RAJA SAEED AKRAM KHAN, J. -- The captioned appeal by leave of the Court has been filed against the judgment of the Service Tribunal dated 27.04.2018, whereby , the appeal filed by the appellant, herein, has been dismissed.
2. The facts as emerged from this appeal are that the appellant, herein, was appointed as work-charge Sub- Engineer in the Electricity Department, on 16.02.2010. The concerned departmen tal authority advertised posts of Sub-Engineer vide advertisement dated 22.08.2017. The appellant, herein, applied and participated in the selection process against the quota allocated to District Bhimber . After conducting test and interview , the merit list was prepared and the name of the appellant was placed at serial No,
6. The departmental authority issued the appointment order of the appellant on 11.05.2012, subject to the condition that the appellant shall obtain the relaxation in, district quota from the concerned authority within a period of one month otherwise the appointment order shall be deemed to be cancelled. In compliance of the aforesaid order , the appellant submitted his joining report on 17.05.2012; however , later on, the authority cancelled the appointme nt order on 20.06.2012, on the ground that the appellant failed to obtain the required relaxation within the prescribed period. The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the order dated 20.06.2012, which was initially admitted for regular hearing and finally dismissed being filed at a wrong forum. Thereafter , the appellant filed an appeal before the Service Tribunal. The learned Service Tribunal after necessary proceedings dismissed the appeal vide impugned judgment dated 27.04.2018, on the sole point of limitation, hence, this appeal by leave of the Court.
3. Sh. Masood lqbal, Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellant, argued that the impugned judgment is against law and the facts of the case which is not sustainable in the eye of law. He contended that the appellant has continuously held the post since appointment and the concerned departmental authority before cancelling his appointment order neither provided an opportunity of hearing to the appellant nor conveyed the said order to him.
In this way, the appellant has been deprived of his vested legal right, but the learned Service Tribunal without considering the real controversy involved in the matter dismissed the appeal on the sole ground of limitation. He forcefully submitted that an application for condonation of delay was filed and it was also specifically argued before the Service Tribunal that the order was not conveyed to the appellant in time, moreover , initially the appellant due to mistaken advice 'of the counsel, filed a writ petition before High Court. therefore, the circumstances were beyond the control of the appellant, but despite that the learned Service Tribunal dismissed the appeal on the ground of limitation without any justification. .
4. Raja Saadat Ali Kiani, the learned Additional Advocate-General, strongly contro verted the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. He submitted that the impugned judgment is perfect and legal which is not open for interference, by this Court. He added that the appeal filed by the appellant before the Service Tribunal was hopelessly time-barred. therefore, the learned Service Tribunal rightly dismissed the same on the point of limitation.
On merits of the case, he submitted that the appointment order was issued subject to the condition that the appellant shall obtain the relaxation from the concerned departmental authority' regarding the district quota within a period of one month, but he failed to comply with the condition, therefore, the authority was justified to cancel the appointment order of the appellant.
5. We have heard the arguments and gone through the record made available alongwith the impugned judgment.
As the learned Service Tribunal has dismissed the appeal on the sole ground of limitation, therefore, we intend to resolve this point at first. It is an admitted fact that the appointment order of the appellant was cancelled by the authority vide order dated 20.06.2012 and he filed appeal before the Service Tribunal on 27.04.2018, after more than a period of 6 years. The counsel for the appellant has taken the stance that the cancellation order was not conveyed to the appellant in time, moreover , due to mistaken advice of the counsel, he chosen the wrong forum and filed the writ petition before the High Court. The record shows that the appellant 'challenged the cancellation order dated 20.06.2012, before the High Court on 10.10.2012, by filing writ petition and the learned High Court 'dismissed the same vide judgment dated' 19.02.2018. The appel lant alongwith appeal filed before the Service Tribunal has also filed an application for condonation of delay , wherein, he took the same stance as has been agitated by the counsel for the appellant before this Court; i,e, the order dated 20.06.2012, was not conveyed to the appellant and when he came to know he filed writ petition before the High Cour t on the mistaken advice of the counsel and on dismissal of the writ petition, he immediately filed the appeal. It will be useful to reproduce here the relevant grounds of application for condonation of delay which read as under:-- "3. That the case of the applicant was filed before the High Court on mistakenly advice the counsel instead of Service Tribunal.
4. That after getting knowledge of the order applicant remained in a wrong forum, hence delay accrued in filing of - instant appeal was beyond the control of applicant, hence, after obtaining the order of Hon'ble High Court on 26.02.2018, the instant appeal is within time and applicant humble request for condonation of delay ."
From the stance taken by the appellant, it is obvious that he sought condonation for such period which he spent at a wrong forum on the ill/mistaken advice of the counsel, whereas, it is now settled that if a litigant spends time in pursuing a remedy at a wrong forum under a mistaken advice, the period spent by him goes waste and delay cannot be condoned on this ground. In this regard, reference may be made to a judgment of this Court delivered in a case titled Abdul Rahim Zubair Butt v. Competent Authority and others (Civil Appeal No, 86 of 2013, decided on 25.02.2017), wherein, while dealing with the proposition it has been held that:--- "The perusal of the application filed by the appellant for condonation of delay shows that he sought condondation for the period consumed in pursuing the remedy at the wrong forum and in this regard he has taken the stance that on the advice of some senior advocates he had chosen the said forum. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the appellant has also submitted that the appellant bona fidely filed representation before the worthy Prime Minister on the advice of some senior Advocates. We are afraid, that delay cannot be condoned on the ground that someone has given ill-advice to a person to choose a wrong forum for redressal of grievance. It may be observed here that law is settled on the point since long that if a litigant spends time in pursuing a remedy under a mistaken/negligent advice the period spent by him goes waste and in such situation delay cannot be condoned. Reference may be made on a case reported as Masud Ahmad and others v. United Bank Limited [1992 SCR 98], wherein, it has been held that:--
8. This takes us to the question whether the appellants can successfully urge that the appeal filed in the Court of District Judge and been filed and prosecuted with good faith. If the appellant's contention is shown to be well- founded, it would furnish a "sufficient cause" for condonation of delay . Notwithstanding the fact that both the learned counsel who appeared in this appeal were not aware of it, this proposition stands concluded by judgments of this Court that circumstances as appearing in the present case cannot be termed as being the result of "good faith" rather in fact they constitute "gross negligence" and cannot be treated as a sufficient cause for condonation of delay . Where the provision of law is clear question of condonation does not arise. It may arise when a litigant is misguided by some practice of a Court or by an erroneous judgment.'"
After going through the controversy involved in the matter and the case-law referred to hereinabove, it becomes clear that the appeal before the Service Tribunal was hopelessly time-barred and the appellant failed to substantiate any plausible reason for condonation of delay . Thus, they learned Service Tribunal rightly dismissed the appeal on the sole ground of limitation and has not committed any illegality . As we have reached the conclusion that the appeal before the Service Tribunal was time-barred and liable to be dismissed on the sole ground, hence, dilation upon the merits of the case will be a futile exercise.
In View of the above, finding no force this appeal is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.