RAJA MUHAMMAD KHURSHID KHAN, ACTG. C J.-Mushtaq Ahmed Farooq, appellant, an Advocate of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Supreme Court and the High Court, by this appeal, by leave, brings before this Court an order pronounced by the Chief Justice of the High Court, on 13th May, 1976. By this order, purporting to have been passed under section 13 (f) of tile Legal Practitioners Act, 1879, the learned Chief Justice. Felt advised to direct an enquiry against the appellant to be conducted by the District Judge; Muzaffarabad, touching his conduct.
2. The trouble for the appellant started in the following circum--stances : A miscellaneous petition by one Muhammad Yousuf. Respondent herein, was moved before the Chief Justice, on 21st April, 1976, alleging that the appellant purchased a thermos from him. After three months he came to return it whereupon the respondent, Muhammad Yousuf, refused to accept the same. It was further alleged that the appellant taking undue advantage of being an Advocate brought a false complaint against him under section 420), P: C. For the above stated facts it was requested that an enquiry be made and action takers against the appellant.
3. On 13th May, 1976, the appellant and respondent appeared before the Chief Justice and said that they had compromised the dispute in consequence of which the complaint under section 420, P. C.
Had been brought to an end and in so far as the thermos was concerned the appellant had refunded part of the price while the petitioner (respondent herein) himself had borne a part of it.
4. Despite the compromise the learned Chief Justice thought it fit to take action against the appellant under the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879. The application of Muhammad Yousuf, therefore, was sent to the District Judge, Muzaffarabad, with the direction to make a factual enquiry about the petition.
5. Ordinarily a lawyer is to be proceeded for his conduct which is incidental to the functions of a lawyer. That is not the case here. No. l act of misconduct has been levelled against the Advocate incidental to, his functions as lawyer. However, certain types of gross misbehavior by an Advocate although unconnected with his professional work orb life, may serve to find an order of removal or suspension. Lord West bury in the Privy Council case "In re : Wallace" (LRIPC App. Case. 283, at 295) said :- "It must not, however, be supposed that a Court of Justice has not the power to remove the officers of the Court if unfit to be entrusted with a professional status and character. If an Advocate, for example, were found guilty of crime, there is no doubt that the Court would suspend him. If an Attorney be found guilty of moral delinquency in his private character, there is no doubt. That he may be struck of the Roll."
Mention may also be made to the principle enunciated in relation to solicitors in the case "In re: a Solicitor ex parte the Law Society" (1912) I K B 302 that "Professional misconduct" includes conduct which would reasonably be regarded as disgraceful or dishonorable by Solicitors of good repute and competency."
6. In the present case the alleged conduct of the appellant is not incidental to his functions as lawyer ; naturally no action can legally be taken against him touching his conduct in the discharge of his professional duties. However, that does not debar the competent authority to take action against him if he is found guilty of gross misbehaviour and conduct unbecoming of an Advocate.
7. We would like to state here that charges of misconduct must clearly be proved and should not be inferred from mere ground for suspicion. An enquiry in a serious case, to wit, misconduct on the part of an Advocate should proceed on formulated charges not only in fairness to the person charged with misconduct but in order that the evidence may relevantly bear on the particular issues and further the evidence should be carefully taken and judged according to the ordinary standard of proof.
8. It would thus appear that the conduct must be involving moral turpitude for that is the least vice which can justify the description of fraudulent or grossly improper conduct.
9. In view of the above it is to be seen as to, whether the standard of evidence is available in the present case to hold the appellant guilty of misconduct and if the enquiry is allowed to proceed ; would it bear any fruit.
10. After giving our considered thought we are not convinced that anything has been brought on record to suggest the improper conduct of the appellant much less that it is disgraceful or dishonourable.
11. We 'have perused the statement of Muhammad Yousuf, recorded by the learned Chief Justice, which he wanted to be relied upon in support of his application moved before the Chief Justice of the High Court. His evidence run: counter to his statement, which we find in the judgment of the Chief Justice. In his statement, as per judgment of the Chief Justice, he stated before the learned Chief Justice that appellant had refunded part of the price while the remaining part was borne by him. However, in his statement, as a witness, before the District Judge he disowned the above- mentioned statement made before the learned Chief Justice and stated that the whole price of the thermos amounting to Rs: 30 was returned to the appellant. He even went to the extent that in fact he had said nothing before the Chief Justice. It would be better to quote him. He says :-
12. In our view the faulty and discrepant statements of the respondent before the Chief Justice and District Judge do not inspire confidence to make out any case of gross or improper misconduct against the appellant, and even if a specific charge had been formulated that would have no difference because the respondent was very much alive about the nature of the proof which he had to produce in support of complaint.
13. Raja Muhammad Akram Khan, Advocate-General; contended that an action under section 13 (f) of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879, which authorises a Court to suspend or dismiss any pleader or Advocate, can be taken for any other reasonable cause. We agree with the learned Advocate- General but the reasonable' cause must be construed as a gross misconduct i.e., the conduct should be dishonourable or disgraceful as regards to the office of an Advocate. Here in this case no such infirmity in the conduct of the appellant stands proved. For the above-stated reasons we are of the view that the respondent has failed to make out any case of misconduct against the appellant. Therefore, in exercise of the powers vested under Order XL1I1, rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules to meet the ends of justice and prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. We direct that the enquiry against the appellant shall stand dropped. This is how we dispose of this appeal.