SYED ARSHAD ALI, J.---The petitioners seek the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court praying that:-- "It is, therefore, very humbly and respectfully prayed that on acceptance of the instant writ petition, the discontinued stipend may kindly be allowed to the petitioners w.e.f. 1st July, 2016 along with cost and interest, and any other relief deems fit and appropriate, in light of the circumstances of the case, to the petitioners".
2. Brief but relevant facts of the instant writ petition are that the petitioners qualified and obtained MBBS degree from Private Sector Medical Colleges duly recognized by PMDC. Ayub Teaching Hospital, Abbottabad has selected and offered to the petitioners to work as paid house officers for a particular period mentioned in the offered letter dated 22.01.2016 against name of each candidate. As such the petitioners joined their duties. The respondent/Ayub Teaching Hospital, Abbottabad vide letter dated 01.08.2016 has stopped the stipend to all candidates including the petitioners, who were offered house job against payment of stipend, allegedly owing to non- releasing fund by Government of Khyber Paktunkhwa. However, despite the stipend was stopped, the petitioners completed their house job. The respondents filed their separate comments. Ayub Teaching Hospital, Abbottabad has not denied the contents of the writ petition, however, has taken stance that it received the finance from the Provincial Government and due to increase in the stipend of house officers who graduated from Ayub Teaching Hospital, Abbottabad, have been paid enhanced amount, therefore, they are left with no budget for the house officers, who have graduated from Private Sector Medical Colleges, whereas respondent No.1 Finance Department of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has stated that budget has already been released to the Ayub Teaching Hospital, Abbottabad in this regard.
3. Arguments heard and available record perused.
4. The petitioners were offered house job against payment of stipend vide letter dated 22.04.2016.
Pursuant to the said offer the present petitioners joined their duties, hence a right has been accrued to the petitioners to receive their stipend as agreed and promised to them by the respondents. The respondents being State functionaries cannot be allowed to resile from the commitment made with their subjects. In the present case, the petitioners are young doctors and have just entered into their professional carrier. The letter dated 22.04.2016, whereby they were offered house job against payment of stipend has bestowed upon them legitimate expectation to work in the State owned Hospital against stipend for the time bounded agreed period and if at this stage they are given any feeling that the Government would not perform their promise then we are afraid that it will disappoint the petitioners who are at the threshold of their carrier. Even otherwise if the Government has started violating their promise it will lead to a chaos and anarchy in the society. The argument of the learned counsel for the respondents that writ to the respondent can only be issued, when the government or for that matter the respondent institution has taken an action in disregard of some law, can't be endorsed. It is by now settled law that the actions of the respondent while dealing with the people, if are unfair or unreasonable, can be corrected by the Constitutional Court on the principles of legitimate expectations and promissory estoppel. The doctrine of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation are equitable doctrine evolved by the Judges while adjudicating upon the complaint lodged by the aggrieved party against an unfair and arbitrary action of the government. It falls in sphere of neither contract nor statutory estoppel.
It can be said that if the government promises to any person and the promise is not inconsistent with the law of the land and not against the public interest, then afterwards the government cannot refuse to abide by its promise and in case the government acts inconsistent with its promise, then the said action of the government is subject to the judicial review by the constitutional Court. In our country, the doctrine of promissory estoppel has found acceptance in the case of Federation of Pakistan v. Chaudhary Mohammad Aslam 1986 SCM R 916. However, the same principle has been elaborately expounded in "Fecto Belarus Tractors Limited v. Pakistan through Ministry of Finance Economic Affairs 2001 PTD 1829", wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has held as under:-- "The true principle of promissory estoppel seems to be that where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or effect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is in and fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties and this would be so irrespective of whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the parties or not. The doctrine of promissory estoppel need not be inhibited by the same limitation as estoppel in the strict sense of the term. It is an equitable principle evolved by the Courts for doing justice and there is no reason why it should be given only a limited application by way of defense. There is no reason in logic or principle why promissory estoppel should also not be available as a cause of action."
In the case of "Messrs M. Y. Electronics Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. through Manager and others v.
Government of Pakistan through Secretary Finance, Islamabad and others 1998 PTD 2728" while discussing the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan observed:-- "The doctrine Of promissory estoppel is founded on equity. It arises when a person acting on the representation by the Government or a person competent to represent on behalf of the Government, changes his position to his detriment, takes a decisive step, enters into a binding contract or incur a liability. In such case, the Government will not be allowed to withdraw from its promise or representation. However, a general promise without any time limitation cannot bind the Government for all times to come. The enforcement of doctrine of promissory estoppel against the Government or a Government functionary competent to represent on behalf of the Government is however, subject to the following limitations as held by this court in the case of Army Welfare Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (1992 SCMR 1652):-- "(i) The doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked against the Legislature or the laws framed by it because the Legislature cannot make a representation;
(ii) promissory estoppel cannot be invoked for directing the doing of the thing which was against the law when the representation was made or the promise held out;
(iii) no emergency or authority can be held bound by a promise or representation not lawfully extended or given;
(iv) the doctrine of promissory estoppel will not apply where no steps have been taken consequent to the representation or inducement so as to irrevocably commit the property or the reputation of the party invoking it; and
(v) the party which has indulged in fraud or collusion for obtaining some benefits under the representation cannot be rewarded by the enforcement of the promise."
Justice (Retd.) Fazal Karim in his book "Judicial Review of Public Actions" at page 1365 has very precisely elaborated the principle as following "The justification for treating 'legitimate expectation' and 'promissory estoppel' together as grounds for judicial review is, one, that they both fall under the general head fairness; and too, that 'legitimate expectation' is akin to an estoppel. As was explained by Simon Brown LJ in R v.
Devon CC, 'the various authorities show "that the claimant's right will only be found established when there is a clear and unambiguous representation upon which it was reasonable for him to rely. Then the administrator or the other body will be held bound in fairness by the representation made unless only its promise or undertaking as to how its power would be exercised is inconsistent with the statutory duties imposed upon it". The relationship between them is more clearly brought out by what Bingham LJ stated in R v. IRC ex p IMK"
"If a public authority so conducts itself as to create a legitimate expectation that a certain course will be followed it would often be unfair if the authority were permitted to follow a different Course to the detriment of one who entertained the expectation, particularly if he acted on it. If in private law a body would be in breach of contract in so acting or estopped from so acting a public authority should generally be in no better position. The doctrine of legitimate expectation is rooted in fairness."
In view of the above, when pursuant to the representation of the respondents, the petitioners have performed their duties as house officer against stipend, then the respondent cannot refuse to them the stipend. Resultantly, the impugned letter whereby the stipend to the petitioners was disallowed, is hereby declared illegal and the respondents are directed to pay stipend to the petitioners offered to them through letter dated 22.04.2016.