' MIAN BURHANUDDIN KHAN, J.-As common questions of law and facts are involved in this petition and Petitions Nos. 303/79, 389/79, 462/79, 463/79, 473/79, 544/79, 545/79, 783/79, 560/79, 561/79, 710/79, 728/79, 774/79, 812/79, 831/79 and 855/79, therefore we propose to dispose them of by this single judgment.
2. In W. P. No, 293/79, the petitioner, Nawab Khan, an ex-Superintending Engineer, A & R Department, has assailed the order of his premature retirement under rule 5(4) of the N.-W. F. P. Government Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules 1973, read with rules 3 and 4 thereof, contained in Notification No, SOI (S&GAD) 9-217/76, dated 30th October, 1976. It is stated by the petitioner that he joined service as an Assistant Engineer on 28th March, 1956 and was promoted as an Executive Engineer on 14th February, 1963 and was lastly promoted as Superintending Engineer ; that while serving at Abbottabad as Superintending Engineer ; B & R Department, he was served with show- cause notice dated 15th October, 1976 which was duly replied by him, that subsequently the Authorised Officer without holding any inquiry or recording any evidence held the petitioner guilty of the charges levelled against him and recommended his compulsory retirement from service ; that after the proclamation of Martial Law on 5th July, 1977, the Chief Martial Law Administrator promulgated M. L. O. 23 on 22nd October, 1977. This M. L.
0. Contemplated the creation of Review Board for the purpose of providing a fair opportunity of hearing to all Government servants who were retired between the 1st day of January, 1972 and 5th day of July, 1977 ; that in pursuance to this M. L.
0. Vide Notification SOI (S & GAD) 9.217/77 dated 24th December, 1977 issued by the Government of N.-W. F. P. Information, Service and General Administration Department, four Review Boards were constituted, Board No, 1 consisted of Brig. Usman Khalid as Chairman, Lt.-Col. Azizuddin and Mr. Muhammad Khurshid Khan, Chairman, Service Tribunal N.-W. F. P. As Members, Board No, H consisted of Group Captain Shujauddin Ahmed as Chairman Major Muhammad Jamshed Yunus and Mr. Allah Bakhsh Khan as Members, Board No, III consisted of Lt.-Col. Shahzad Ahmad Khan as Chairman, Mr. Abdul Aziz Khan and Syed Masud Shah as Members ; and Board No, IV consisted of Col. Matloob Hussain as Chairman, Major Ahmed and Mr. Zulfiqar Khan as Members.
3. The main grievance of the petitioner is that M. L.
0. 23 stipulated that the Review Board shall give the petitioner an opportunity of "hearing" and after making further inquiries submit a report together with its recommendations to the competent authority, who may pass such order as may deem appropriate that the Review Board which examined the case of the petitioner did not afford any opportunity to the petitioner of 'hearing" in the proper legal sense and that the Board had no jurisdiction or power to accept or reject a review petition but could simply make recommendation to the competent authority ; that if the competent authority proposed to pass an order adverse to the petitioner, it could only do so after hearing the petitioner ; that at no time 'competent authority' summoned the petitioner much less to have heard him, thus the order of rejection of the petitioner's review petition was bad in law as the same is in conflict with the principle of audi alteram pattern ; that even the Review Board which made recommendation rejecting the petitioner's review petition condemned the petitioner unheard and that mere appearance before the Board did not amount to hearing him in his defence, that no evidence ocular or documentary was produced before the Review Board and no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, if any, appeard against him, was afforded. It is also stated in the petition that the four Boards so constituted examined a number of cases of the compulsory retired Government servants and re-instated thirteen (13) officials out of a total number 320: that proceedings before the Board were also coram non judice inasmuch as under M.
L. O. 23 the Board was required to set out a procedure for the purposes of deciding the review petitions and it was obligatory upon the Board to apprise the petitioner of the procedure adopted for the hearing of his petition.
4. It would be appropriate to reproduce the relevant provisions of M. L. O 23, which are as under."
5. In pursuance of the Establishment Division Notification No, S. R.
0. Dated 5th December, 1917 the Chief Martial Law Administrator was pleased to set up the Review Boards for reviewing petitions submitted by persons who were in the N.-W. F. P. Govt. Service and persons who were in Corporation service in Corporations or other institutions l set up or established by the N.-W. F. P. Government against each. A position of these Boards have already been given in the foregoing paras of this judgment, any the jurisdiction of these Boards, in dealing with the cases of persons in G. 18, 19 and 20 who were compulsorily removed from service, was confirmed on Review Board No, 1 ; that of persons in G. 16 and 17 on Review Board No, 11 ; and of persons in G. 15 and below on Review Boards No, III and IV.
6. Nawab Khan, petitioner, filed a review petition under M. L.
0. 23 before Review Board No, 1 and the proceedings of the Board, which have been produced before us by the learned Advocate-General, show that his appeal (review petition) was not considered by the Board on the ground that his appeal/petition was beyond the scope and powers of the Board. The findings of the Board are contrary to the very letter and spirit of the order as the Board was constituted to deal with the cases of persons who were in Government service or in Corporation service and were compulsorily removed from such service between the first day of January, 1972 and the fifth day of July, 1977, and included prematurely retirement order on completion of twenty-five years' service including termination of service on giving notice as provided in the terms and conditions of service of the affected persons. We also find that order of the Review Board in the case of the petitioner, Nawab Khan, was signed only by the Chairman of the Board while there is no concurrence of the other two Members. Thus, it is also evident that the Board was not properly constituted to deal with the appeal/petition of the petitioner.
According to Notification No, SOI (S & GAD) 9-217/77, in pursuance of Establishment Division Notification No, S. R. O., dated 5th December, 1977, the Chief Martial Law Administrator was pleased to set up Boards mentioned in foregoing para. So, it is expressly provided that each Board shall consist of three Members, presumably the law makers prescribed different qualifications for the three members deliberately and on purpose made the officer of the status of Brig., Group Capt., Lt.- Col., Col. And senior judicial officers of the rank of District Judge. The intention appears to be obvious that the Government wanted the Board to consist of members possessing legal qualifications as well as officers having knowledge of service matters, which also contemplates that the members of a Tribunal must act all together, it would, in our opinion, be a perfectly legitimate view to take that if the law makers did intend to make an exception to this rule, it would have done so in clear terms instead of leaving it to be gathered inferentially. It is quite true that a quasi-judicial tribunal enjoys greater flexibility and freedom from the strict rules of law and procedure than an ordinary Court of law, but however informality and celerity might be considered to be desirable in regard to the proceedings of a Tribunal, it is absolutely necessary that the tribunal must be properly constituted in accordance with requirements of law before it is allowed to function at all.
7. Learned Advocate-General, however, contended that the petition suffers from laches in that a person invoking Constitutional jurisdiction must be vigilant and prompt and the Court may refuse constitutional remedy unless good grounds in making a writ petition are shown. According to him the petitioner's review petition was dismissed on 7th of January, 1 978 and the result thereof was communicated to him on 16th March, 1978 and the present petition was filed on 31st March, 1979, after a period of more than one year He cited The Chairman, District Screening Committee Lahore and another v. Sharif Ahmad Hashmi (1), {{FOOT NOTE}}
(I) PLD 1976 SC 258 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' wherein their Lordships were pleased to hold ; "No hard and fast rule can be laid down for condonation of delay and the question of sufficiency or otherwise of the cause is to be examined in the light of facts of each case. There have been cases where eight years' delay was overlooked. On the other hand there are cases in which few months delay was treated to be condonable". Their Lordships further observed, "the principle, however, is well-settled that Courts of Equity have always refused aid to enforce stale claims or demands. The principles appear to be well-settled. Courts of Equity (who are otherwise not bound by law of limitation) will not allow enforcement of stale claims. Secondly, principle of laches is applied strictly where a public servant seeks restoration to his office or other redress, against a wrongful order. The reason for strict application of principle of laches in such cases is not far to seek. Having regard to the nature of his employment his office is "at pleasure" and he is to be paid out of public revenues. "Pleasure" is qualified or abridged only to the extent that if he is to be removed from service for reason of misconduct, he will be afforded "reasonable opportunity" to show cause. Nevertheless his tenure remains "at, pleasure" and is removable at any time for any other cause say on account of abolition of his post. To obviate payment of unearned salary out of public revenues, Courts of Equity have, therefore, insisted for invocation of their jurisdiction, (which is entirely discretionary), with promptitude. Law of Limitation, has not been made applicable advisedly to such a case for in that event, the matter would be beyond the discretion of the Court, It is in the light of these principles that the Courts of Equity have often refused redress for the sake of avoiding "inconvenience" or "major upset in the administration". This case related to the retirement of Mr. Sharif Ahmad Hashmi, who was Zilladar in the Irrigation Department and was compulsorily retired from service on 30th June, 1959 and until 26th March, 1970 he made repeated representations variously described as appeals and mercy petitions, and the last of these representation was rejected on 26th March, 1970 and he was informed that no further representation shall be entertained. Ultimately on 25th October, 1971 i. e.
After more than 12 years of the order of his compulsory retirement, the respondent moved writ petition for setting aside the order of his compulsory retirement. Which was dismissed by a learned Judge of the High Court on 8th November, 1971 on the ground of laches? The respondent filed Letters Patent Appeal on which it was held that since it was conceded that the order of respondents' compulsory retirement was "without jurisdiction", therefore, it was without lawful authority and void ab initio. On appeal to the Supreme Court their Lordships made the above observations, accepted the appeal of the Chairman, District Screening Committee and set aside the order of the Letters Patent Bench. But in the instant case there is no such noticeable laches as during this period the matter dealing with the cases of compulsorily retired servants remained fluid, and ultimately a glimpse of hope appeared in the shame of M. L.
0. 23 which according to the provisions reproduced in the foregoing paras, provided full right of hearing and any further inquiry in the matter brought before the Board.
8. The petitioner was served with a show-cause notice on 16th October, 1976 vide Annex. 'A' and we refer to White Paper, Volume 11, page 141, which reads as under:-- "Meanwhile, the powers of the 'authorised officer', that is, the powers under the disciplinary rules to issue show-cause notice, etc. Were assumed by the Establishment Secretary in respect of all Government Servants in Grade 17 to 20 irrespective of the Department in which they might be serving. The Establishment Secretary normally is the authorised officer for officers of All-Pakistan Unified Grades (former C.S.P. And P. S. P. Officers and officers serving in the Federal Secretariat as Deputy Secretary and Joint Secretary and the Section. Officers. All other officers, say, in Accounts.
Income-tax, Customs Departments or serving as engineers, scientists, doctors, and a very large number of other general service cadres, come under the disciplinary control of the respective Secretaries to Government under whom they are employed. But for the period from 9th October, 1976 to 7th January, 1977 during which the above-mentioned notification remained in force, the powers to take disciplinary action remained vested exclusively in the Establishment Secretary. The Chief Secretaries to the Provincial Government were also asked to assume similar powers in respect of all officers in Grades 17 to 20 of the Provincial Government. They were asked to ensure that necessary orders on the subject were issued by 13th October, 1976.
' The stage having been thus set for launching the proposed retirements, the plan given by the Establishment Secretary was that all retirement orders, as well as the show-cause notices, and also the orders of termination of service in respect of Corporation employees would be served simultaneously on the 16th October, 1976 on the Federal Government employees. The retirement orders would become effective forthwith, while 7 days were given for replies to the show-cause notice. The cases falling in the show-cause category were to be retired on October 30, 1976 and, except for a few cases, these deadlines were duly observed. The lists of Provincial Government officials, who were to be retired, were taken to the Chief Secretaries concerned at Lahore, Karachi and Peshawar (there were no names from Baluchistan) by officers specially deputed for the purpose by the Establishment Secretary. On the 14th October, 1976 the Establishment Secretary informed the Chief Secretaries, on the phone of the retirement plan (minus names). The officers deputed for the purpose reported to the Chief Secretaries on October 15, 1976, and the whole exercise went through with clock-like precision.
' So, it will amply prove that the creation of a new forum under M. L.
0. 23 were to obviate hardships and mala fide actions of the Government resulting in the retirement of a large number of Government servants.
9. In Writ Petition No, 303/79 the petitioner joined service as Sub-Inspector in the Department of Provincial Co-operative in June, 1943, under the Government of N.-W. F. P. ; was promoted as Inspector Co-operative in 1957 and as Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies worked upto 13th March, 1972 when he was prematurely compulsorily retired under M. L. R.
114. He alongwith other affectees under M. L. R. 114 challenged the orders of retirement by invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, when in the meantime under Article 212 of the Constitution, Services Tribunals were constituted and case of the petitioner abated. The petitioner then filed an appeal before the Service Tribunal in September, 1974 but the matter remained pending till October, 1977, that after the Chief Martial Administrator was pleased to promulgate M. L.
0. 23 in supersession of all other Regulations and Orders ; Review Boards were established for reviewing cases of the Government servants between first day of January, 1972 and fifth day of July, 1977. He accordingly submitted a petition after withdrawing his appeal from the Service Tribunal as laid down in para. 3(2) of M. L. 0, 23.
10. We have perused the Review Board proceedings. Undoubtedly, there are serious allegations against the petitioner of corruption, misappropriation, etc. For which according to the finding of the Board, on a number of occasions he was demoted and asked to deposit the embezzled amount.
But as far as the question of 'hearing the petitioner', is concerned, we do not find any material on the record of the Review Board proceedings that the petitioner was heard in person as required under the provision of M. L.
0. 23,
11. In Writ Petition No, 319/79, the petitioner, Fatehullah, was in the Public Works Department as Assistant Engineer and was promoted as Executive Engineer in 1954 and in 1964 he was appointed as Superintending Engineer, when he was retired under M. L. R. 114 on 13th March, 1972. Thereafter, he persued his case in the High Court and later on creation of the Service Tribunals, filed an appeal which he later on withdrew and submitted a review petition to the Board constituted under M. L.
0. 23.
12. Review Board proceedings examined. Case of the petitioner was examined by the Board headed by the Chairman, Brig. Usman Khalid, only, and the other two Members have not signed the recommendation of the Board, and, therefore, we think that in his case also the Board was not properly constituted as required under the said Order.
13. In Writ Petition No, 462/79, we examined the proceedings of the Board. Petitioner, Ghulam Sarwar, was called to appear before the Board on 19th November, 1977 for interview and after appearance of the petitioner the Board held that there were numerous complaints of moral turpitude. It is not shown what instances have been taken into consideration and whether the petitioner was confronted with the specific allegations and his explanation was called for.
14. In Writ Petition No, 463/79, the petitioner, Arbab Abdul Qadoos, was serving in the. Irrigation Department and was retired under M. L.
0.
114. His case was examined by the Review Board. We have perused the proceedings of the Board but find that the recommendations of the Board are signed only by the Chairman, and no opportunity seems to have been afforded to the petitioner of personal bearing, as required under the Order.
15. In Writ Petition No, 473/79, Muhammad Akbar, petitioner, was retired under M. L. R. 114, and after various petitions and appeals, he filed a review petition under M. L.
0.
23. We have perused the proceeding of the Review Board. Laziness and lethargy are the hall marks of his service, recorded in the proceedings, but no personal bearing appears to have been given to the petitioner.
16. In Writ Petition No, 544/79, petitioner, Sh. Muhammad Bashir was in the Jail Department and was retired under M. L. R.
114. His case was examined by the Review Board and there is no indication that he was personally heard. The only finding, which is relevant to be mentioned here, is that he had 26 years' service and indulged in departmental intrigues and remained under suspension and subsequently increments for two years were stopped. No personal hearing was afforded as required under the Order.
17. In Writ Petition No, 545/7), the petitioner Haji Muhammad Akram, was serving in the Excise and Taxation Department, Government of N.-W.F.P. And was retired under M.L.R. 114 on 13th March, 1972.
We have examined the proceedings of the Review Board, wherein it has been mentioned that his performance in service remained unsatisfactory with frequent indulgence in malpractices and corruption, but no personal hearing appears to have been given to him.
18. In Writ Petition No, 783/79, the petitioner, Badar Munir Ahmad, was retired from service under M. L.
R.
114. Review Board Il recommended his case for re-instatement mentioning that except for his hot headedness with his colleagues because of his qualification there was no adverse remark on his professional ability or on his integrity as a Research Officer in the Animal Husbandry Department and that immediate officer of the petitioner availed the first opportunity of getting rid of him under M. L. R.
114. But the competent authority after considering the recommendation of the Board refused to re- instate him, for reasons recorded in its order. The grievance of the petitioner is that he was afforded no opportunity to meet the allegations which weighed with the competent authority.
19. In Writ Petition No, 560/79, petitioner Muhammad Nawaz Khan was in police service and was retired under M. L. R.
114. Proceedings of the Board examined. It is recorded in the recommendations of the Board that the petitioner was given hearing on 10th November, 1977. It was further remarked that his record )f service shows that he is an average type officer with no outstanding merits and nothing of adverse nature exists against him to have warranted his compulsory retirement except for a cursory mention of unsubstantiated doubt of his integrity. But we find that there is no explanation of the petitioner on record of his involvement in cases of misappropriation and lack of supervision, which is violative of the principle of audi alterm partem.
20. In Writ Petition No, 561/79, the petitioner, Muhammad Idris, was in Police Department and was retired under S. 13(i) of N.-W.F.P. Civil Servants Act, 1973, on 6th February, 1976, but earlier to this his compulsory retirement order was passed on 20th December, 1975 but later on he was re-instated on 1st January, 1976. But still we find that the personal hearing would not mean only appearance of a person, but be should be afforded an opportunity to meet the charges levelled against him, particularly, when a case under S. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was registered against him earlier to his re-instatement. The board proceedings are silent about the result of the case so registered,
21. In Writ Petition No, 710/79, Attaullah Wazir is the petitioner, who was retired under M.L.R. 114 on 18th March, 1972. We have examined Board proceedings and find nothing on the record that he was given personal hearing as required under the Order.
22. In Writ Petition No, 728/79, Ghulam Hussain is the petitioner. In this case also no personal hearing was given to the petitioner.
23. In Writ Petition No, 774/79, petitioner, Zaffar Ali Khan was retired under M.L.R. 114 on 18th February, 1972. We have examined Review Board No, 1 proceeding. No opportunity of personal hearing was afforded to the petitioner and the Board observed that the petitioner was generally reputed to be honest but slow in his work and that in his dossier strictures of accepting hospitality of a person whose many cases were pending in his Court, was recorded. But the Board also held that the strictures appear unkind as appeals against his decisions were all rejected, which uphold his assertion that he was unaffected by any influence. The Board further observed that he appears to be a man with considerable dignity and character and his conduct has been above board, yet it is considered not to be a fit case for re-instatement and bar against his re-employment was removed, which can hardly be a recommendation as bar against the Government servants under M.L.R. 114 had already been removed vide Cabinet Secretariat Establishment. Government of Pakistan, vide Memo dated 7th November, 1972, relevant part of which is reproduced as under : "3. It has also been decided that there would be no ban on these Government Servants securing employment with non-Government organizations and no prior permission of Government for this purpose would be necessary. These persons will also be permitted to secure employment outside the country and will be given necessary permission if they get foreign jobs."
' By Notification No, SOS-V (S&GAD) 1-14-78, dated 15th March,1978- in pursuance of the orders passed by the Martial Law Administrator, Zone `B' as competent authority under Martial Law Order No, 23, issued by the Chief Martial Law Administrator the Government of the North- West Frontier Province is pleased-
(a) To re-instate the Government servant specified in Part A, and,
(b) To remove the bar for further employment from the persons specified in Part B. Hereunder, with effect from the 7th March, 1978. Petitioner's name appears at Serial No, 6 in Part B of the Notification.
' So, in this case we are constrained to remark that there is no bar against the petitioner for his re- instatement in his Department where he was serving at the time of his retirement, and particularly when the petitioner made a reference in para. 8 of his petition to the effect that respondent No, 3 (Registrar, Peshawar High Court) vide his letter No, 3708, dated 7th April, 1978 had informed respondent No, 2 (Provincial Government) that their Lordships the Chief Justice and Judges of the Peshawar High Court had no objection to the re-instatement of the petitioned no that the petitioned could be easily accommodated in the Department-this is a case where there is no bar in the way of the petitioner to be re-instated, and we .
24. In Writ Petition No, 812/79, Amir Jan petitioner was retired under M. L. R. 114 on 17th March, 1972.
Board proceedings examined. Right of hearing was not afforded to the petitioner as required under the Order ; nor the incident of his incompetency has been detailed in the recommendation of the Board. Thus, leaves great doubt in our mind that his case was dealt with in accordance with the Order.
25. In Writ Petition No, 831/79, petitioner, Abdul Qayum Tenon, was retired under M.L.R. 114, on 18th March 1972. Board proceedings show that he was too not given the right of hearing.
26. In Writ Petition No, 855/79, Mehrullah Khan, petitioner, was retired under M,L,R. 114, when he was serving in the Police Department. Though there are serious allegations in the finding of the Review Board of his blemished service record and inefficiency, corruption, but we do not find any explanation or statement of the petitioner in rebuttal of these charges.
27. Learned counsel for the petitioners, however, relied, on Abdul Qayum Khan v. The State and others (1) wherein it was held that in view of section 10 of Ordinance III of 1959 that the petitioner did not challenge the impugned order by bringing a writ petition in this Court, on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to call in question the proceedings of the Screening Committee, which was barred by section 10 of the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Ordinance, 1959. However, subsequently in another case reported as Sardar Muhammad Zaman Khan v. M. B. Nishat and others (2) it was held that where opportunity of appeal against the recommendation of Screening Committee contemplated by Rule 6 was not afforded to an employee, the appointing authority's order terminating the service of the employee is not deemed to be within Ordinance and section 10 is no bar to the order being challenged in Court. Reliance was also placed on the Province of East Pakistan and others v. M.
Amir Hussain (3) wherein their Lordships' observation was : "It remains to consider whether the jurisdiction of the Courts is barred, since the order is not, in our opinion, vitiated by mala fides or otherwise, as found by the High Court. Under Article 6 (3) of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958, an order retiring a Public Servant for a cause mentioned in clause (3)'- which includes 'misconduct', shall not be called in question in any Court. But to attract this bar, misconduct must be found, at the very least, in logic, and here the non-equator is plain. Under section 10 of the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Ordinance, 1959, an order or finding by an appointing authority or a Screening Committee shall not be called in question in any Court. But, for the same reasons as before, the finding in this case is no finding for which protection against judicial examination can be claimed and the order which proceeded thereon is equally liable to interference." {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1968 Posh. 6 (2) PLD 1962 SC 22
(3) PLD 1963 SC 185 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' Learned counsel for the petitioners also cited Syed Kazim Raza v. Government of Sind Through The Secretary, Home Department, Karachi and 2 others (1) ; Dr. Salahuddin and 3 others v. Revenue Commissioner, Baluchistan and 2 others (2) and Baqir Hussain, etc. v. Mst. Yatim Bibi, etc.
28. In all these petitions we find that no right of personal hearing was afforded to the petitioners and as we already referred to in our judgment dated 21st October, 1979 in W. P. 424179, the law laid down by their Lordships in case Yusuf All v. Muhammad Aslam Zia and 2 others (3) and Zahid Iqbal Raza v. Controller of Examinations (4), therefore we hold that the right of hearing does not mean personal interview o appearance of a party. It is something more that a person shall be heard, which postulates that what he says shall be considered, and if not accepted, the reason therefor shall be given and to hold otherwise would amount to saying that only formality of hearing might be gone through, even without actual hearing, or considering what is said. There are at least three essential elements of a common law 'hearing'. The right reasonably to know the charges or claims preferred; the right to meet such charges or claims by competent evidence; and the right to heard by counsel on the probative force of the evidence adduced by both sides, and on the law applicable thereto-Wisconsin Telephon Co. v. Public Service Commission (5). The word hearing contemplates and opportunity to be heard, not only the privileges to be presented when the matter is being considered but the right to present one's contentions, and to support the same by proof and argument. State v. Milbollan (7). In such circumstances, nobody else than the authority concerned would be in a position to know or adjudge as to whether the petitioners had, been dealt with on facts and reasons and not arbitrarily or fancifully.
29. On the view of the matter that we take, we allow these petitions and set aside the impugned orders. We would, however, like to remark that when an alternative forum was provided to the Government Servants in the shape of M.L.O. 23, their cases are to be reconsidered in the light of observations of the superior Courts referred to above and according to our own judgment in the matter under consideration. Respondents shall constitute a proper forum for the hearing of these petitions within a reasonable time of this order. No order as to costs. {{FOOT NOTE}}
(3) PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 104
(5) 287 N W 122, 232 Wis. 274
(2) PLD 1978 Quetta 61 (4) PLD 1975 Lab. 1385
(6) 195 N W 292.50 N 0 184 {{FOOT NOTE}}