1. HAMOODUR RAHMAN, C. J.-The petitioners in this case were convicted by the Assistant Sessions Judge, Rangpur, under section 447 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three months each. The petitioners Nos. 3 and 4 were further convicted under section 323 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentence to rigorous imprisonment for one year each and the petitioner No. 2 was further convicted under section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentenced to rigorous imprison--ment for two years. All their sentences were, however, to run concurrently.
2. On appeal, the learned Sessions Judge of Rangpur upheld the convictions under sections 447 and 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code but reduced the sentence under section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code from two years to one year only. The conviction and sentences of the petitioners Nos. 3 and 4 under section 323 of the Pakistan Penal Code were, however, set aside. The petitioners went up in revision before the High Court but a learned Single Judge summarily rejected their revisional petition. They now seek special leave to appeal to this Court.
3. The case against them was that they had all variously armed, on the 2nd of August 1967 at about 11 a.m., wrongfully entered upon the land of the complainant and ploughed it up at a time when he was not present there, with the intent of dispossessing him. Later when he came to the land and protested against such wrongful entry, some of the accused persons beat him with lathis and the petitioner No. 2 caused injuries to him with a dao.
4. The defence of the accused, on the other hand, was that the land in dispute was not in the possession of the complainant but was, in fact, in the possession and enjoyment of the petitioners since the time of their predecessors-in-interest, and it was the complainant and his party men who came to dispossess the petitioners. Whatever was done by the petitioners, therefore, was done in the exercise of the right of private defence of property.
5. The medical evidence 'showed that the complainant had one incised wound on his head, one on the left side of his back and two on two of his fingers. The complainant claimed that he received the injuries on the fingers in trying to ward off the second blow with his hand.
6. The trial Court and the first appellate Court disbelieved the defence story, found that the land was in fact in the possession of the complainant, that the petitioners had wrongfully trespassed upon the same and when the complainant protested against such trespass he was beaten up. The appellate Court, however, gave the benefit of doubt to the petitioners Nos. 3 and 4 on the ground that the medical evidence did not disclose any blunt weapon injury on the complainant. All the four injuries found on him were incised wounds which could be caused by a dao.
7. Learned counsel appearing in support of this petition however, contends that the first appellate Court was wrong in convicting the petitioners under section 447 of the Pakistan Penal Code after coming to the conclusion that when they entered the land of the complainant they only committed a civil trespass. What the learned Sessions Judge of Rangpur has said in this behalf is as follows :- "As the complainant was not oil the disputed land at the time when the appellants went there, the real and dominant intent of the appellants for entering into the disputed land was undoubtedly to dispossess the complainant from the disputed land. So it is contended on behalf of the appellants that the. Trespass was a civil trespass and the appellants did not commit any offence under section 447, P. P. C;. So far as the first entry of the appellants in the disputed land, I agree with the learned Advocate for the appellants. But when the complainant and his cousin, Raicharan, came and protested, the appellants did not leave the land and heat the complainant. Section 441 provides that even after lawfully entering into a property if some one unlawfully remains there with intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy the persons in possession commits an offence of criminal trespass. So when the appellants did not care the protest made by the complainant they caused annoyance to the complainant and, as such, the appellants committed an offence under section 447, P. P. C."
8. We are unable to follow the reasoning of the learned Sessions Judge. If, as he has pointed out in the first sentence quoted above, the petitioners entered the land of the complainant with the intent of dispossessing him, then criminal trespass was com--mitted from the very initial stage, because, even under the first portion of section 441 an entry with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession is sufficient to constitute criminal trespass.
9. If the intent be to dispossess a person by force, surely that would be sufficient also to cause him annoyance. It is clear, therefore, that from the very moment the petitioners entered the' land of the complainant with the intent of dispossessing him, they`,, committed criminal trespass. At any rate, from the moment they disregarded the complainant protests and beat him up, their entry became wrongful and their further continuance on the land made them liable as trespassers.
10. It is next contended by the learned counsel that the conviction of the petitioner No. 2 under section 324 was not justified, because, the medical evidence seemed to indicate that blows struck by a dao, even with normal force, would have caused more serious injuries. Whether more serious injuries would have been caused or not is wholly immaterial. The dao is a cutting weapon and if it is established beyond doubt that a person has caused an injury g to another with a cutting weapon, then he is clearly liable under; section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code. In this case, the evidence` believed by the Courts blow fully established that the petitioner No. 2 had caused the dao injuries to the complainant. He was, therefore, not only rightly convicted but was indeed lucky to escape punishment under section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code.
11. There is no substance in either of the grounds urged in support of the petition. This petition is accordingly, dismissed.