IJAZ UL AHSAN, J.---Through this single order, we intend to decide the titled Civil Petitions as they arise out of the same impugned judgment and involve common questions of law and fact.
2. The petitioners seek leave to appeal against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, dated 26.09.2017. Through the impugned order, Review Petitions bearing Nos.122, 124, 126 and 129 of 2017 filed by the petitioners were dismissed.
3. The petitioners are employees Of the Directorate General of Special Education, Capital Administration and Development Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad. Their terms and conditions of service including matters relating to promotion were governed by the Recruitment Rules published vide SRO No.237(I)/2001 dated 21.03.2002 and SRO No.311(1)/2005 dated 12.04.2005.
The said Rules reserved 100% quota for promotion to the posts of Deputy Director (BS-18), Assistant Director (BS-17) and Administrative Officer (BS-16). However, pursuant to modification in the Recruitment Rules, through SRO No.1025(I)/2008 dated 25.09.2008, said 100% promotion quota was reduced to 75%. The rest of the posts were to be filled by direct recruitment. The petitioners remained quiet about the said change in the Recruitment Rules for many years. Seven years later in 2015, they filed departmental appeals complaining about the change. These did not succeed.
This prompted the petitioners to approach the Service Tribunal through Service Appeals which were dismissed vide judgment dated 16.06.2017. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed review petitions before the Service Tribunal. However, the said petitions met the same fate through the impugned order dated 26.09.2017. Hence, these petitions.
4. The learned ASC for the petitioners submits that the Recruitment Rules were changed in an arbitrary manner which was detrimental to the legitimate expectancy of the petitioners. He further maintains that fundamental rights of the petitioners have been violated and they were condemned unheard. Confronted with the questions of laches and limitation, the learned counsel submitted that limitation is not a hurdle when a citizen complains of violation of fundamental rights.
5. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and examined the record. Admittedly, the Service Rules including the question of promotion were determined by SRO No.237(I)/2001 dated 21.03.2002 and SRO No.311(1)/2005 dated 12.04.2005. However, the same were modified through SRO No.1025(I)/2008 dated 25.09.2008. The latter SRO reduced the quota reserved for promotion to the posts of Deputy Director (BS-18), Assistant Director (BS-17) and Administrative Officer (BS-16) from, 100% to 75%. In case, the petitioners felt aggrieved, they should have challenged the same at the earliest. There is A no denial of the fact that they slept over their rights (if any) for the next at least seven years for which no plausible explanation is forthcoming.
6. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that where the fundamental rights are involved, limitation is not a hurdle has not impressed us. Where a right is required to be asserted, it has to be done vigilantly and no indulgence can be shown to indolent and negligent litigants. As Lord Camden put it, 'a Court of equity always refuses aid to stale demands where a party sleeps over his rights and acquiesces for a great length of time".
7. It is settled law that even in matters relating to and arising out of service matters, a civil servant has to display vigilance and promptitude in approaching the appropriate fora and unexplained delay has always been a material factor which could prove fatal for him. Reference in this regard may usefully be made to Muhammad Asghar Rana v. Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education (2008 SCM R 663) and Rehmat Din v. Nasir Abbas (2007 SCM R 1560).
8. It may also be noted that the petitioners did not challenge the order of the Service Tribunal before this Court and in the first instance they chose to file review petitions before the Service Tribunal which were rightly dismissed on the ground that review is not a substitute for an appeal and review jurisdiction is meant for limited purpose of correcting glaring omissions or patent mistakes that may have crept into the order by judicial fallibility, otherwise the judgment pronounced by the Court is final. A review cannot be granted for merely re-examination of the same argument on merits or any additional ground which is beyond the scope of review jurisdiction as determined by this Court in a large number of cases including Muhammad Ashiq v.
Water and Power Development Authority (2009 SCM R 749). We have not found any such ground being available to the petitioners.
9. We have asked the learned ASC for the petitioners to show us any glaring omission, patent mistake or a grave error in the earlier judgment of the Service Tribunal. However, he has failed to do so. He has also failed to convince us that any ground for review was available to the petitioners that may have been re-looked by the Service Tribunal. We have not found any legal or procedural error or flaw in the impugned order nor any perversity of reasoning has been pointed out to us that may call for interference by this Court.
10. Even otherwise, no question of law of public importance within the meaning of Article 212(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 has been raised in these petitions.
11. For the aforenoted reasons, these Civil Petitions are dismissed and leave to appeal is declined.