The Respondents brought Suit No. 126 of 1972, in the Court of the III Extra Joint Civil Judge at Hyderabad wherein they have claimed mesne profits and accounts for the three years, since prior to the filing of the Suit and for injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the joint possession of the plaintiffs. The Plaintiff No. 1 Ashiq Ali and Mst. Roshan at the time of filing the suit were minors.Mst. Khatoo and Amina plaintiffs Nos. 2 and 3 respectively are Pardanasheen ladies.
According to the Plaintiffs,' they have 71 paisas share while the petitioner/defendant has only 29 paisas shares in the property bearing survey No. 142/1 (3 acres 30 ghuntas) and Survey No. 148/2 (3 acres 24 ghuntas) in all 7 acres 16 ghuntas in Deh Behram, Tapu Hatri, Taluka Hyderabad. The property originally belonged to one Kbakoo, son of Nathoo maternal grandfather of the parties and all of them claim shares in the aforesaid property on account of inheritance through him.
The application for appointment of receiver was also filed which was granted by the learned trial Court by order passed on 31-5-1976 on the ground that the parties claim title to the property by way of inheritance f rod Khakoo and the share of the Plaintiffs jointly i3 71 paisas and that of the petitioner is 29 paisas. The petitioner. However contended that the suit property was gifted to him which plea was disbelieved as the petitioner bad not produced any document in respect of the alleged gift nor gave the parti--culars regarding the same. As regards the contention of the defendant/ petitioner that the mutation was obtained by the Plaintiffs through fraud, the learned Judge observed that this is yet to be decided. Having found that the Plaintiffs/Respondents had established a prima facie case and in view of the specific allegation of waste of the suit land made by the Plaintiffs and further that prima facie the respondents are entitled to the income and produce to the extent of their share, of which they were deprived, the learned Judge found it just and proper to appoint the receiver.
2. Against the aforesaid order of appointment of receiver the petitioner filed a review Petition under Order XLVII, rule 1, C. P. C., which was how ever dismissed on merits on 31-5-1979.
3. Against the order dismissing the review application the Petitioner filed a Revision Petition before the learned District Judge being Revision No. 53 of 1979 which was also dismissed on 10-9-1979.
4. In the meantime however on the advice of the learned Advocate for the Petitioner a Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 53 of 1979 was filed on 23-7-1979 in the Court of the learned District Judge against the orders dated 23-5-1972, 31-5-1976 and 31=5-'.979 passed by learned Civil Judge.
The above appeal was heard by the 4th Additional District Judge; Hyderabad who by order passed on 24-3-1980, dismissed the same on the ground that it was barred by time.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid order the petitioner has filed this revision application.
5. The learned counsel for the Petitioner has argued that the time in prosecuting the review application before the trial Court which was dis--missed on 31-5-1979 and the Revision Application dismissed on 10-9-1979 by learned District Judge were proceedings bona fidely prosecuted by the Peti--tioner on the advice given by the learned Advocate who was then appearing for him and that in view of the provisions of section 14, subsection (2) of the Limitation Act the time so spent is to be excluded in calculating the period within which the appeal was required to be filed. He further submitted that even otherwise there was sufficient cause to condone the delay in filing the appeal before lower Appellate Court under section 5 of the Limita--tion Act.
As regards the applicability of section 14, subsection (2) of the Limitation Act, it may be pointed out that the time is to be excluded for the period during which any proceeding was being prosecuted in good faith in a Court which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. We however find that the Petitioner's case does not attract the provisions of section 14(2) of the Limitation Act. The Review and the Revision Petitions filed by him in the lower Courts were not dismissed for want of defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature. The question o C exclusion of time under section 14(2) of Limitation Act, therefore does not arise.
6. In any case the application under Order XLV11, ruse 1, C. P. C., for review and revision application under section 115, C. P. C., were dismissed by orders passed on 31-5-1979 and 10-9-1979 respectively. The Petitioner had however on 23-7-1979 filed Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 53 of 1979, which was dismissed as time barred by the learned lower Appellate Court. For the purposes of section 14 (if applicable) as well as for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay of each day is to be explained. The order by which the learned Trial Court dismissed the review application was passed on 31-5-1979 but there is nothing on the record to explain delay of such a long period (53 days) in filing the Appeal Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 53 of 1979 on 23-7- 1979. In my opinion the appeal was hopeless barred by time and no justification has been made out for condoning the delay or excluding the time under section 14 of the Limitation Act and thus the learned Lower Appellate Court was fully justified in dismis--sing the said appeal as barred by time.
7. It may in the end be also observed that the interest of minors as well as pardanashin ladies is involved in the suit and the record shows that the Petitioner who is prima facie entitled to only 29 paisas share, is depriving the ladies and the minors from their rightful dues out of the income. He has set up adverse title on basis of an alleged gift of which no particulars have been supplied. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.