' MUNAWWAR ELAHEE RANA, J.-This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated I 1th December, 1979 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Lahore dismissing the plaintiff-appellant's suit for damages.
2. In his suit against his employer the plaintiff-appellant claimed a sum of Rs, 8,36,981 as compensation for physical disability caused to him during his employment and also for mental shock sustained by him on account of his unreasonable removal from service. He also claimed expenses, both past and future, in respect of his medical treatment etc. He stated in his plaint that as a Commercial Officer of the defendant he was entrusted with uneasy duties with the result that he developed heart ailments. He was thus advised light work, but on the pretext of bad health he was removed from service, which, according to him, gave him further agony and mental shock. He, therefore, calculated his loss in terms of money and filed the suit for damages in forma pauperis.
3. The defendant-respondent, which was a limited company carrying on construction work in the name of Messrs Conforce Limited, contested the suit denying its liability to pay compensation to the plaintiff for acts done in his own way. The maintainability of the suit was also disputed stating that the plaintiff having unsuccessfully approached the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, was left with no cause to come to the Court.
4. On pleadings of the par ties the following preliminary issues were framed :--
(1) Whether this suit is competent in its present form ? OPP
(2) Whether this suit is barred by Workmen's Compensation Act ? OPD
(3) Whether this plaint is liable to be rejected under O. VII, r. 11, C.P.0 ? OPD
(4) Relief.
' Without affording them an opportunity of leading evidence, the parties were required by the learned trial Court to straightaway come up with arguments, which were concluded on 11th December, 1979 and the suit was dismissed as having disclosed no cause of action. While disposing of Issues Nos. 2 and 3 reference was made to the copy of the order. Dated 9th November, 1974 passed by the Commissioner and it was held that the suit was barred by section 3 (5) of the Workmen's Compensation Act (VIII of 1923). The learned trial Court also took up the question of limitation and expressed the view that the suit was filed beyond the time provided by Article 22 of the Limitation Act (IX of 1908). It was also observed that the plaint did not contain necessary particulars of mala fides in express terms, and as such the Court had no jurisdiction to go into it.
4. It appears from the impugned judgment that the suit was dismissed under r. 11 of 0. VII, C P C because the plaint, according to the endings on Issues Nos. 2 and 3 did not disclose a cause of action, and that too because on the strength of an order placed on record by the defendant the suit was held barred by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. It is well settled that the plaint is liable to be rejected inter alia in cases where it does not disclose a cause of action, or where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. It, therefore, follows that if the plaint was viewed to be barred A by law or to disclose no cause of action, the proper course for the Court would have been to resort to the provisions of rule 11 and reject the plaint, and not to dismiss the suit as has been done in the instant case. That being so, it can safely be inferred that this suit, although apparently dismissed, virtually amounted to rejection of the plaint, and while doing so the learned trial Court should have, according to various reported cases, applied its mind only to the facts given in the plaint, and not to any matter supplied by the defendants. The Court, if it once resorts to applying the provisions of r. 11, has to presume that every allegation made in the plaint is true and then to see that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief. The instant case is based on injury said to have been caused to the plaintiff on account of the alleged over-work and the employer's neglect to provide him reasonable facilities. Such allegations, if proved, were likely to result in the success of the suit, and for that reason the proceedings could not be shut out, and the suit of such a fantastic value could not be summarily dismissed.
5. Even otherwise, the suit should not have been dismissed as not maintainable unless evidence on material points in issue was led. The learned trial Court, while disposing of issue No, 2, had taken into consideration the order of the Commissioner and found that the suit was barred by the provisions of section 3 (5) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. It thus appears that the learned trial Court could not dispose of issue No, 3 without first going into the merits relating to issue No, 2, which basically required evidence, and as such it could not be disposed of unless the entire material was examined. In spite of that we see that the parties were not afforded with an opportunity of proving or disproving the issue, no evidence was led, nor was any chance provided to the parties to prove their respective stand. Even the order of the Commissioner read in evidence was formally not formed part of the record. No chance was ever allowed to the parties to show whether the suit was filed by the plaintiff as a workman, and whether the vague approach to the Commissioner by a person, who was held to be not a workman, had the effect of barring the plaintiff to institute the instant suit. The finding of the trial Court based on no legal evidence cannot thus be maintained. It was in the same way wrong to state that allegation of mala fides as raised in the plaint was vague and was not sufficient to give the plaintiff a cause of action. If at all it was so, the proper course should have been to order the party to remove vagueness and not reject the plaint or dismiss the suit.
6. It also requires to be pointed out that the Court should not have decided the question of limitation especially at a time the plaint was resorted to be rejected under r. 11 of 0. VII, Code of Civil Procedure. Limitation in the instant case was a question of law arising out of facts to be placed on record. It could not therefore be taken up unless the same was specifically raised in the pleadings and an issue was framed in that behalf. Without such a formality it was not within the jurisdiction of the Court to discuss the question and give a finding. Such an expression of view on limitation, therefore, is a premature attempt which cannot be viewed with favour.
' For the foregoing reasons we are constrained to accept the appeal. The judgment and the decree of the trial Court appealed against are set aside and the case is sent back to the learned trial court for framing proper issues and deciding the suit in accordance with law after affording the parties a fair chance to lead evidence, oral as well as documentary. The parties are however left to bear their own costs.
' . Case remanded.