1. ZAFAR AHMED RAJPUT, J.---Through this application, the decree holder Bank seeks execution of the decree dated 17.07.2014, passed in Suit No,B-92 of 2012.
2. The judgment debtors have filed their objections to the execution application.
3. Learned counsel for the judgment debtors has contended that this execution application is not maintainable as the judgment debtors had already informed the decree holder Bank that the sole source of repayments as mentioned in the Schedule of Payment mutually agreed by the parties shall be through construction of multistoreyed commercial buildings on the mortgaged property but due to certain reasons the scheme of construction could not be implemented. He has further contended that even otherwise the consent decree based on compromise is just a fresh contract between the parties, breach whereof would give rise to the fresh cause of action, therefore, the decree holder Bank should file a fresh suit for the redressal of its grievances as the consent decree or order is nothing but a contract between the parties within command of the Court. He added that the term Decree under sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Civil Procedure Code contemplates five types of decree i,e, (i) Preliminary; (ii) Final; (iii) Partly preliminary and partly final; (iv) Order rejecting plaint; and (v) Order determining question under Section 144 and under Rules 60, 98, 101 and 103 of Order XXI, C.P.C. while alleged, compromise decree does not fall under the definition of any type of decrees, as such, this Court cannot impose and execute any Clause of the Settlement Agreement. In support of his contentions; learned counsel has placed his reliance on the cases of Peer Dil and others v. Dad Muhammad (2009 SCM R 1268) and Shah Rasool and others v. Maulana Ghulam Rahim and others (2015 YLR 89).
4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the decree holder Bank has maintained that the decree holder had filed this suit for the recovery of Rs,167,967,751.14, which was decreed under Order XXXIII, Rule 3, C.P.C. as the defendants and plaintiff amicably settled the matter, whereby the defendants jointly and severally accepted the aforesaid liability along with costs of funds from the date of default i,e, 30.09.2011 and agreed to pay the said amount in 17 installments, as such, with the consent of the parties, the suit was decreed. He has further maintained that there was no understanding between the parties that the judgment debtors shall make payment of the decretal amount from the earning of any multistoried commercial buildings on the mortgaged property, thus it is just an afterthought attempt of the judgment debtors to escape from their liabilities under the consent decree. He has also contended that the compromise decreed passed by this Court is a filial decree for all the practical purposes and the judgment debtors, after defaulting their obligations, are trying to wriggle out of their obligations under the compromise decree by twisting the simple facts of the case and at present, this Court being the executing Court cannot go beyond the decree. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the decree holder has relied on the cases of Abdul Wahid v. Abdul Ghani and others (PLD 1963 (W.P) Karachi 990), Samba Bank Ltd. through Authorized Officers v. Messrs Syed Bhais and others (2013 CLD 2080), Messrs Montgomery Flour and General Mills, Sahiwal through Chief Executive v. MCB Bank Limited and others (2015. CLD 1590) and Messrs Pakistan Industrial Leasing Corporation Limited through A.V.P. and Manager v.
5. Noorani Industries (Pvt.) Limited through Chief Executive and 5 others (2003 CLD 259).
6. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.
7. It appears that the suit of the plaintiff was decreed on 05.06.2014 in terms of compromise, as enunciated in C.M.A. No,7710 of 2014, where under the defendants jointly and severally accepted without any reservation their liabilities to the extent of Rs,167,967,751.14, along with costs of funds from the default i,e, 30.09.2011 and agreed to repay their liabilities in 17 installments up to 31.10.2018 and it is specifically mentioned in Clause 7 of the Settlement Agreement that the decree passed on the terms of settlement, shall be final decree for sale of all the assets charged and property managed in favour of the plaintiff/ decree holder; so also, under Clause 11 of the Settlement Agreement, the plaintiff/decree holder is entitled to file execution application if the defendants fail to fulfill their obligations in accordance with the terms as mentioned in the Settlement Agreement.
8. Admittedly, the judgment debtors after passing of the consent decree have failed to discharge their liabilities as per the settlement which was under no circumstances conditional with raising any multistoreyed commercial buildings on the mortgaged property. Thus, the decree holder Bank is legally justified to recover the decretal amount through execution in terms of Clause 11 of the Settlement Agreement, inter-alia, based on which, the consent decree was passed.
9. It has been held in the case of Abdul Wahid (supra) that "if a decree grants certain rights to both the parties, there can be no doubt that those rights have to be enforced in the execution proceedings and not by a separate suit, as matters relating to the execution of such rights are matters relating to the execution of the decree.
10. In the case of Messrs Pakistan Industrial Leasing Corporation Limited (supra), it has been held that "after passing of the consent decree, which is not even appealable under section 93(3), C.P.C., which has attained finality, nobody can challenge the terms of decree and both the parties are bound to execute the same as it is. Undoubtedly, the Banking Court is under legal obligation to execute the decree, as it is and cannot go beyond the decree.
11. So far the case-law cited by the learned counsel for the judgment debtors, are concerned, I have respectfully gone through the same and of the opinion that the same are distinguishable to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
12. For the foregoing facts and reasons, I allow this Execution Application. The judgment debtors are directed to satisfy the decree within 30 days hereof.
13. Above are the reasons of my short order dated 23.04.2018, whereby this Execution Application was allowed.