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2018 CLC 1337

Syeda MEHWISH through Mother/Attorney and another vs ADDITIONAL

Citation2018 CLC 1337
CourtIslamabad High Court
Judge(s)Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb
ResultRevision allowed

MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB, J.---Through the instant revision petition, the petitioners, Syeda Mehwish and her mother, Mst. Kaneez Zahra, impugn the order dated 28.11.2015, passed by the Court of the learned Additional District Judge, Islamabad, whereby the petitioners' appeal against the judgment and decree dated 02.12.2014, passed by the Court of the learned Civil Judge, Islamabad, was dismissed. Vide the said judgment and decree dated 02.12.2014, the learned civil Court decreed respondent No,2's suit to the extent of gold ornaments (i,e, 12 bangles (150.4 grams), necklace set (114.3 grams) gold ring (6.8 grams), gold chain (35.8 grams), and jhoomar (24.9 grams) or their value at the prevailing gold rate.

2. The record shows that petitioner No,1 and respondent No,2 got married on 18.07.2007. In the Nikkahnama dated 18.08.2007, Rs,1,00,000/- was fixed as deferred dower. After the marriage, respondent No,2 proceeded to Saudi Arabia. When respondent No,2's parents joined him in Saudi Arabia, petitioner No,1 started living with her parents. On 17.11.2008, petitioner No,1 instituted a suit for dissolution of marriage and recovery of maintenance, dower and dowry articles against respondent No,2 before the learned Judge Family Court, Islamabad. Respondent No,2 contested the said suit by way of filing a written statement. In paragraph-6 of the written statement, respondent No,2 pleaded that he was entitled to recover the gold ornaments which were given to petitioner No,1 as bridal gifts. However, respondent No,2 had not prayed for the recovery of these gold ornaments, but had prayed for the restitution of the conjugal rights. The issues framed by the learned Family Court also included an issue on whether respondent No,2 was entitled to the recovery of the gold ornaments listed in paragraph-6 of the written statement.

3. Vide judgment and decree dated 11.01.2010, the learned Family Court decreed petitioner No,l's suit to the extent of dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula in lieu of the dower amount. The rest of petitioner No, 1 's claim in her suit was dismissed as withdrawn. As regards respondent No,2's claim for the recovery of the bridal gifts, the learned Family Court in its judgment dated 11.01.2010 observed that respondent No,2 was entitled to institute a civil suit before a civil Court, and that the learned Judge, Family Court, did not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the said claim.

Consequently, respondent No,2's claim for the recovery of the bridal gifts was dismissed. The said judgment and decree dated 11.01.2010 was not assailed by any party.

4. On 29.03.2010, respondent No,2 instituted a civil suit against the petitioners for the recovery of gold ornaments, zar-e-khula and valuable items or their market value before learned civil Court. In paragraph-3 of the said suit, respondent No,2 listed the items the recovery whereof was sought against the petitioners. The gold ornaments listed in the said paragraph are the same as the ones listed in paragraph-6 of the written statement filed by respondent No,2 in the petitioners' above mentioned suit for dissolution of marriage, etc. However, unlike paragraph-6 of the said written statement, respondent No,2, in paragraph-3 of his civil suit did not describe these gold ornaments as "bridal gifts".

5. The petitioners contested the said civil suit by filing a written statement. In their written statement, the petitioners did not raise an objection to the jurisdiction of the learned civil Court to adjudicate upon the matter. From the divergent pleadings of the contesting parties, the learned civil Court framed the following issues:- i. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover gold ornaments, Zare-Khula and valuable items as mentioned in Para No,3 of the plaint or its alternate price? OPP ii. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action and locus standi to file this suit? OPD iii. Whether the suit is bad due to mis-joinder of necessary party? OPD iv. Whether the claim of the plaintiff is false and vexatious and such the suit is liable to be dismissed? OPD v. Relief.

6. After the recording of evidence, the learned civil Court, vide judgment and decree dated 02.12.2014, decreed respondent No,2's suit to the extent of gold ornaments (i,e, 12 bangles (150.4, grams), necklace set (114.3 grams), gold ring (6.8 grams), gold chain (35.8 grams), and jhoomer (24.9 grams)) or their value at the prevailing gold rate. The said judgment and decree was assailed by the petitioners in an appeal before the Court of the learned Additional District Judge, Islamabad.

The petitioners, in their appeal, took a ground that under Section 5 of the .West Pakistan Family Court Act, 1964 ("WP-FC Act"), only a Family Court had the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the claim raised by respondent No,2 in his civil suit. Vide order and decree dated 28.11.2015, the said appeal was dismissed. The petitioners in the instant revision petition, have impugned the said concurrent judgments and decrees.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioners, after narrating the events leading to the filing of the instant revision petition, submitted that the order dated 11.01.2010, passed by the learned Family Court was unlawful to the extent of the observation that respondent No,2 was entitled to institute a civil suit before a civil Court for the recovery of the bridal gifts, and that the learned Family Court did not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the said claim; that the order dated 11.01.2010, passed by the learned Family Court was unlawful to the extent of holding that respondent No,2's claim for the recovery of the bridal gifts lay before a civil Court; that if respondent No,2 wanted to institute proceedings for the recovery of the gifts given to petitioner No,1, he should have filed a fresh suit before a Family Court, and should have assailed the order dated 11.01.2010, whereby the learned Family Court had disposed of the suit filed by petitioner No,1; that uncle section 5 read with Part-1 of the Schedule to the WP-FC Act, only a Family Court had the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon a husband's claim for the recovery of the gifts given to the wife at the time of the marriage; that a Family Court has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain, hear and adjudicate upon matters including "personal property and belongings of a wife"; that the gifts given by respondent No,2 to petitioner No,1 at the time of their marriage or thereafter, were the latter's personal property, and respondent No,2 could not file a civil suit for their recovery; that all gifts (and not just bridal gifts) given by a husband to a wife at the time of marriage or during the subsistence of the marriage become the personal property of the wife and vest absolutely in the wife; that petitioner No,1 had withdrawn her claim for maintenance in the proceedings before the learned Family Court; that the petitioner's statement before the learned Family Court recorded on 11.01.2010 shows that she had given up her dower; that the petitioner had never relinquished her ownership rights over the gifts received from respondent No,2 at the time or during the subsistence of the marriage; and that the concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below suffer from jurisdictional errors.

Learned counsel for the petitioners prayed for the concurrent judgments passed by the learned Courts below to be set aside.

8. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No,2 submitted that the petitioners should have challenged the order dated 11.01.2010, passed by the learned civil Court; that in the said order, it was observed that respondent No,2 could file a suit before a learned civil Court for the recovery of the gifts given to petitioner No,1 at the time of the marriage; that the gifts which were sought to be recovered by respondent No,2 were in possession of petitioner No,1; that since petitioner No,1 had filed a suit for dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula, she was under an obligation to return not just the dower but also all the benefits received by her, including the gifts given to her by respondent No,2 or his family at the time of the marriage; and that petitioner No,1 had given up her claim to such gifts when she withdrew her suit from the Family Court after the marriage was dissolved on the basis of khula.

9. Furthermore, it was contended that the scope of the revisional jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C. is restricted; that no-misreading or non-reading of evidence has been committed by the learned Courts below in concurrently decreeing the suit instituted by respondent No,2; and that since petitioner No,1 had sought the dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula, she was bound to return all the benefits received by her from respondent No,2 during the subsistence of the marriage. In making these submissions, learned counsel for respondent No,2 placed reliance on the cases of Mst. Bal is Fatima v. Najm ul lkwam Qureshi (PLD 1959 (W. P.) Lahore 566), Muhammad Yasin v. Mst. Rafia Bibi (PLD 1983 Lah. 377), Said Rasool Khan v. The Additional District Judge, Lakki Marwat (1991 MLD 1732). Learned counsel further submitted that the question regarding the determination of benefits given by a husband to a wife during the marriage was a question related to a civil liability, and therefore, a civil Court could be moved for the determination and recovery of the same. In this regard, she placed reliance on the cases of Dilshad v. Judge Family Court, Kharian (1991 CLC 1564) and Sarnia Akbar v. Muhammad Zubair (PLD 1990 Lahore 71). Learned counsel for respondent No,2 prayed for the dismissal of the civil revision petition.

10. I have heard the contentions of the learned counsel for the contesting parties and have perused the record with their able assistance. The facts leading to the filing of the instant revision petition have been set out in sufficient detail in paragraphs 2 to 6 above, and need not be recapitulated.

11. Section 5 of the WP-FCA, 1964, provides that Family Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain, hear and adjudicate upon matters specified in Part-I of the Schedule to the said Act.

"Personal property and belongings of a wife" is one of the nine subjects/items in the Schedule to the said Act over which the Family Court has been given exclusive jurisdiction. All gifts (not limited to bridal gifts) given to a wife during the subsistence of the marriage become her personal property and belongings. Therefore, a suit with respect to personal property and belongings of a wife is to be filed before a Family Court. Reference in this regard may be made to the following case law:-

(i) In the cases of Major Muhammad Khalid Karim v. Mst. Saadia Yaqoob (PLD 2012 SC 66), and Ejaz Naseem v. Fareeha Ahmad (2009 SCMR 484), it has been held inter alia that under section 5, of the WP-FC Act, the Family Court has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain hear and adjudicate all matters which fall within the First Schedule to the said Act.

(ii) In the case of Shamim Akhtar v. District Judge (2016 MLD 242), it has been held as follows:- "8. Bridal gifts fall within the ambit of personal property and belongings of a wife i,e, Item. No,9 of the Schedule in terms of Section 5 of the Family Courts Act, 1964 which confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Family Court to hear the claim of such matters. The term "personal property and belongings of a wife" has already been explicated by this Court in the case titled Muhammad Akram v. Hajra Bibi (PLD 2007 Lah. 515) and maintained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case titled Syed Mukhtar Hussain Shah v. Mst. Saba Jmtiaz and others (PLD 2011 SC 260)."

(iii) In the case of Taimoor Aslam Satti v. Mst Aalia Bibi (2016 YLR 765), it has been held that a suit for recovery of dower as well as personal property and belongings of a wife came within the domain of a Family Court under Part-I of the Schedule of the WP-FC Act. Furthermore, it was held that property gifted to a wife came within the definition of "personal property and belongings of a wife".

(iv) In the case of Mst. Nomail Zia v. Adnan Riaz (2014 CLC 87), it has been held by this Court that a claim pertaining to recovery of bridal gifts or personal property of a wife fell within the jurisdiction of a Family Court, and that a suit for the recovery of bridal gifts filed by a husband was competent before a Family Court.

12. In the case at hand, respondent No,2, in his civil suit, had clearly pleaded that at the time of the marriage/Rukhsati, he had given gold ornaments to petitioner No,1/wife. It is for the recovery of these very gold ornaments that respondent No,2 had filed a suit before the learned civil Court.

Although, in his written statement to the suit for dissolution of marriage, filed by petitioner No,1 before the Family Court, respondent No,2 had described these gold ornaments as "bridal gifts", it is my view, that it does not make any difference whether or not such gifts are described as "bridal gifts". The admitted position is that the said gold ornaments were given to petitioner No,1 at the time of marriage, and therefore, they can aptly be described as "gifts", and therefore, her personal property and belongings. As mentioned above, a suit with respect to any of the matters enumerated in Part-1 of the Schedule to the WP-FC Act can only be filed before a Family Court.

13.I have gone through the civil suit instituted by respondent No,2 against the petitioners. It is not respondent No,2's case that the gold ornaments sought to be recovered by him were given to petitioner No,1 in lieu of dower. Indeed, petitioner No,1 upon obtaining dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula was bound to return the dower, if any, received by her from respondent No,2.

Petitioner No,1 was under no obligation to return the gifts received by her from respondent No,2 or his family at the time of the marriage or during its subsistence, whether or not such gifts are termed as "bridal gifts".

14.Sections 2(a) and 5 of the Dowry and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act, 1976, are reproduced herein below:- "(a) 'Bridal gift' means any property given as a gift before, at or after the marriage, either directly or indirectly, by the bridegroom or his parents to the bride in connection with the marriage but does not include Mehr;"

"Vesting of dowry etc., in the bride.--- All property given as dowry or bridal gifts and all property given to the bride as a present shall vest absolutely in the bride and her interest in property however derived shall hereafter not be restrictive, conditional or limited."

15. The conjoint reading of the said Sections show that presents and gifts given to the bride at or after marriage by the bridegroom or his parents vest absolutely in bride. On the basis of the said provisions of the Dowry and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act, 19?6, the Superior Courts have consistently held that bridal gifts given by a husband are the absolute property of a wife and cannot be taken away from her. A bride can always recover the articles of bridal gifts, wari and presents given to her by a bridegroom or his family at the time of the marriage. Reference in this regard may be made to the following recent cases:-

(i) In the case of Dawlance United Refrigeration Industries Private Ltd. v. Muhammad Asim Chaudhry (PLD 2016 Lahore 425), it has been held that in view of Section 5 of the Dowry and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act, 1976, it is the bride who is to be considered as an absolute owner of the items of dowry and bridal gifts.

(ii) In the case of Abdul Sattar v. Chairman Railways (2011 YLR 1033), the Hon'ble Peshawar High Court has held that a woman was absolute owner of all the property given to her as dowry or bridal gifts to the exclusion of her husband under section 5 of the Dowry and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act, 1976.

(iii) In the case of Gul Sher v. Maryam Sultana (2011 YLR 1000), it has been held as follows:- "5. ... section 5 of the Dowry and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act, 1976 provides that all property given as dowry or bridal gifts to a bride shall vest absolutely in her and that her interest in the said property, however derived shall not be restrictive, conditional or limited. In the said section, there is no limitation of Rs,5,000 either for dowry or for war i. On the other hand, it has been provided therein that such property shall be owned by her absolutely and to the exclusion of the bridegroom without caring for the source through which it has come and without limitation of any amount. Therefore, it is quite clear that in spite of the restriction imposed in section 3, a bride is the owner of the dowry and wari articles irrespective of their value and she is entitled to retain it forever and to claim its return or the value thereof, if the same is kept back by her husband or any other person. In this regard I rely upon 'Masud Sarwar v. Mst. Farah Deeba' 1988 CLC 1546 (Lahore)."

(iv) In the case of Tariq Mehmood v. Farah Shaheen (2010 YLR 349), it has been held that gold ornaments mentioned in column No,16 fell Within the ambit of gifts which, under the injunctions of Islam, are not to be returned as gifts become the property of the donee.

(v) In the case of Muhammad Nawaz v. Mst. Abida Bibi (2010 MLD 352), it has been held that gifts did not fall within the ambit of Zar-e-khula, and were not something that could be recovered under the injunctions of Islam. Furthermore, it was held that once the bridegroom acknowledged that gold jewelry was given as gifts, he could not claim the recovery of the same especially if they find no mention in the Nikahnama. In paragraph-10 of the said report, it has been held as follows:- "10. Once the petitioner acknowledges that the 4 tolas of gold jewellery he wants back from respondent No,1 were gifts he cannot claim the recovery of the same. Hiba (gift) cannot be consideration of the contract of marriage in this particular case as under the Muhammadan Law Chapter XI section 138 it is categorically stated "Hiba means transfer of property in substance by one person to the other "without" consideration which is a condition to be fulfilled in order to make a valid gift". Under section 148 it is mandatory that the donor relinquish all rights and dominion over the gift. He has to divest himself totally of all ownership over the subject of the gift. No condition can be attached to the gift. Condition in this particular case would also cover return of the same in case of Khula, whether implied or implicit, because a condition would derogate from the completeness of the grant. Under section 167 the issue of revocation of gift is addressed. A gift can be revoked before delivery of the same to the donee. However, the second proviso of this section clearly enunciates that a gift given by a husband to his wife and vice versa can be revoked after delivery only under the decree of a Court of competent jurisdiction. In present matter the gift is not falling in the ambit of hiba bill awaz either because there is no mention of it in the Nikahnama. So the upshot would be that only a gift given in lieu of dower amount would be recoverable through a decree of the Court."

(Emphasis added).

16. Since there is plenty of case law in support of the proposition that the gifts or benefits given to a wife at the time of the marriage or during the subsistence of the marriage become her personal property and belongings, it is my view that a husband would have no right to recover such gifts whether through a suit for recovery filed before a Family Court or a Court of plenary jurisdiction.

However, a husband will be well within his rights to institute a suit for the recovery of gifts from the wife which were given to her in lieu of dower and entered as such in the Nikahnama. Such a suit can be filed before a Family Court to the exclusion of any other Court. In the case, of Babar Shahzada v. Basharatan Bibi (2015 CLC 808), a husband's suit for the recovery of gold ornaments given to the wife at the time of the marriage was decreed by the Family Court, but the appellate Court returned the plaint for presenting the same before a civil Court. Since the husband had filed the suit for the recovery of gold ornaments which were given to the wife as part of dower, and entered as such in the Nikahnama, it was held that the matter lay within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court. This is because "dower" is one of the entries made in Part-I of the Schedule of the WP-FC Act. In the case at hand, it is an admitted position that the gold ornaments, the recovery whereof was sought by respondent No,2 were not given in lieu of dower but as gifts.

17. The learned appellate Court made reference to the judgment of the Hon'ble Lahore High Court in the case of 'Muhammad Hussain v. Mukhtar Ahmad' (2007 YLR 2228), and held that the Family Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate upon a suit instituted by a husband for the recovery of the gold ornaments given to a former wife at the time of marriage. The said case is not with respect to a family dispute. It relates to a dispute under the Specific Relief Act, 1877. Reliance placed by the learned appellate Court on the said case appears to be a mistake. However, in the case of Muhammad Akram v. Hajra Bibi (PLD 2007 Lah. 515), column No,17 of the Nikahnama provided that if the husband/petitioner divorces the wife/respondent No,1, a sum of Rs,1,00,000/- shall be paid to respondent No,1. Respondent No,1 had filed a suit for dissolution of marriage, which suit was decreed. Thereafter, she filed a suit for the recovery of Rs,1,00,000/- before the learned Family Court. The said suit was dismissed with the observation that respondent No,1 could file a suit for recovery of Rs,1,00,000/- before a civil Court. Respondent No, l's appeal against the said decision of the learned Family Court was accepted. The appellate Court took the view that since the subject matter of the suit fell in the purview of entry No,9 of the schedule to the WP-FC Act, the Family Court had the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter. The Hon'ble Lahore High Court allowed the writ petition against the said decision of the learned appellate Court. The Hon'ble High Court took the view that the amount of Rs,1,00,000/- allegedly payable by the petitioner to respondent No,1 due to a divorce between the said parties did not become the personal property -or belongings of respondent No,1 so as to bring the case within the jurisdiction of the Family Court. Furthermore, it was held as follows:- "Such personal property or belonging referred to in Entry No,9, in my considered view, is a residuary provision, which enables the wife to recover through the process of the Family Courts Act 1964, whatever property she has acquired during the subsistence of the marriage, which is not the part of her dowry, through her own independent means or even through the means provided by the husband, such as her clothes, ornaments and items of personal use and nature; that may also include anything which has been gifted to the wife by the husband or any of his or her relatives or the friends; such property and belonging may be the one acquired by the wife out of the money given to her by the husband, her saving from household allowance, or pocket money, from the money provided by her parents and relatives. But definitely the aforesaid entry does not cover any amount which is not yet the property of the wife and she only has a claim to recover from the husband on the basis of any special condition incorporated in the Nikahnama."

(Emphasis added)

18.The facts of the case at hand are distinguishable from the one in the case of Muhammad Akram v. Hajra Bibi (supra). In the case at hand, respondent No,2 was seeking to recover the items which were gifted by him to petitioner No,1 at the time of the marriage. These items were petitioner No, 1 's personal property and belongings. However, in the case of Muhammad Akram v. Hajra Bibi (supra), the wife was asserting her claim on an amount which was allegedly payable to her by the husband due to their divorce. The said amount had not become the wife's property and belongings, and therefore, a suit could not have been filed before the Family Court. Therefore, it is my view that the conclusion of the learned appellate Court is based on a misunderstanding of the ratio in the case of Muhammad Akram v. Hajra Bibi (supra).

19.The learned appellate Court committed a jurisdictional error by holding that it was for the wife and not the husband to invoke the jurisdiction of the Family Court for the personal property and belongings. The ratio of the judgment in the case of Muhammad Akram v. Hajra. Bibi (supra) is not that only a wife could institute a suit before a Family Court on any of the items mentioned in the Schedule to the WP-FC Act, and not the husband. The WP-FC Act does not give the privilege only to a wife to institute a suit on any of the subjects listed in Part-1 of the Schedule to the WP-FC Act. In the case of Mst. Nasim Sharif v. Imtiaz Ali Khan (2006 CLC 1393), it has been held that the jurisdiction of the Family Court would be determined on the basis of the subject matter of the suit and not on the basis of the persons entitled to invoke its jurisdiction. Furthermore, it was held that any suit on the subject matter mentioned in the Schedule to the WP-FC Act could be instituted before the Family Court. The Hon'ble Lahore High Court after making reference to section 5 of the WP-FC Act, held in paragraph-7 of the said report as follows:- "7 An examination of the aforesaid provision of law reveals that the jurisdiction vested in the Family Courts is determined on the basis of the subject-matter and not on the basis of the persons, permitted or entitled to invoke such jurisdiction. There is no provision in the said Act, which identifies the persons entitled to initiate the proceedings before the Family Courts, which have the exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matters mentioned in the schedule..."

'20. True, petitioner No,1 had obtained a decree for dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula.

Consequently, she would be bound to return the Haq Mehr/dower (as specified in the Nikahnama) received by her from respondent No,2. Under the proviso to subsection (4) of section 10 of the WP- FC Act, a Family Court can pass a decree for dissolution of marriage and restore Haq Mehr received by the wife in consideration of marriage at the time of marriage. There is no requirement for the wife to return the gifts to the husband when a decree for dissolution of marriage is passed.

The learned Court below committed a jurisdictional error by holding that petitioner No,1, having obtained a decree for dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula, was bound to return the gifts received from respondent No,2 at the time of the marriage. Reference in this regard may be made to the following case law:-

(i) in the case of Abdul Sattar v. Mst. Kalsoom (PLD 2004 Karachi 272), it has been held that dissolution of marriage by way of Khula is only premised on the payment of dower amount to the husband by the wife, and that the wife is not bound to return gifts received before or after the marriage to the husband.

(ii) In the case of Shakeel Saood Khan v. Rizwana Khanum (PLD 2012 Lahore 43), it has been held as follows:- "The word "dower" employed in section 10(4) of the Family Courts Act, 1964, has to be given its ordinary and plain meaning and cannot be stretched to include bridal gifts or benefits other than dower received by the wife. There is no reason to treat dower and bridal gifts or benefits other than dower as synonymous. Giving an enlarged meaning to dower so as to include the bridal gifts and benefits other than dower can open floodgates with the result a wife seeking khula would be exposed to insurmountable liabilities as would certainly dissuade here from seeking khula."

(iii)In the case of Mussarat labal Niazi v. Judge Family Court (2013 CLC 276), the suit instituted by the petitioner for dissolution of marriage was decreed by the learned Family Court on the condition that she would have to return 15 tolas of gold ornaments and 5 marlas of land, which was said to have been given to her in lieu of dower at the time of marriage. In columns No,13 of the Nikahnama, Rs,50,000/- was mentioned as dower, whereas in column No,16, there, was mention of 5 marlas of land and 15 tolas of gold. It was held by the Hon'ble Lahore High Court that the petitioner's suit for dissolution of marriage could have been decreed only on the condition of the return of the dower mentioned in column No,13, and not any other property that was given to the petitioner as bridal gifts at the time of the marriage. Furthermore, it was held that such bridal gifts were solely the petitioner's property.

(iv) In the case of Tania Naseer v. Muhammad Zubair (2017 YLR 1481), the learned Family Court had decreed the wife/petitioner's suit for dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula. The husband/respondent had asserted that the petitioner Was bound to return the gold ornaments, clothes and shoes, which had been gifted to her. The petitioner, in her suit, had prayed for the dissolution of marriage as well as the return of gold ornaments, which were in the respondent's possession. White decreeing the suit for dissolution of marriage, the learned Family Court did not accept the petitioner's claim for the recovery of gold ornaments. The learned appellate Court directed the petitioner to return the gold ornaments etc. Aggrieved by the said direction of the learned appellate Court, the petitioner invoked the constitutional, jurisdiction of, the High Court by filing a writ petition. The said writ petition was accepted, and it was held that the benefits and gifts given to the petitioner by her 'husband were the petitioner's absolute property, which could not be taken away from her. Law to the said effect has also been laid down in the cases of Masud Sarwar v. Mst. Farah Deeba (1988 CLC 1546), and Aamir Iqbal Khan v. Maria Nargis (2016 MLD 1862).

21. Revisional jurisdiction of High Court being corrective and curative in nature comes into play to undo manifest injustice having been caused to a party due to incorrect appreciation of the law. In the result, the present revision petition succeeds and is allowed, and judgments and decrees dated 28.11.2015 and 02.12.2014 passed by the learned appellate Court and the learned Civil Court, respectively, are set aside, and respondent No,2's civil suit is dismissed. Under the circumstances of the case, I refrain from making any order as to costs.

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