' Muhammad Yousuf Khalid, Headmaster, Millat Islamia High Schm, 63 Temple Road and Khawaja Muhammad Saeed, 94 Hameed Nizami Road, Lahore have filed petitions (Writ Petition No, 9065 of 1980 and Writ Petition No, 821 of 1981 respectively) under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 with the prayer that the orders dated 20th of April, 1978 passed by the Secretary to Government of Punjab, Home Department be declared to be illegal, without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
2. Kb. Muhammad Saeed is the owner of property No, S-57-R-63. It was taken on rent by Muhammad Yousaf Khalid, Headmaster, for running a School. By the impugned orders this property was requisitioned for educational institution and the petitioners were required to deliver its possession within three months. They felt aggrieved. Hence these petitions. As a common question of law is involved in both the cases, this judgment shall dispose of both.
3. However, the facts of each case are given separately. W. P. No, 9065/80 Muhammad Yousaf Khalid, Headmaster had taken property No, S-57-R-63 from Kh. Muhammad Saeed on rent. He was running "Millat Islamia High School" therein. The School had two sections, one Primary and the other Secondary.
' In October, 1972, the Primary Section was nationalised by the Government. Subsequently, on the move of the petitioner-Headmaster, Secondary Section of the said School was also recommended and approved by respondents Nos. 2 to 5 for nationalization. But due to promulgation of Martial Law in the country, the scheme was dropped. Thereafter, the impugned order was passed on 30th April, 1978.
' Kh, Muhammad Saeed is the landlord of property No, S-57-R-63. He alleged that initially the premises were taken from him by Muhammad Yousuf Khalid Headmaster on monthly rent of Rs,
325. He was running "Millat Islamia High School". In October, 1972, after nationalization, Secretary Government of Punjab, Home Department became his tenant. The respondent has been making payment of the rent but he did not pay the same from February, 1978. The petitioner then filed n ejectment petition against the respondent which was dismissed by the Rent Controller on 30th September.
1980. According to the petitioner, he came to know of the requisition for the first time when the written reply was filed by the respondent to the ejectment petition in April, 1980.
3. It was contended by both the learned counsel that the property being already in possession of the Government having been nationalised, it could not be requisitioned. The learned counsel further submitted that the requisition was made without notice to the petitioner which was essential. Lastly, it was submitted that the orders were mala fide. In this behalf, reliance was placed on the judgment passed in Writ Petition No, 2872 of 1978 "Sh. Noor Muhammad v. Province of Punjab."
4. Mr. S. M. Zubair, Assistant Advocate General appeared on behalf of the respondents. He submitted that as the property was in possession of the Government, there was no need of notice.
Hence the orders were in accordance with law and with lawful authority. He relied on Azhar Ali Khan v. Government of Punjab (1) and Muhammad Aslam v. Abdul Jabbar (2).
5. Admitted position is that the petitioners came to know of the requisition of the property only during the course of ejectment proceedings. If the requisition was to be made in good faith, then that was not the proper stage, time and manner to inform the petitioners about the requisition order. I am, therefore, of the view that the contention of the learned counsel that the action of respondent No, 1 was mala fide is not devoid of force.
Although the learned Assistant Advocate-General contended that no notice was necessary but I think in situation like this it was incumbent to serve the aggrieved party with the notice. The case cited above by the learned counsel for the petitioners is on all fours and provides complete answer to the submission made by the learned Assistant Advocate-General.
' I agreeing with the ratio of that case, am of the view that the orders of requisition in both the cases cannot be legally sustained.
6. Accordingly, I allow the petitions and declare the impugned orders to be void and as such of no legal effect. There will be no order as to costs.
(1) NLR 1978 Civil 1128 (2) 1982 CLC 1504