordinance of 1979 (as amended) had not even come into force.
The learned Single Judge in the case of Mumtazuddin Ahmad (PLD 1981 Kar. 239) bad not laid down any thing different while observing that the landlord within the ambit of above section should not have let out after qualifying to one of the above categories.
12. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that to allow the landlord (respondent) to avail remedy under section 14 after he had attained the age 60 years despite the fact that he being a retired Government servant had earlier let out the premises, would cause great hardship to the appellant who bona fide took the premises as a tenant, cannot be accepted in view of the plain and unambiguous language used in the statute.
13. As to the other plea raised by the learned Counsel that the Respon--dent had not reached the age of 60 years on the date when he filed the application for the eviction under section 14 of the Ordinance of 1979 it may be stated at the every outset that this argument is not available to the appel--lant in view of admission made in para. 3 of the written statement filed in the trial Court wherein it was stated as follows :- "That since the eventuality of retirement had taken place first and the applicant had attained the age of 60 years subsequently the consideration applicable to the applicant's case would be that of retirement and not of attainment of the age of 60 years."
14. The fact that the respondent had already reached the age of sixty years, when the case was filed by him, is fully corroborated by entries in his Service Book as well as Pension Book. Moreover it is the appellant's own case that the respondent let out the premises in dispute to him after he had retired on reaching the age of fifty-five years.
The submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the above entries cannot be accepted as proof of the date of his birth, cannot succeed in the presence of oral as well as documentary evidence of unimpeachable character produced by the Respondent coupled with appellant's own admission, para. 3 of his Written Statement reproduced above.
15. The upshot of the above discussion is that both the grounds raised on behalf of the appellant could not succeed. Consequently the appeal is dismissed as having no merits. I however allow the appellant one month time to vacate the premises.