MANZOOR HUSSAIN SIAL, J.-This regular second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 21st October, 1981 of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Rahimyar Khan whereby he dismissed the suit of the appellants.
2. The relevant facts of the case are that the appellants instituted a suit for possession through pre-emption of the suit land situated in village Akram Abad, Tehsil and District Rahimyarkhan alienated by Tassadaq Hussain and others on 21st January, 1980 through registered sale deed in favour of the respondent asserting themselves to be collaterals of the vendors and having superior right of pre-emption than the vendee--stranger.
3. Durint the pendency of the suit on 14th July, 1981, the Board of Revenue. Punjab in exercise of its powers under subsection (2) of sec--tion 8 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 issued notification dated 9th July. 1981. Published in the extraordinary issue dated 14th July, 1981 of Punjab Gazette whereby it was declared that no right of pre-emption would exist with respect to the sale of suit land in favour of respondent for exten--sion of existing Cotton Ginning and Pressing Factory.
4. The respondent moved an application under Order VII, rule 'It. C. P. C. Read with section 151, C. P. C.
For rejection of the plaint and dismissal of the suit on the ground that after the publication of the notifi--cation herein before referred no right of pre-emption existed in respect of the suit land. The application was resisted by the plaintiffs. The learned trial Court by the impugned judgment and decree dated 21st October, 1981 dismissed the suit as afore-mentioned.
5. Learned counsel for the appellants relied on Alam Sher Khan v. Allah Din (AIR 1939 Lah. 517) and contended that the notification in question could not operate retrospectively and the suit of the plaintiffs for pre-emption was maintainable. It was submitted that the notification was operative for future transactions and did not hit the transaction in question in respect of the suit land which had already been completed.
6. We have considered the contention raised by learned counsel for the appellants and find that the same can be determined without summon, ins for the record as it pertains to interpretation and enforcement of notification, copy whereof has already been placed along with other copies of the pleadings of the parties, in the suit by learned counsel for the appellants.
7. Undoubtedly the notification in question would be operative from the date of its publication in the official Gazette and not retrospectively but the appellants are required to show that they had superior right of A preemption not only at the time of sale, the institution of the suit but also till the passing of decree by the comp--tent Court. The notification in question extinguishes the right of preemption in respect of the sale of the suit land and therefore, the appellant obviously could not maintain his superior right of pre-emption till the date of decree. The case relied and cited by learned counsel for the appellants is distinguishable inasmuch as that the learned Judges in that case did not address themselves to the question whether the plaintiff lost his right of pre-emption before the date of decree. The notification issued in that case hit alienation of the proper--ties in general affected through public auction under the orders of the Court of Wards as distinguishable from the facts of the instant case wherein the notification in question specifically relates to the sale of the land in dispute. The impugned judgment/order of the learned trial Court holding the suit of the plaintiff having become infructuous from the date of operation of the notification is unexceptionable.
8. This appeal leas no merit and is, therefore, dismissed in limine.