' Respondent Dr. Miss Akhtar Jamal was appointed as a part-time doctor by the applicant National Cement Industries Ltd., on 9th August, 1965 on emoluments of Rs, 250 per month. On completion of her probation, she was confirmed in her post of Lady Doctor with effect from 1st February, 1966 on the basic pay of Rs, 300 per month. For reasons which it is not necessary to consider or deal with for the purposes of these proceedings, the services of Dr. Miss Akhtar Jamal were terminated by the applicants on 25th October, 1975. Thereupon she filed an application under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, before the Authority at Karachi under the said Act. Her claim was resisted by the applicant-Company on the main ground that as she was employed in a dispensary, which is located outside the premises of the factory of the applicant-Company, the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act were not applicable to her. The Authority upheld the objections of the applicant-Company and dismissed the respondent's claim on that account. On appeal filed by Dr. Miss Akhtar Jamai, the 1st Sind Labour Court Karachi, set aside the order passed by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act and remanded the case to the Authority for disposal on merits according to law, vide its order, dated 14th March, 1978. The applicant-Company thereupon invoked the suo motu revisional jurisdiction of this Tribunal under section 38 (3-a), I. R.
0., to challenge the legality and the propriety of the order passed by the learned Labour Court. This Tribunal, by its order dated 5th August, 1979 was of the view that the appellant orders passed by the Labour Court under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act cannot be deemed to be proceedings under the I. R.
0. And hence are not amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of this Tribunal. The applicant- Company thereupon challenged the, said order of this Tribunal through a Constitutional petition made to the High Court. The High Court, by its judgment, delivered on 2nd April, 1981, has held that "when a matter under any special law is transferred to the Labour Court under a statutory provision its adjudication and determination by the Labour Court becomes a proceeding under the t. R.
0., by virtue' of subsection (5) (d) of section 35 so that it is amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal. The High Court accordingly remanded the case to this Tribunal for disposal on merits according to law.
2. I have heard Mr. Abdul Hafeez, who appeared for the applicant company, and Mr. Mazhar All Chohan Advocate, who represented respondent Dr. Miss Akhtar lama'. Mr. Abdul Hafeez assailed the appellate decision of the learned Labour Court on the grounds -
(a) that as the dispensary in which respondent Dr. Miss Akhtar Jamal was employed was separate from and outside the precincts of the Cement factory of the applicant-Company neither the provisions of the Factories Act nor those of the Payment of Wages Act would be applicable to her ; and
(b) that in any case, the respondent was not employed in any manufacturing process, or in any other kind of work whatsoever, incidental to or connected with the subject of the manufacturing process and, therefore, she was not a "worker" for the purposes of the Factories Act, which Act accordingly would not be applicable to her.
3. It may be pointed out that the Payment of Wages Act is applicable only to the payment of wages to persons employed (a) in any factory, (b) upon any Railway, and (c) in any industrial establishment to which the provisions of the Act have been extended by the Provincial Government by notification in the official Gazette. The contention of the respondent is that the dispensary in which she was employed was within the precincts of the cement factory of the applicant- Company and hence the provisions of the Factories Act, 1934, would apply to her. In order to appreciate the contending arguments of the learned counsel in regard to this plea, it would be appropriate to set down the definition of 'factory' as contained in the Factories Act. The said definition reads as follows ;- "( j) "factory" means any premises, including the precincts thereof, whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on or is ordinarily carried on with or without the aid of power, but does not include a mine, subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1923 (IV of 1923)."
5. The word "precincts" has not been defined either in the Factories Act or in any Statute which is in pari materia with the said Act. We have, therefore, to construe the word in its ordinary dictionary meaning. It has been defined in the Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Vol. II, as :-"The region immediately sorrounding a place-Environs". The connotation of this word came up for consideration before the Court of Appeal in England in the case of Walsh v. .411 Weather Mechanical Grounting Co. Ltd. (I) Pearce, L. J. Who delivered the judgment on behalf of the Court of Appeal, while. Examining the question whether the {{FOOT NOTE}}
(I) (1959) 2 All E R 583 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' apron to the hanger of the company was within the precincts of the banger which was admittedly used as a factory observed as follows :- "Neither side relied on any dictionary for the meaning of the words "close", "curtilage" or "precincts", or on any case defining those words with precision. It was conceded that the words "close", and "precincts" import the notion of a boundary surrounding an inclosure, but that the boundary might be a line or notional surround. The first meaning of "precinct" given in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary is :- 'The space enclosed by the walls or other boundaries of a particular place or building, or by an imaginary line drawn around it ; esp, the ground immediately surrounding a religious house or place of worship.'
' The word can also be used to mean "the environs". With all respect to the learned Judge's contrary opinion; we think that this apron was within the close, curtilage or precincts of the hanger, and that the position of the fence at the time when the licence was given (whether thereafter it was in situ or temporarily removed) must be regarded as the limit or the close, curtilage or precinct."
5. Mr. Abdul Hafeez, however, relied upon the following passage appearing at page 195 of Vol. 20 of Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition :- "Where a place situate within the close, curtilage or precincts forming a factory is solely used for some purpose other than the processes carried on in the factory, that place is not to be deemed to form part of the factory for the purposes of the Factories Act 1961, but, if otherwise it would be a factory, it is to be deemed to be a separate factory."
It may, however, be pointed out that there is a great difference between the definition of factory as given under the British Law and as given either under our Factories Act or the Indian Factories Act, 1948, as has been pointed out by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in re K. V. V. Sarma, Manager, Gemni Studios, Madras (1).
6. We have, therefore, to see whether the evidence on record justifies the inference that the dispensary where the respondent Lady Doctor was employed was within the precincts of the factory of the applicant company. In her evidence before the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, the respondent admitted that the dispensary was located in the residential area and further that the residential area and the factory were divided by a road. She, however, denied the fact that this dividing road was a public road. She admitted in her evidence that the residential area was outside the factory premises. In order to further clear up the point whether the dispensary where the respondent was employed was within or outside the precinct of the factory, the respondent was also examined before this Tribunal. Before this Tribunal, the respondent admitted that there was compound wall all around the dispensary and that further the dispensary had a separate gate from the gate of the factory. All these circumstances clearly indicate that the dispensary was clearly outside the "precincts" of the factory of the applicant company, since it was not only separated from the factory by a road, but also by the compound wall of the dispensary. B Moreover, the dispensary was in the residential area of the factory, a {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) A 1 R 1953 Mad, 269 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' admitted by the respondent herself and the residential area was separate from the factory premises.
7. Since the respondent was not employed either in the factory or in the precincts thereof, neither the Factories Act. 1934, nor the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, would be applicable to her case.
8. There is another ground on which the claim of the respondent under the Payment of Wages Act must fail. One of the essential requirements for any premises to fall under the definition of "factory" as given in the Factories Act is that ten or more workers must be working therein. "Worker" has been defined in the Factories Act as follows :- "(h) 'worker' means a person employed directly or through an agency, whether for wages or not, in any manufacturing process, or in cleaning any part of the machinery or premises used for a manufacturing process, or in any other kind of work whatsoever, incidental to or connected with the subject of the manufacturing process but does not include any person solely employed in a clerical capacity in any room or place where no manufacturing process is being carried on."
' A bare perusal of the above definition makes it clear that unless a person is employed in any manufacturing process or in cleaning any part of the machinery or premises used for a manufacturing process or in any other work incidental to or connected with the subject of the manufacturing process, he is not deemed to be a worker for the purposes of the Factories Act. In the case of Mir Laik Ali and others v. Mehboob Khan (1), the question that arose 'for consideration by a Division Bench of the defunct High Court of West Pakistan was whether a person working as a Clerk in the Cleaning and Forwarding Branch of the Hyderabad Relief and Rehabilitation Trust, Karachi, was covered by the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. Rejecting the contention on behalf of the Trust that his case was covered by the Payment of Wages Act, Waheeduddin, J., delivering judgment on behalf of the Division Bench observed as follows :- ' there is overwhelming evidence on the record to show that the respondent at the relevant time was not employed in any factory of the appellants' trust. He was working at their office on Lawrence Road and was incharge of the Clearing and Forwarding Branch of the said Trust. The evidence of P.
W. 2, Capt. Riazul Haq and D. W. I, Mujibuddin, is very clear on this point. Both of them stated that the respondent had nothing to do with the process of manufacture in the four factories belonging to the Trust. On the other hand, they stated that he was merely a clearing and forwarding officer- incharge of material on behalf of the said Trust. It is, therefore, obvious that the respondent was not employed in any factory or in any industrial establishment and therefore his case is not at all covered by the Payment of Wages Act of 1936. In our opinion the view of both the learned subordinate Courts on the question raised before us is absolutely correct and no exception can be taken to it."
9. In the subsequent case of the Employees' Union v. Pakistan Security Printing Corporation Ltd. (2), the question which fell to be considered by a Division Bench of the Karachi High Court was whether {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) 1962 PLC 925 (2) 1977 PLC 590 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' Malis employed in the Pakistan Security Printing Corporation on a plantation within its factory's premises were workers for the purposes of the Factories Act. Rejecting the contention that Malls are deemed to be workers for the purposes of the Factories Act, the Division Bench observed as follows "Apparently the worker under the Act means a person employed, whether for wages or not in any manufacturing process, or in cleaning any part of the machinery of premises used for manufacturing process, or any other kind of work whatever incidental to or connected with the manufacturing process or connected with the subject of the manufacturing process, but it would not include any person solely employed in any place where no manufacturing process is carried on or his work is not directly or indirectly connected with the process employed in the factory itself.
It has not been contended that the malis are in any way connected with any of the jobs provided in the factory. Consequently, it was rightly held that the malis were borne on distinct establishment unrelated with the factory. Thus there can be no escape from the conclusion that the math do not fall within the definition of "worker" and therefore, neither the Factories Act nor the Commercial Industrial Disputes Ordinance is applicable to them."
10. As admittedly the respondent was not employed in any manufacturing process or in any other kind of work incidental to or connected with the subject of the manufacturing process, nor was any such C process carried on in the Dispensary, she cannot be deemed to be a worker for the purposes of the Factories Act, 1934, and consequently, neither the said Act nor the Paym ent of Wages Act would be applicable to her employment or claim for wages.
11. For the reasons discussed by me above, I am of the view that the appellate order the Sind Labour Court, Karachi dated 14th March, 1978, is without lawful authority and is thus legally not sustainable.
I would accordingly set aside the same and would confirm the order of the learned Authority under the Payment of Wages Act.