SHAKIL-UR-REHMAN KHAN, J.---Through the instant writ petition the Petitioner/Adeel Ahmad Gaba has challenged the order dated 28.04.2018 passed by Respondent No, 1/Special Judge Rent, hereinafter referred to as the ("Rent Tribunal") with the prayer that the ejectment petition filed by Respondent No, 2 be dismissed as barred by law on the ground that the said learned Rent Tribunal, established under the provisions of "The Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009" hereinafter referred to as ("Act") has no jurisdiction to entertain the same.
2. The necessary facts out of which the instant writ petition has arisen are that Respondent No,2/Malik Bashir Ahmad filed an ejectment petition against the Petitioner on 10.05.2017 under the provisions of Section 15 of the Act. The basis of the relationship as stated in the petition was an oral agreeme nt said to be dated 01.5.2015, entered into by and between the parties in the presence of two witnesses. It is the case of Respondent No,2 that the Petitioner had defaulted in payment of rent and that the oral rent agreement had expired. The fine equivalent to 10% of the annual value of the rent of the said premises under the provisions of clause (b) of Section 9 of the Act was deposited, accordingly the learned Rent Tribunal proceeded with the said petition.
3. On 15.6.2017 the Petitioner filed an application for leave to contest the same, on the grounds, amongst others, that there was no relationship of. landlord and tenant existing between the Petitioner and Respondent No, 2; that he has never defaulted in the payment of rent; that Akbar Ali Malik son of Malik Bashir Ahmad is dealing with all the matters of his father; that he entered into a written rent agreement dated 20.10.2015 for three years from 01.11.2015 to 30.10.2018 and monthly rent of Rs,55,000/- was fixed (copy of Rent Agreement was also attached); that he had also paid a sum of Rs,4,25,000/- in cash for the construction of the hall and a sum of Rs,15,000/- per month is being deducted from the monthly rent; refundable security in the sum of Rs,5,00,000/- has also been paid; that the rent agreement was from 01.11.2015 to 30.10.2018, whereas monthly rent was enhanced as per agreement between the parties and was further extendable with the consent of the parties; rent receipts were also attached with the reply along with that of the electricity bill for the month of April 2017; that the business at the rented premises is well established and the Petitioner now wants to blackmail the Respondent, gain benefit of good will of the Respondent and also to violate the terms and conditions of the agreement entered into by his son.
4. On 22.06.2017 Respondent No,2 filed his reply to the application for leave to contest on various grounds, including, that he had attached a copy of the title deed with the ejectment petition; that his son who had allegedly signed the said tenancy agreement had no right or entitlement over the property , nor was he given any authorization in this regard; that said document was prepared by the Petitioner in connivance with his son; that a suit for declaration has been filed by the Respondent No,2 against his sons who were bent upon to get his valuable property .
5. The learned Rent Tribunal allowed the leave to contest vide order dated 28.10.2017 and framed the following three (03) issues:-
(1) Whether there exists relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties? OP A
(2) If the issue No,1 is proved then whether the Respondent has committed default in payment of rent and since when? OP A
(3) Relief
6. Subsequently , on 24.04.2018 the Petitioner filed an application for rejection of the ejectment petition on the ground that the same is not maintainable in view of the provisions of the Act, on the grounds:-
(A) that a tenancy cannot be created through an oral agreement since its promulgation and that the instant ejectment petition has been filed on the basis of an alleged oral agreement dated 01-5-2015 is incompetent, therefore, not maintainable; and
(B) that for exercising exclusive jurisdiction, the case must be covered by the provisions of the Act, whereas, the ejectment petition does not fall within the purview of the said Act, therefore, has been wrongly entertained by the learned Rent Tribunal.
In response to the same, learned counsel for Respondent No, 2 opted not to file reply to the said application and also got recorded his statement to this effect on 24-4-2018 and it was also stated that the application is not maintainable and the same be decided after hearing arguments on the same.
7. The learned Rent Tribunal after hearing the arguments of learned counsel for the parties dismissed the said application vide impugned order dated 28-4-2018, hence the instant writ petition.
8. Learned counsel for the Petitioner argued that the impugned order dated 28-4-2018 is liable to be set aside being against the law, facts of the case, the record, as well as the precedents of the Hon'ble Superior Courts. He further contended that the application of the Petitioner was dismissed by the learned Rent Tribunal without having applied a judicial mind; that the questions of jurisdiction and maintainability , can be taken up at any point in time and have to be decided first and the application could not have been dismissed on the ground of its having been filed at a belated stage. He vehemently contended that the ejectment petition filed on the basis of alleged oral agreement as to the tenancy dated 01.05.2015 is clearly barred under the governing law. Explaining his stance further he stated that in view of the various provisions of the governing Act, a tenancy cannot be created through an oral agreement, and therefore, the same was incompetent, hence not maintainable , resultantly ejectment petition is liable to be rejected and the impugned order dated 28.04.2018 is liable to be set aside. Learned counsel further contended that in order to exercise exclusive jurisdiction by the learned Rent Tribunal under the said Act, the case must be shown to be covered under the provisions of the said Act and not otherwise. He added that in view of the above facts and circumstances of the instant case, the same being not covered under the provisions of the Act, therefore, the ejectment petition was wrongly entertained and subsequent proceedings thereupon are not sustainable under the law. Learned counsel for the Petitioner also argued that the provisions of Section 8 and subsection (2) of Section 9 of the said Act have been misconstrued, whereas these provisions are time specific with respect to existing tenancies on promulgation of the said Act and do not apply to the subsequent tenancies.
Elaborating his arguments he read clause (m) of Section 2 of the said Act, which defines the "tenancy agreement".
Then, he read Section 4 of the Act, which declares the said law to have an overriding effect on other laws. He then read subsection (1) of Section 5 of the Act and pointed out that all future tenancies are barred, which are not in writing. He then pointed out that intention of the legislature through Section 8 of the Act is related to the existing tenancies. After reading Section 9 of the Act, he argued that his case does not fall within the purview of either of the Sections i,e, neither Section 8 nor Section 9 of the said Act, as an 'existing tenanc y' is not involved in the case in hand. He next contended that in view of subsection (4) of Section 16 of the said Act, if a party wishes to get benefit under the said law, it has to fall within the four corners of the statutory provisio ns, otherwise the learned Rent Tribunal would have no jurisdiction or authority to entertain a matter , which does not fall within the parameters of clause (m) of Section 2 of the said Act. He then contended that a joint reading of the above noted provisions of the said Act clearly provide that oral tenancy is not an 'existing tenancy'. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the Petitioner placed reliance on the judgment reported as Dr. MUHAMMAD AFZAL HUSSAIN v. ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, LAHORE and 5 others (2015 CLC 1546 ).
9. Learned counsel for Respondent No, 2 started his arguments by stating that it needs to be noted that as per record, Respondent No, 2 is the admitted owner of the property in question. He added that the Petitioner had not taken this ground of 'oral tenancy' through the application for leave to contest. He further contended that son of the owner of the said property , namely Akbar Ali Malik, entered into a fake tenancy agreement dated 20-10-2015. He added that unfortunately , -there is a dispute between the father and his sons and civil litigation is pending between them before the learned Trial Court. He further stated that Akbar Ali Malik is a close friend of the Petitioner and in collusion with one another they have prepared a fake rent agreement. As far as, various provisions of the said Act, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the Petitioner , are concerned, he stated that an 'oral tenancy' has not been declared barred under subsection (5) of Section 5 of the said Act. He argued that as far as the provisions of Section 9 are concerned, the Petitioner has admitted before this Court that Respondent No,2 has complied with the same and has deposited the requisite fine. In support of this contention, learned counsel relied upon clause (a) of subsection (2) of Section 35 of the said Act to state that an 'oral tenancy' is covered under the provisions of the said Act. In order to strengthen his arguments, learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgments reported as Rana Abdul Hameed Talib v. Additional District Judge Lahore and others (PLD 2013 SC 775) and Mirza Book Agency and others v . Additional District Judge Lahore and others ( 2013 SCMR 1520 ).
10. In rebuttal learned counsel for the Petitioner reiterated his stance that the question of jurisdiction of a Court/T ribunal and the issue of maintainability of ejectment petition can be pointed out and challenged at any point of time. He added that provisions of Sections 35 and 36 are not applicable for the reason that there is no existing tenancy so to speak; hence Respondent No, 1 has no jurisdiction to continue with the hearing of the ejectment petition.
11. Arguments heard. Record perused.
12. In order to appreciate the arguments of learned counsel for the parties, it is imperative to first note the operative part of the impugned order dated 28.04.2018, which is as follows:- "4. Perusal of the record transpires that the applicant/respondent filed application for rejection of ejectment petition on the grounds that under the provisions of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 a tenancy cannot be created through an oral agreement since its promulgation and instant ejectment petition on the basis of an alleged oral agreement as to tenancy dated 01.05.20 15 is incompetent. Record shows that the grounds raised through the instant application have not been taken in petition for leave to contest. Record also shows that by considering the version of the applicant/respondent, petition for leave to contest has been allowed vide order dated 08.11.2017 and evidence of ejectment petitioner has been concluded. Record shows that the evidence of the applicant / respondent is yet to be recorded and obviously the applicant / respondent shall have a right to prove his stance by producing his evidence. Hence instant application is not maintainable at this belate d stage and the same is hereby dismissed."
The relevant provisions of the said Act, are reproduced below for ready reference:- Section 2. Definitions. In this Act:
(f) "premises" means a building or rented land not being an agricultural land or land subservient to agriculture;
(1) "tenant" means a person who undertakes or is bound to pay rent as consideration for the occupation of a premises by him or by any other person on his behalf and includes;
(i) a person who continues to be in occupation of the premises after the termination of his tenancy for the purpose of a proceeding under this Act;
(ii) legal heirs of a tenant in the event of death of the tenant who continue to be in occupation of the premises; and
(iii) a sub-tenant who is in possession of the premises or part thereof with the written consent of the landlord; and
(m) "tenancy agreement" means an agreement in writing by which a landlord lets out a premises to a tenant.
Section 4. Act to override other laws. The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force.
Section 5. Agreement between landlord and tenant. (1) A landlord shall not let out a premises to a tenant except by a tenancy agreement.
(2) A landlord shall present the tenancy agreement before the Rent Registrar .
(3) The Rent Registrar shall enter the particulars of the tenancy in a register , affix his official seal on the tenancy agreement, retain a copy thereof and return the original tenancy agreement to the landlord.
(4) The entry of particulars of the tenancy shall not absolve the landlord or the tenant of their liability to register the tenancy agreement under the law relating to registration of documents.
(5) A tenancy agreement entered in the office of a Rent Registrar or a certified copy thereof shall be a proof of the relationship of landlord and tenant.
(6) Any agreement which may be executed between the landlord and the tenant in respect of the premises shall be presented before the Rent Registrar in the same manner as provided in subsection (2).
Section 8. Existing tenancy . An existing landlord and tenant shall, as soon as possible but not later than two years from the date of coming into force of this Act, bring the tenancy in conformity with the provisions of this Act.
Section 9. Effect of non-compliance. If a tenancy does not conform to the provisions of this Act, the Rent Tribunal shall not entertain an application under this Act:
(a) on behalf of the tenant, unless he deposits a fine equivalent to five percent of the annual value of the rent of the premises in the Government treasury; and
(b) on behalf of the landlord, unless he deposits a fine equivalent to ten percent of the annual value of the rent of the premises in the Government treasury .
Section 16. Establishment of Rent T ribunal. --
(1) The Government shall establish a Rent Tribunal in a district or an area as it may deem necessary .
(2) A Rent Tribunal shall consist of one or more Special Judges (Rent) to be appointed by the Government in consultation with the Lahore High Court.
(3) Subject to this Act, the Lahore High Court may empower a civil judge or a judicial magistrate to act as Rent Tribunal for a district or an area.
(4) The Rent Tribunal shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over a case under this Act.
(5) If there are more than one Special Judges (Rent) in a district or an area, a Special Judge (Rent) designated by the Lahore High Court shall act as an Administrative Special Judge (Rent) in the district or the area.
Section 35 . Repeal and savings .
(1) The Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (VI of 1959), is hereby repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding the repeal of the Ordinance VI of 1959-
(a) a proceeding pending before a Rent Controller shall stand transferred to the Rent Tribunal of the district or the area and the same shall be decided by the Rent Tribunal in accordance with the provisions of the repealed Ordinance;
(b) an appeal may be filed against an order passed under the repealed Ordinance in accordance with the provisions of the repealed Ordinance;'
(c) an appeal pending under the repealed Ordinance may be decided in accordance with the provisions of the repealed Ordinance; and
(d) a Rent Controller appointed under the repealed Ordinance shall exercise and perform the functions of a Rent Tribunal and a Rent Registrar till the appointment of a Special Judge (Rent) and a Rent Registrar for the district or the area under this Act.
Section 36 . Repeal and validation.
(1) The Punjab Rented Premises Ordinance 2007 (XXI of 2007) is hereby repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, anything done, proceedings or action taken, order or rule made, liability incurred or right acquired under the Ordinance XXI of 2007 or purported to have been done, taken, made, incurred or acquired under that Ordinance , from the date of promulgation of the Ordinance till the coming into force of this Act, shall be deemed to have been done, taken, made, incurred or acquired under this Act.
13. The matter of oral tenancies came before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in case reported as Rana Abdul Hameed Talib v. Additional District Judge Lahore and others (PLD 2013 SC 775). Here the issue was regarding the interpretation and effect of non-compliance of the provisions of clause (b) of Section 9, independently , and also when read in the context of Section 8 of the said Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:- "From the object clause of these two new legislations and from the parts/sections thereof (note: which have been mentioned above or shall be referred in the succeeding part of the judgment), it is clear that all the existing tenancies, may be oral or the one constituted vide registered or unregistered instruments, or for that matter , even statutory tenancies, in respect of which the disputes between the landlord and tenant had not yet even arisen, were also brought into the net and purview of the Act, 2009 and made amenable to the jurisdiction of the Rent Tribunal with immediate effect (a specific forum created under the Act, 2009 for that purpose). In other words the existing tenancies were not set apart or separated or saved to be dealt with under the repealed law, except the pending matters. Rather in relation to the disputes in respect of the existing tenancies arisin g in future, were to be adjudged under the provisions of the Act, 2009, from the date of its enforcement. Resultantly in order to keep the conformity and parity with respect to the class/category of cases which might come before the Rent Tribunal in future, (obviously under Act 2009 now), and for the purpose of catering for and for securing the rights and liabilities of the landlord (s) and the tenant(s) qua previous (existing) tenancy (ies), section 8 of the Act, 2009 mandates as:-
8. Existing tenancy .- An existing landlord and tenant shall, as soon as possible but not later than two years from the date of coming into force of this Act, bring the tenancy in conformity with the provisions of this Act.
9. Thus, from the above stated legal position and the factual backdrop, it is my candid opinion that the nature, the interpretation and the effect of section 9 in relation to the proposition in hand, (note : stated at the very outset of this judgment has to be reckoned and made, keeping in view the aforementioned object(s) of the law, not only with respect to those tenancies coming in being in future, but also those existing (prior to the new law). And this has to be done on account of the collective reading of section 9, as also the other provisions of the Act mentioned earlier , including 5, 6, 7 ibid, and thus it should be determined and adjudged, as to whether the said Section 9 is a mandatory or a directory provision of law and the ef fect thereof....
10. Reverting to the proposition in hand, it seems expedient at this stage to reproduce section 9 of the Act 2009, which reads as under:- "9. Effect of non-compliance .- If a tenancy does not conform to the provisions of this Act, the Rent Tribunal shall not entertain an application under this Act---
(a) on behalf of the tenant, unless he deposits a fine equivalent to five percent of the annual value of the rent of the premises in the Government treasury; and
(b) on behalf of the landlord, unless he deposits a fine equivalent to ten percent of the annual value of the rent of the premises in the Government treasury ."
Upon the unmistakable reading of the Section and especially when conjointly read with all other relevant provisions (referred to supra) it seems that all these are integrated provisions, having nexus to the very purpose of the Act as described above and the palpable object of the law is to compel the parties to enter into a tenancy agreement within the purview and scope of the provisions of sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act, 2009 (read together). Therefore a penalty has been provided by the law for the breach of the obligations, envisaged thereby , in that, where the tenancy agreement is not so entered and registered and a landlord or the tenant approached the Tribunal for the enforcement of his right(s) under the Act, 2009 he has to pay a fine."
It was further held by the Hon'ble Supreme that:- "In my view sections 9 and 8, when both are read together along with the provisions of Act, 2009 and the object and the spirit of the said enactment, leads to no other reasonable construction of the two sections (while in interaction), that the landlord/tenant can bring the existing tenancies in conformity with the Act within two years period and in this regard Section 8 should be construed independent and insulated from Section 9 and applied only in time with the sole object of bringing the tenancy in line with the provisions of the said Act. But where the applicant/petitioner (landlord/tenant) wants to avail the remedy of that law (Act, 2009) and exercise his right to enforce the duties of the opposite side, he shall be obliged to pay the fine as mentioned in Section 9 ibid as in the case of future tenancies; notwithstanding it is an existing tenancy or otherwise. In this behalf no exemption or moratorium etc. on the basis of new years period mentioned in Section 8 shall be available to him. And if the fine is not paid by the petitioner/ applicant the fall out and the consequences of failure of the non-compliance as envisaged by Section 9 for the future tenancy cases, as has been prescribed above, shall be duly attracted to such petition(s)/application(s) as well."
14. The above view was also reiterated in the case reported as Mirza Book Agency and others v. Additional District Judge Lahore and others ( 2013 SCMR 1520 ), in the following terms:- "2. The question about the effect of sectio ns 8 and 9 of the Act, 2009 has come under consideration before a three member bench of this Court in Civil Appea l No, 679-L of 2012 and this Court vide its judgment dated 21-6-2013 has held that the provisions of section 9 of the Act, 2009 are mandatory not only vis--vis the future tenancies, but also with respect to the existing tenancies. And if a landlord or a tenant who agitates before the Rent Tribunal for the exercise of his right and for the enforceme nt of the obligations of the opposite side, in terms of the provisions of the Act, 2009 notwithstanding that a period of two years is available under section 8 of the Act, 2009 to bring the existing tenancies in conformity with the Act, 2009, yet he is obliged to pay the fine/penalty under section 9 of the Act, 2009 at the time of filing the petition/application or as directed by the Rent Tribunal, as has been held in judgment afore-stated. Otherwise it shall be ridiculous and ludicrous to conceive that although he (the appellant) shall be entitled to exercise his right etc. under the Act, 2009, but is not obliged to perform his duty of paying the fine under section 8. However , it has further been held in the said judgment that in those cases where the application(s)/petition(s) (of the landlord or the tenant) have been entertained and the petitions etc. are either pending before the learned Rent Tribuna l or even if finally adjudicated by the Tribunal and are pending in further hierarchy of appeal or in the constitutional jurisdiction of the learned High Court or even before this Court; and the original applicant/petitioner has not paid the fine which he was required to pay, such proceedings, shall be halted (emphasis supplied) and the original applicant/petitioner shall first be directed to pay/deposit the amount of fine as per section 9 of the Act, 2009. The -amount of fine and the time whereof should be exactly specified by the Court, seized of the matter in the requisite order; and in the case of failure thereof, the original application/petition should be dismissed as has been ordained in the judgment."
In view of the law already settled the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan there is. no substance in the grounds raised through the instant petition as it has already been held that the provisions of Section 9 will also apply to future tenancies.
15. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has relied upon Dr. MUHAMMAD AFZAL HUSSAIN v. ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, LAHORE and 5 others. (2015 CLC 1546 ). In this case the title of the landlord was in serious dispute. In view of the fact that civil litigation was pending before Civil Court in the shape of applications under subsection (2) of Section 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and in such view of the matter this Court while relying upon the case of Rehmat Ullah v. Ali Muhammad and another (1983 SCMR 1064 ) held that the ejectment Petitioner must first establish his title relating to he property beyond any doubt and till that nine he would not be competent to ask for eviction of persons occupying the premises. In this background it was held that in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the Rent' Tribunal under the said Act, a person claiming himself to be the owner or landlord of the premises seeking eviction of the Respondent in the ejectment petition must be equipped with a tenancy deed registered with the Rent Registrar and in view of provisions of subsection (5) of section 5 of the Act, it is the exclusive document to establish their relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties to such ejectment petition. Having found that there was no such rent deed, this Court concluded' that the eviction petition before the Rent Tribunal were not competent thus were not entertainable. This case clearly does not support the contention of the learned counsel for the Petitioner as the same is distinguishable from the instant case on the ground that the question of oral tenancy was neither raised nor considered in that case. It is also to be noted that the purpose and intention of the legislature is self-evident from the provisions of subsection (5) of section 5 and the same being that the tenancy agreement entered into in the office of Rent Registrar or a certified copy thereof shall be the proof of relationship of landlord and tenant, meaning thereby that no further proof would be required to establish the said relationship in view of the said document.
16. There is one other aspect of the matter and that being that the intention of the Legislature has to be gathered by reading the whole statute. In case the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted, that would mean that after the expiry of two years section 8 as well as 9 would have become redundant. It is settled law that every attempt should be made to save the statute rather than to declare its provisio ns redundant. Furthermore, the law relating to mandatory and directory provisions of any given statute is well settled and it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan that where legislature has provided penalty/co nsequences for non-compliance of a provision, such provision is mandatory in nature, however , if such consequences are not provided the provision is to be taken as directory . It has further been held that the complete statute is to be read to determine the nature of such provisions in a statute. Reliance in this regard is placed on Ghulam Hassan v. Jamshaid Ali and others (2001 SCMR. 1001 ), Maulana Nur-ul-Haq v. Ibrahim Khalil (2000 SCMR 1305 ) and Niaz Muhammad Khan v. Mian Fazal Raqib ( PLD 1974 SC 134 ).
17. In this regard reference can also be made to the case reported as Waqar Zafar Bakhtawari and 6 others v. Haji Mazhar Hussain Shah and others (PLD 2018 SC 81). The question before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was to the effect that Section 17 of the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001 provides for the grounds on the basis of which an eviction can be sought by the landlord and there was no provision in the said section as to what will happen after the term of the tenancy expires. On the other hand Section 6 related to the tenure of the tenancy but no reference of such a ground was conta ined in Section 17 of the said law.. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:- "It is settled that while interpreting the law, a specific provision of any statute, which is independent in nature, cannot and should not ordinarily be held to be redundant, especially on the touchstone of another independent provision of the same statute; rather all possible efforts should be made to apply and adhere to the rules of purposive and harmonious construction, so that the allegedly conflicted provisions should be reconciled and saved.
If some precedent law is required in this behalf, reference can be made to the judgments reported as Combined Investment (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Wali Bhai (PLD 2016 SC 730), Lucky Cement Ltd. v. Commissioner Income Tax, Zone Companies, Circle-5, Peshawar (2015 SCMR 1494 ), Aftab Shahban Mirani V. Muhammad Ibrahim (PLD 2008 SC 779), Collector of Sales Tax and Central Excise (Enforcement), and another v. Messrs Mega Tech (Pvt.) Ltd. (2005 SCMR 1166), Mirza Shaukat Baig v. Shahid Jamil (PLD 2005 SC 530) and D.G. Khan Cement Company Ltd. v.
Federation of Pakistan and others ( 2004 SCMR 456 )."
The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held as under:- "Thus, we conclude that as after expiration of the tenancy period, a tenant, though can continue to hold over the possession of the rented premises, but this tenancy is rendered invalid, in that, it has come to an end and if there is no express consent of the landlord to extend the tenancy period the tenant shall be guilty of having infringed the conditions of tenancy , rendering him liable to be evicted under section 17(2(ii)(b) of the Ordinance, 2001."
18. Now turning to the impugned order dated 28.04.2018, I tend to agree with the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner to the extent that said application could not have been dismissed for the reasons mentioned therein, i,e,, to the effect that such a ground had not been taken by the said tenant in his petition for leave to contest; that the evidence of the ejectment petitioner had been concluded and the petitioner will have the right to prove his stance by producing his evidence and lastly that the said application was not maintainable at a belated stage. As noted above, the only question raised in the application submitted by the petitioner related to the question of jurisdiction of Rent Tribunal, therefore, the said legal question could have been raised at any stage of the proceedings before the Rent Tribunal. However , as detailed above and for the reasons noted herein, the Rent Tribunal has the jurisdiction to hear the matter . Resultantly , the instant writ petition being devoid of any merit is dismissed.