SHAHID MUBEEN, J. Through this Regular First Appeal under Section 96 of C.P.C. the appellant has challenged the legality and validity of impugned judgment and decree dated 24.01.2018 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Pasrur whereby the suit of recovery filed by the appellant was dismissed being time barred.
2. Unnecessary details apart, the facts relevant for disposal of this appeal are that the appellant instituted a suit for recovery of Rs.20,26,000/- under Order XXXVII, Rule 2, C.P.C. against the respondent contending therein that respondent issued cheques in the name of appellant bearing No.3185045 dated 14.11.2012 amounting to Rs.9,13,000/- Cheque No.3185044 dated 04.07.2012 amounting to Rs.9,13,00 0/-, cheque No.3185041 dated 02.02.2012 amounting to Rs.1,00,000/- and cheque No.3185042 dated 22.02.2012 amounting to Rs.1,00,000/-; that having relation with the appellant the respondent borrowed Rs.23,26,000/- for his business and when he was asked for return of this amount he issued cheques to the appellant; that Rs.2,00,000/- were paid to the appellant and one cheque amounting to Rs.1,00,000/- was lost and this suit is only to the extent of recovery of Rs.20,26,000/-; that he presented the said cheques before the bank for encashment which were dishonoured issuing memo slips due to insuf ficient funds in the account of respondent. On failur e to return the said amount case FIR No.266/2012 under Section 489-F , P.P.C., Police Station Sabz Peer, District Sialkot was got registered against the respondent in which he has been found guilty . The respondent appeared before the court and submitted application for leave to defend the suit which was admitted subject to submission of surety amount and written statement. The issues were framed and subsequently respondent has not submitted security and written statement was submitted without compulsory requirements of submission of security and on 21.06.2017 ex parte proceedings were initiated against him and vide impugned judgment and decree dated 24.01.2018 suit was dismissed being barred by time. Hence, this appeal.
3. It is contended by learned counsel for the appellant that suit of the appellant was well within time as the respondent has refused to adhere to the genuine request of the appellant prior to 05-days from the institution of the suit.
4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has supported the impugned judgment and decree of the court below .
5. Heard. Record perused.
6. The Article which is applicable, in case suit is instituted under Order XXXVII, C.P.C. is Article 64-A of the Limitation Act, 1908 which reads as under:- Description of suitPeriod of limitationTime from which period begins to run 64A. Under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil ProcedureThree yearsWhen the debt become payable Its bare perusal manifestly reveals that suit under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure be filed within a period of three years from the date when the debt becomes payable. In the light of afore-noted Article it is to be seen that when the period of limitation would begin to run in this case. Admittedl y, the disputed cheque Exh.P/4 bearing No.3185045 dated 14.11.2012 was dishonoured on 03.12.2012 whereas other cheques were dishonoured on 01.03.2012 and 18.07.2012. The date of dishonouring of cheque is 03.12.2012 and it is the date on which the last cheque was dishonoured which could be considered to be the date when the debt was payable as per Article 64-A of Limitation Act, 1908 within three years whereas suit was instituted on 20.09.2016 i.e. after expiry of limitation i.e. 10 months and 17 days. In taking the above view reliance is placed on case laws reported as "Najma Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Mega Trading Company through Chief Executive" (2008 MLD 114) (D.B.) and "Muhammad Farooq and others v. Abbas Lakadwala and others" (2003 CLC 1879 ) wherein the date of notice of dishonor was considered to be the date when the debt becomes payable.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant has failed to point out any illegality and mate rial irregularity in the impugned judgment and decree of the court below .
8. Sequel to the above, this Regular First Appeal has no merits, hence, dismissed with no order as to costs.