' This is a petition under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The petitioner Muhammad Siddique alleges therein and seeks thereby decision of this Court accordingly that his dismissal ordered by the Manager of the Spencer and Company Ltd. Respondent on 30th April, 1980 is illegal and consequently he is entitled to reinstatement alongwith back benefits. The facts are affirmed by the petitioner in the petition itself that he was served with a charge-sheet and the charges embodied therein having been denied by means of his reply thereto, inquiry was conducted against him, and the offence held proved by the inquiry officer and this was followed by usual second show-cause notice and his reply thereto and then. Then the dismissal order was issued to him. This too is a common ground that the said inquiry was conducted against the 'petitioner and his colleague Muhammad Sarwar jointly. The dismissal has been challenged in the grounds alleged in the petition inter alia that the charge sheet was time barred, that the joint inquiry violated rules of natural justice and actually caused prejudice to the petitioner and that Dost Muhammad Branch Manager the main P. W. Against the Petitioner acted as judge in his own cause when he himself issued the dismissal order. The dismissal is however proper and legal according to the respondent's written statement which raises objections inter alia that the petitioner is not a workman. The petitioner himself and aforesaid Dost Muhammad Manager are the only witnesses examined for or against the petitioner.
2. The facts as under are conclusively proved on record. The petitioner worked as Salesman in the employment of the respondent. The charges against the petitioner will be apparent from the charge sheet (Exh. P-3) dated 28th October, 1979, operative part whereof is reproduced below :- "It has been brought to our knowledge that you have been indulging in large scale irregularities by fraudulently claiming yourself commission on direct orders received in this Branch from various institutions and in some cases booked by Principals' representatives by reproducing such orders on your order book as if such business was booked by you. You have also indulged in booking some fictitious orders in the name of some institutions which are allowed extra discount by our Principals and presumeably the stocks against them have never been supplied to such institutions but disposed of somewhere else. Settlement of such bills has been made by cash payments received after a lapse of several months."
' The charge-sheet gives a list of various transactions under reference. This charge sheet was served in pursuance of Audit made by aforesaid Dost Muhammad R. W. As Auditor. His evidence before this Court is to the effect that the said audit was made on 17th October, 1979, the second part of the same having been of 23rd October, 1979, (whereas the charge sheet is dated 28th October, 1979) and the irregularities under reference did not come to the knowledge of the respondent until the audit. The charge-sheet was issued by the then Branch Manager Azizuddin.
The inquiry was conducted by the then Branch Manager Liaquat Ali, whose report is Exh. R/2. The inquiry officer stated in his report that he examined Muhammad Sharif, Store Keeper, and Fazal Hussain, Haqdad and Jalal-ud-Din Delivery man besides aforesaid Aziz-ud-Din and Dost Muhammad in support of the charge sheet. Some other P. Ws. Were also examined. The aforesaid Aziz-ud-Din was succeeded by Dust Muhammad as Branch Manager on 2nd February, 1980. The inquiry officer then examined the petitioner and Muhammad Sarwar dealt with as accused in the joint inquiry. The report of the inquiry officer was also joint. This was followed by second show- cause notice Exh. P-4 and its reply Exh. P-5. A proforma of dismissal order Exh. R/6 was then received by Dost Muhammad Manager from the Head Office under the forwarding letter dated 22nd April, 1980 Exh. P-7 for being used after the inquiry which was to be held on 26th April 1980 the same having been issued with the approval of the Managing Director. Dismissal order Exh. P-6 was accordingly issued in the aforesaid proforma under the signatures of Dost Muhammad, stating therein that the decision of the Management had been made with the concurrence of the Managing Director.
3. The petition embodies a long list of grounds of alleged illegality of the dismissal order. Out of them three grounds have been specifically pointed to above and the same have been reiterated by the petitioner in his evidence before this Court. Accordingly his first and foremost objection is to the legality of joint inquiry, his evidence in this behalf being as under : "We had raised the objection at the start of the joint inquiry but the objection was ruled out we have this objection in writing but they did not receive it and returned the same to us. The charges against were unfounded."
' His evidence reproduced below may be taken to point to his next objection that the charge sheet was time barred :- "The allegations contained in the charge sheet had taken place 4 or 5 months before the charge- sheet. The third objection of the petitioner as per his evidence before this Court may be taken to be that the dismissal order having been issued by Dost Muhammad who was a P. W. Against him; the entire proceedings were thereby vitiated. Now I proceed to decide the case.
4. The evidence of Dost Muhammad R. W. Clearly proves that the charge-sheet was served within one month of the knowledge of the irregularity. The audit which led to the irregularities was made by the R. W. Himself. His evidence in this behalf is worthy of credit and there is nothing to rebut the same. I rule out the objection that the charge sheet was time barred. The audit was made by Dost Muhammad R. W. He was moreover examined by the inquiry officer as a P. W. The contention is however without basis that he acted as Judge in his own cause. The finding of guilt was recorded by the inquiry officer and not by this R. W. The dismissal order was made by him on the authorization of the head office. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to show what prejudice was caused by reason of joint inquiry, which was moreover not against principles of natural justice. The petitioner was punished for his own doings and not those of the other workers dealt with in the inquiry jointly with him. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is, therefore, without force that joint inquiry magnified the offence.
5. Having considered all the aspects of the case I am left with little doubt in my mind that the petitioner failed to make out a case for interference by this Court. The impugned order is correct.
The respondent's counsel did not press the preliminary objections which are, therefore, ruled out. I decide the petition against the petitioner.