DECISION ' These are three separate appeals against different but similar decisions given by the learned VIth Labour Court on 13th October, 1980, dismissing the grievance petitions of the three appellants on the common ground that being Chowkidar (Watchman) they cannot be deemed to be workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders and accordingly are not entitled to file and maintain grievance petitions under clause (3) of Standing Order 12 read with section 25-A, I. R.
0. In coming to these decisions the learned Labour Court has relied upon the decision of this Tribunal in the case of Khudadad Khan v. National Construction Company, that a Chowkidar was not employed to do manual or clerical work. The latest decision of this Tribunal on this issue is in the case of Muhammad Shafi Tanneries v. Majeedullah, decided on 21st April, 1980, wherein it was observed as follows :- "This brings me to the consideration of the second issue, namely, whether the respondent is a workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders Ordinance. It is the case of the respondent that he was a workman employed to do general duties. However, apart from his bare word, he was unable to adduce any evidence to show that he was employed to do general work and not as a Chowkidar, as asserted by the appellant industry. The contention of the respondent that he was employed as a general workman is belied by the vouchers admittedly bearing his thumb- impressions wherein he has been described as a Chowkidar. Apart from this strong piece of evidence controverting the respondent's claim, another Chowkidar in the appellant industry, by name Abdul Hakeem, as well as the Labour Officer of the industry, have categorically stated that the respondent was employed as a Chowkidar. They have further denied that the respondent was employed for or required to perform any other duties. The admission of Muhammad Sarwar that the respondent was employed in the place of Misal Khan is explained by the fact that for a short period Misal Khan, who was working as a Chowkidar, was required to work on machines and it was presumably during this interval that the respondent was employed in the place of Misal Khan. This does not, however, mean that the respondent was employed on machines. The respondent himself has made no such claim. As such, I am satisfied that the respondent was employed in the appellant industry solely as a Chowkidar. The duties of a Chowkidar are well-known and do not involve the performance of physical or clerical work."
2. Mr. Wasiullah Qureshi, the learned representative for the appellants, however, raised a two-fold contention in support of his appeal. His first contention was that the appellants were employed to perform other duties besides those of a Watchman. The learned representative, however, was unable to point out any piece of evidence on record in support of his contention. All that he was able to point out was a bare assertion in the grievance petitions that the appellants were workmen for the purposes of the labour laws. This bare assertion, however, cannot lead to the inference that the appellants were employed to do any other work besides that of a Chowkidar and hence are workmen for the purposes of the Standing Orders. As was pointed out by this Tribunal in the case of Johnson and Johnson v. Zubair Ahmed (1), the burden of proving that a person is a workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders is upon the person who makes such a claim. In the instant case, since there is no evidence on record to show that any of the appellants were employed to do work other than that of Watchman, the contention of Mr. Wasiullah that the appellants are workmen for the purposes of the Standing Orders must fail.
3. It was next contended by Mr. Wasiullah Qureshi that as an industrial dispute, being industrial dispute No, 1 of 1980, was pending adjudication at the time that the services of the appellants were terminated, the termination of their services is hit by the provisions of {{FOOT NOTE}}
(I) 1980 PLC 622 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' Section 47, I. R.
0. Mr. Wasiullah Qureshi, however, conceded that the appellants in their grievance notices to the employer had made no such claim. Furthermore, despite the fact that Mr. Wasiullah Qureshi was given about one month's time to produce evidence in support of his contention that the services of the appellants were terminated during the pendency of an industrial dispute between the respondents and their workmen, he was unable to produce any such evidence. I am, therefore, forced to the conclusion that there is no evidence on record to substantiate the contention that the termination of the services of the appellants took place during the pendency of an industrial dispute.
4. For the reasons given by me above, I see no merit in the three appeals and would, accordingly, dismiss the same.