1. AWARD MD. NURUL ISLAM KHAN (CHAIRMAN). This is an application under section 34 of the industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance.
2. The case of the first party is that he was a permanent employee under the second party since 1-7- 1951 till his services were finally terminated on 15-8-1967. He was not paid termination benefits as per law. He approached the second party and a lot of time passed, but he received no reply. Time was wasted. Finally on 28-4-1970 he filed the present case in Court for termination benefits.
3. The second party entered into appearance by filing a written statement wherein it was stated that the petition was time-barred; that there was no cause of action; that the case is false, malicious and vexatious and that the first party was not a worker. Hence the petition should be rejected.
4. Points for determination
(1) Whether the application is time-barred?
(2) Whether the application is maintainable under law?
(3) Whether the first party is entitled to any relief under the Ordinance?
5. FINDINGS AND DECISION All .the points are dealt with together for the sakeof convenience.
6. 1t appears from the statement of the first party that this application was filed on 30th April 1970. So it is clear that a long time has passed since the date of termination and filing of the application in this Court. Under the Standing Orders Act, 1965, he could have been allowed maximum time of 75 days to observe all formalities before he could come to this Court. In the present case he has come with an application under section 34 of the Ordinance on the ground that he was entitled to some legal benefits under section 25 of the Standing Orders Act, 1965. In that view of the case he claimed that his right was guaranteed under section 25 of the Standing Orders Act, 1965. But the Standing Orders Act, 1965 has provided some limitations which the Supreme Court has held that the same should be rigorously applied. So by the automatic application of the provision of the limitation of the said Act, the right of the first party, if any, accrued to him as a result of the order of termination was forfeited and no right remained beyond the period of limitation as neither the Standing Orders Act nor the Ordinance provided for any condonation of the limitation period. In that view the petition of the first party under section 34 of the Ordinance is not maintainable and this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this application in the present form.
7. As for the question that he was a worker, we see no necessity of entering into this in view of the fact that the petition is time---barred.
8. For all these reasons we feel obliged to dismiss this application as not maintainable.
9. Members on consultation agreed with my decision above.