RAJA SAEED AKRAM KHAN, J. The titled appeal by leave of the Court has been filed against the judgment of the Service Tribunal dated 21.06.2018, whereby the appeal filed by the respondent, herein, has been accepted.2. The facts as emerged from the record are that the respondent, herein, was serving as Deputy Secretary Finance (Budget).
2. The post of Additional Secretary Finance (Budget) fell vacant on 22.08.2014, due to retirement of one Mumtaz Ahmed Mir. The respondent was appointed against the said post on current charge basis vide notification dated 02.03.2015 and subsequently he was promoted on regular basis on 18.08.2015. The respondent filed a 'representation before the authority for giving retrospective effect to the promotion from the date when the post was fell vacant i.e. 22.08.2014. The authority partially accepted the representation vide notification dated 22.02.2016 while giving retrospective effect to his promotion from the date when he was appointed on current charge basis, i.e. 02.03.2015. The respondent feeling aggrieved from the notification dated 22.02.2016, filed an appeal before the Service Tribunal. The learned Service Tribunal vide impugned judgment dated 21.06.2018; while accepting the appeal issued a direction that the notification dated 22.02.2016, shall be amend ed while giving it retrospective effect from 22.08.2014, instead of 02.03 .2015. Now the appellants have challeng ed the validity of the judgment passed by the Service Tribunal by filing this appeal by leave of the Court.
3. Raja Ayaz Ahmed Khan, Assistant Advocate-General, submitted that the impugned judgment is against law and the facts of the case. He contended that the concerned authority had already given the retrospective effect to the promotion of the respondent from the date of his appointment on current charge basis and there was no justification to give the retrospective effect from the date when the post was fallen vacant. He added that the law on the strength of which the learned Service Tribunal has given the retrospective effect to the promotion, in view of the peculiar facts of the case in hand, was not applicable; therefore, the impugned judgment is based on misinterpretation of law and liable to be vacated.
4. Conversely , Ch. Shoukat Aziz, Advocate, the learned counsel for the respondent strongly controverted the arguments advanced by the learned Assistant Advocate-General. He submitted that the impugned judgment is perfectly legal and interference by this Court is not warranted under law. He added that when the post in question fell vacant due to the retirement of the incumbent official the respondent was fully eligible for promotion, therefore, the learned Service Tribunal was justified to give the effect to his promotion from the date when the post fell vacant.
He lastly submitted that the learned Service Tribunal while applying the correct law has passed the well-reasoned judgment, therefore, this appeal is liable to be dismissed.
5. We have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record made available alongwith the impugned judgment. The perusal of the record shows that the post of Additional Secretary Finance (Budget) was fell vacant on 22.08.2014' and on 02.03.2015, the respondent was appointed against the said post on current charge basis and thereafter on the recommendations of the Selection Board he was promoted on regular basis vide notification dated 18.08.2015. The record shows that on the representation filed by the respondent the concerned authority has already given the retrospective effect to his promotion from the date when he was appointed against the post of Additional Secretary Finance (Budget) on current charge basis. The claim of the respondent that he was eligible for promotion from the date when the post in ques tion had fallen vacant, therefore, from the said date he was entitled for promotion, has no substance as it is not an automatic process that when a post will become vacant then immediately on the same date the person eligible for promotion shall be promoted, rather in this regard a specific procedure is required under law. It is now settled that the effect to be given to the appointment, made by promotion or transfer , retrospectively , is within the competence of the concerned authority if the circumstances of a case so demands. In the case in hand, after due process the respondent was promoted on regular basis on 18.08.2015 and the authority after taking into account the circumstances as well as grievance of the respondent had passed a suitable order in favour of the respondent while giving the retrospective to his promotion from the date of appointmen t on current charge basis, therefore, it can be said that the genuine grievance of the respondent had already been redressed. The learned Service Tribunal without taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case-law , referred to in the impugned judgment, has applied the same and accepted the appeal. From the bare reading of the case-law referred to by the learned Service Tribunal it is clear that the persons aggrieved in the referred cases were discriminately treated, whereas, in the present case, no, such eventuality was available as due right had already been granted to the respondent by the authority .
In view of the above, this appeal is accepted and while setting aside the impugned judgment the appeal before the Service Tribunal being devoid of any force is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.