' Gul. MUHAMMAD KHAN, J.-This order shall also dispose of other connected matters, namely, Writ Petitions 754, 839, 1027, 2516, 842 of 1980 and 4887 of 1981, which involve the same questions of law.
2. The petitioners in all these cases were Provincial Governments employees before 1959. They were subsequently sent on deputation to work in WAPDA, in pursuance to a notification which described their terms and conditions of service. They continued discharging their duties till orders of their removal/retirement were passed on various dates by WAPDA.
3. Some of these petitioners challenged these orders in different forums. Ultimately the Central Legislature introduced Explanation II to section 17 (1-A) of the WAPDA Act, vide Ordinance No, LXXII of 1979 to province that all the officers who are the employees of the Provincial Government working in WAPDA shall stand reverted to their parent Government. The President also enforced P.
0. 24 of 1979 by which such employees were allocated to various Provinces. Tne petitioners have challenged the vires of subsection (1-C) of section 17 of the WAPDA Act, as well as its result.
The learned counsel for the petitioner took us through all the various Constitutions to show that WAPDA was a Provincial subject up-till 1962 Constitution. It was made a Central subject vide P. O. I of 1970 and the President was authorised to decide about the terms and conditions. The interim Constitution of 1972 as well as the Constitution of 1973, however, made it a Central subject, as Item 3, Part II of the 7th Schedule, with the result that the Central Legislature was empowered to legislate about it. In the view of the matter, the amendments brought in the WAPDA Act by Ordinance XVI of 1975 introducing subsection (1-A), its explanations and subsection (I-B) and (1-C) cannot be said to be ultra vires of the Constitution.
4. The learned counsel then submitted that as subsections (1-B) and (1-C) of section 17 are inconsistent, therefore, the one which benefits the subject shall stay while the other shall be declared as inoperative. Even this contention has no merit. The subsection (1-C) is of a later date and, therefore, it has to prevail as against the conflicting provisions of subsection (1-B). It may further be noted that subsection (1-C) only excludes certain specified orders from scrutiny of Courts/Tribunals and consequently this exception cannot be sac I to be void as such. It may be noted that petitioners are Provincial Government employees. According to Article 240 of the Constitution, it is the Governor who can legislate about them or terminate their services. They already stood allocated to their Provinces by P. O. 24 of 1979. Consequently, their services have to be dealt with by the Provincial Government. Further WAPDA can only ask them to go back to their employer but it can neither retire them nor terminate their services, as they are neither its employees nor has such power been delegated to it.
5. The Supreme Court considered the same provisions in the case of President of Pakistan v.
Mahmood Ahmad Cheema (1). That case is in addition to another unreported judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Jahan Zeb Khan v. WAPDA (2) (C. A. No, 55 of 1979) to the same effect.
It was followed by this Court in Raja Muhammad Sadiq (W. P. No, 3555/S/80) to hold that WAPDA can neither terminate the services nor retire them absolutely, as they are not its employees. It can only ask them to go back to their parent Departments in case their services are no longer required by it.
' In view of the above, the petitioners who have already been relieved by WAPDA shall be deemed to be no longer working in WAPDA from {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) NLR 1979 Service (SC) 231 (2) 1981 SCMR 149 {{FOOT NOTE}} that date and should have, therefore, contacted the Provincial Government, their original employer.
The other petitioners, who are continuing to serve WAPDA in pursuance to certain interim orders passed by this Court, shall report immediately to their Provincial Government who is their employer.
' Consequently, these petitions shall stand disposed of in the manner as stated above. There will be no order as to costs.